The formation of Stalin's personality cult in brief. How Stalin fought his “cult of personality” The process of exposing Stalin’s cult of personality

The expression “Stalin’s cult of personality” became widespread after appearing in 1956 in N. S. Khrushchev’s report “On the cult of personality and its consequences” and in the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee “On overcoming the cult of personality and its consequences.”
Soviet propaganda created a semi-divine aura around Stalin as an infallible “great leader and teacher.” Cities, factories, collective farms, and military equipment were named after Stalin and his closest associates. His name was mentioned in the same breath as Marx, Engels and Lenin. On January 1, 1936, the first two poems glorifying I.V. Stalin, written by Boris Pasternak, appeared in Izvestia. According to the testimony of Korney Chukovsky and Nadezhda Mandelstam, he “simply raved about Stalin.”

"And on those same days, at a distance
Behind an ancient stone wall
It is not a person who lives, but an action:
An act as tall as the globe.
Fate gave him his lot
Preceding space.
He is what the bravest people dreamed of,
But no one dared to do it before him.
Behind this fabulous affair
The arrangement of things remained intact.
He did not rise up as a celestial body,
Not distorted, not decayed...
In a collection of fairy tales and relics,
The Kremlin floating above Moscow,
Centuries have become so accustomed to it,
Like the battle of a sentry tower.
But he remained a man
And if, against the hare
In the winter they will shoot at the cutting areas,
The forest will answer him, like everyone else.”

Stalin’s name is also mentioned in the anthem of the USSR, composed by S. Mikhalkov in 1944:

Through the storms the sun of freedom shone for us,
And the great Lenin illuminated the path for us,
Stalin raised us to be loyal to the people,
Inspired us to work and to deeds!
The image of Stalin became one of the central ones in Soviet literature of the 1930s-1950s; Works about the leader were also written by foreign communist writers, including Henri Barbusse (author of the posthumously published book “Stalin”), Pablo Neruda, these works were translated and replicated in the USSR.

Works glorifying Stalin appeared in abundance in publications of folklore of almost all peoples of the USSR.

The theme of Stalin was constantly present in Soviet painting and sculpture of this period, including monumental art (lifetime monuments to Stalin, like monuments to Lenin, were erected en masse in most cities of the USSR, and after 1945 Eastern Europe). A special role in creating the propaganda image of Stalin was played by mass Soviet posters dedicated to a wide variety of topics.
A huge number of objects, including settlements, were named after Stalin during his lifetime (the first of which, apparently, was Stalingrad in 1925 - Stalin participated in the defense of Tsaritsyn Civil War), streets, factories, cultural centers. After 1945, cities named after Stalin appeared in all the countries of Eastern Europe, and in the GDR and Hungary, Stalinstadt (now part of Eisenhüttenstadt) and Stalinváros (now Dunaujváros) became “new socialist cities” built almost from scratch in honor of the leader. There was even a project to rename Moscow to the city of Stalinodar.

Phenomena similar in nature, but smaller in scale, were observed in relation to other government leaders of the 1930s-1950s (Kalinin, Molotov, Zhdanov, Beria, etc.). Comparable to the cult of Stalin was only the (mostly posthumous) cult of Lenin, which lasted throughout Soviet period, understated during the Stalinist era, but elevated again and with even greater force after Stalin’s death.

Nikita Khrushchev, debunking the cult of personality in his famous report at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, argued that Stalin encouraged this state of affairs in every possible way. Khrushchev stated that when editing his own biography prepared for publication, Stalin wrote in entire pages where he called himself the leader of nations, a great commander, the highest theoretician of Marxism, a brilliant scientist, etc. In particular, Khrushchev claims that the following passage was written by Stalin himself : “Masterfully fulfilling the tasks of the leader of the party and the people, having the full support of everyone Soviet people“Stalin, however, did not allow even a shadow of conceit, arrogance, or narcissism in his activities.”

It is known, however, that Stalin suppressed some acts of his praise. Thus, according to the recollections of the author of the Orders of Victory and Glory, the first sketches were made with the profile of Stalin. Stalin asked to replace his profile with the Spasskaya Tower. In response to Lion Feuchtwanger's remark "about the tasteless, exaggerated adulation of his personality", Stalin "shrugged his shoulders" and "excused his peasants and workers by saying that they were too busy with other things and could not develop good taste." In 1949, when they wanted to name Moscow State University after him, Stalin categorically refused.

After the “exposure of the cult of personality,” a phrase usually attributed to M. A. Sholokhov (but also to other historical characters) became famous: “Yes, there was a cult... But there was also a personality!”

In the 30s existed in the USSR one-party system of government. The course towards a forced transition to socialism, strict centralization, merging of party and state power structures - all these factors determined the vector of political development of Soviet society for a long time.

A concrete expression of all qualitative changes political regime became a statement Stalin's personality cult. He was at the top of the pyramid of power, all lower levels of which had only executive functions.

Stalin skillfully used not only people's faith in socialism, but also the enormous authority of Marx and Lenin, seeking to increase his authority as their comrade-in-arms.

The formation of a cult of personality in a country where there were no democratic traditions was largely determined by the atmosphere of fear of repression.

The textbook “History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)” played a major role in the ideological justification of Stalin’s personality cult. A Short Course,” published in 1938. In it, Stalin was portrayed as the leader of the party from the moment of its formation. Strengthening the people's faith in I.V. Stalin was also promoted by the real and imaginary successes of socialist construction. Kult I.V. Stalin was planted by his closest circle, who made a quick political career out of this - K.E. Voroshilov, L.M. Kaganovich, V.M. Molotov, G.M. Malenkov, N.S. Khrushchev, L.P. Beria and others. Throughout the country, the cult of I.V. Stalin was introduced into the consciousness of the people by numerous party workers and civil servants.

In the economic field, a system of strict planning, distribution and control in all areas continued to develop economic activity. During the period of the cult of personality, tens of thousands of citizens suffered, including many well-known figures of the party and the Soviet state.

In the mid-30s. started repression against old party members who do not agree with the established methods of leading the country. The reason for mass repression was the murder on December 1, 1934 of S.M. Kirov, first secretary of the Leningrad city and regional party committees, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

The investigation into the circumstances of this terrorist act was directed by I.V. Stalin. According to official version, the murder was committed on behalf of an underground Trotskyist-Zinoviev group in order to disorganize the country's leadership. Several party and government workers were sentenced to capital punishment, although their participation in the assassination attempt on S.M. Kirov was not proven.

IN 1936. on fictitious charges of anti-Soviet activities and espionage (the case of anti-Soviet “ united Trotskyist-Zinoviev center") condemned former leaders party G.E. Zinovieva, L.B. Kameneva and others. Thousands of political emigrants and many Comintern workers became victims of repression. Repressive policies were carried out against entire peoples. Soon M.P. shot himself. Tomsky, who previously headed the country's trade unions.

IN 1937. on the case “ anti-Soviet Trotskyist center“A group of responsible employees of the People’s Commissariat of Heavy and Forestry Industry was brought to trial. Among them were Yu.L. Pyatakov and G.Ya. Sokolnikov. They were accused of trying to undermine the economic power of the USSR, of sabotage, of organizing accidents at enterprises, of deliberately disrupting state plans. Thirteen defendants were sentenced to death and four to prison. (Reader T10 No. 4)

The repressions affected command cadres of the Red Army(M.N. Tukhachevsky, I.E. Yakir, I.P. Uborevich, A.I. Egorov, V.K. Blucher).

In 1938, another political trial was fabricated in the case of “ anti-Soviet right-Trotskyist bloc”(N.I. Bukharin, A.I. Rykov, etc.). The defendants were accused of intending to liquidate the existing social and state system in the USSR and restore capitalism. They allegedly intended to achieve this goal through espionage and sabotage activities, by undermining the country's economy. All these actions took place in violation of the norms of justice and ended with the execution of the convicts.

Tens of thousands of innocent people were arrested based on false denunciations and accusations of “counter-revolutionary” activities. They were sentenced to imprisonment and forced labor in the system State Administration of Camps (GULAG). Prisoner labor was used in logging, construction of new factories and railways. By the end of the 30s. The Gulag system included more than 50 camps, over 420 correctional colonies, and 50 colonies for minors. The number of people imprisoned there increased from 179 thousand in 1930 to 839.4 thousand at the end of 1935 and to 996.4 thousand at the end of 1937 (official data).

The economic crisis that developed in the early 20s was closely connected with the crisis in the party.

At the Tenth Congress of the RCP(b) the resolution “On Party Unity” was adopted.

Lenin's illness removed him from political activities and caused a fierce struggle for leadership in the party.

Lenin writes a series of articles that are called “Lenin’s Testament” (“On Cooperation”, “Letter to the Congress”, “On Our Revolution”).

The essence of the articles:

Expressed concern about future fate parties;

About possible successors;

On the necessary reorganization of the party;

On the prospects of the NEP;

About the future of the revolution (two dangers: the collapse of the unity of the party and the collapse of the alliance of the working class and the peasantry);

Gave an assessment to close associates;

He believed that the main danger for the party was the rivalry for power between Trotsky and Stalin;

He feared the bureaucratization of the party;

He considered it necessary to reorganize the structure of the party (the goal is to deprive Stalin of his immense power).

In April 1923, the XII Congress of the RCP(b) took place - the first congress without the active participation of Lenin. The report was made by the People's Commissar and Politburo member Trotsky, who considered himself Lenin's successor. Criticism of bureaucratic tendencies in the party, the work of the party apparatus, the policies of the NEP, the demand for the withdrawal of funds from the peasantry for industrialization, the slogan of the world socialist revolution.

The essence of the letter:

Blamed the party apparatus for economic difficulties in the country;

Demanded democratization of party life;

The party must take control of its apparatus;

The party must ensure control over the work of enterprises.

The XIII Party Conference (January 1924) condemned Trotsky (he was absent from the conference due to illness).

Opponents of Trotsky’s “new course” were: Kamenev, Zinoviev, Stalin, who demanded that Trotsky be expelled from the party.

At the XIII Party Congress (May 1924), Stalin retained his post thanks to the support of Kamenev and Zinoviev.

To fight against Trotsky, Stalin skillfully used the support of Kamenev and Zinoviev.

Trotsky, in his speeches, touched on the topic of the October events (an article in the newspaper on the eve of the uprising) and the role of Kamenev and Zinoviev in these events;

Trotsky accused his opponents of disbelief in the world revolution.

The struggle between the opponents was unequal; for example, the entire bureaucratic apparatus of state power (the press, the Plenums of the Central Committee) worked against Trotsky.

Stalin, having defeated Trotsky, soon, with the help of Bukharin, set about Kamenev and Zinoviev.

“New opposition” (1925-1926 Kamenev and Zinoviev).

The real reason for the emergence of the “New Opposition” is the struggle for power in the party and state. The theoretical basis is criticism by the opposition of the NEP as a deviation from the goals of the revolution.

The center of the opposition is industrial Leningrad (Zinoviev) and Moscow (Kamenev).

The opposition criticized Stalin and chose to remove him from the post of General Secretary of the party. In the fight against the opposition, Stalin was supported by Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky, who spoke out for preserving the NEP. The main struggle unfolded during the preparation and holding of the XIV Party Congress (December 18-31, 1925).

Progress of the congress:

Stalin made a report;

Krupskaya in her speech raised the issue that the majority is not always right;

Kamenev in his speech accused Stalin of dictatorship and autocracy.

At the end of the congress, a commission was created to “restore” order in the Leningrad party organization, as a result of which Zinoviev was removed from its leadership.

In April 1926, a “united opposition” was formed consisting of:

Trotsky;

Kameneva;

Zinoviev;

Preobrazhensky;

Pyatakov;

Sokolnikov and others.

Opposition thesis:

“The revolution has been betrayed by the bureaucrats and the country is on the verge of a new coup that will lead to the victory of the bureaucracy over the working class.”

The opposition created underground organizations.

The defeat of the opposition:

The activities of the oppositionists were monitored by the GPU;

On October 16, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Sokolnikov, Evdokimov, Pyatakov wrote a letter in which they admitted their mistakes;

The Plenum of the Central Committee expelled Trotsky and Kamenev from the Politburo;

Zinoviev was removed from his post as chairman of the Comintern;

In October 1927, Trotsky and Zinoviev were removed from the Central Committee;

In January 1928, Trotsky was exiled to Alma-Ata.

Having finished with the “united opposition” with the help of Bukharin, Stalin begins the fight against Bukharin.

The right opposition did not agree with the methods of carrying out super-industrialization and the curtailment of the NEP.

Opposition composition:

Bukharin;

Tomsky.

Bukharin and his supporters saw a way out of the crisis of the late 20s in the following:

Market normalization;

Flexibility of grain purchasing prices;

Increased production of industrial goods;

Relegating collectivization to a secondary role.

At the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, held in November 1928, the views of Bukharin and his like-minded people were declared a “right deviation.” Stalin won the behind-the-scenes apparatus struggle, in which he had no equal.

At the XIV Party Conference (April 1929), the struggle between Stalin and the Bukharin group unfolded over the issue of the pace of industrialization. The opposition was defeated and organizational conclusions soon followed:

Bukharin was removed from his post as editor-in-chief of the newspaper Pravda and removed from the leadership of the Comintern;

Tomsky was removed from the leadership of the trade union;

Rykov resigned from the post of Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars;

The Central Control Commission purged the party ranks;

Bukharin was expelled from the Politburo in November 1929.

Cult of personality - autocracy. Exalting the role of one person in the course of historical development. Under Lenin, the cult of Lenin's personality began to emerge. In 1920, in his work “The Infantile Disease of “Leftism” in Communism,” Lenin outlined the following thesis: “Leaders - party - class - masses” => that is, the masses are divided into classes, classes have parties, and parties are led by leaders.

Personality cult:

Personality replaces collective leadership;

Eliminates democratic traditions;

Establishes a dictatorial regime.

Reasons for the formation of Stalin’s personality cult:

The result of an internal party struggle for power;

The result of massive political and economic repression.

Intra-party struggle and mass repression:

Intra-party struggle 1923-1924 (Trotsky against Stalin);

Intra-party struggle 1925-1926 (Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev against Stalin, Bukharin);

Intra-party struggle 1926-1927 (Trotsky, Preobrazhensky, Kamenev, Zinoviev against Stalin, Bukharin, Rykov);

The reason for mass repression was the murder of S.M. Kirov in 1934

Arrest of more than half of the delegates to the 17th Party Congress;

1936 - the first political trial of Zinoviev, Kamenev and their supporters (shot);

1937 second political trial of Pyatakov, Sokolnikov and their supporters (shot);

1938 third political trial of Bukharin, Rykov and their supporters (shot);

1938 mass repressions in the army (from 50% to 100% of the military leadership were repressed);

The fight against the enemies of the people begins

Stalin's personality cult could not exist without the support of the lower strata of the population. In a society with a low level of education (30% of the population was illiterate), culture could easily create the basis for strengthening faith in the leader.

After Lenin's death, Stalin initiated the “Leninist call” to the party (the composition of the party changed dramatically). Stalin skillfully used some of Lenin's statements in the fight against his political opponents (Trotsky and his “permanent revolution”). By inculcating the personality cult of Lenin, Stalin strengthened leader sentiments in society.

The society built in the USSR was neither free, nor fair, nor equal, but was totalitarian with a pronounced cult of personality of the leader.

Less than 60 years have passed since the country said goodbye to the “Great Leader of the People” Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin. The younger generation knows him from history books and programs that are broadcast every now and then and reveal the secrets and details of his life. The older generation, or rather those who survived, still remember the times of repression and fear, and some still revere him and are ready to fall on their knees before him. So why do opinions about the former ruler of our country differ, and why did a personality cult of Stalin develop? The psychology of this phenomenon is very complex.

Reasons for the emergence of Stalin's personality cult

The concept of Stalin’s personality cult itself appeared immediately after the leader’s death in 1953. It became widespread after the appearance of N.S.’s report. Khrushchev at the 20th Congress of the CPSU Central Committee. But first things first.

The formation of Stalin's personality cult began in the 20s of the twentieth century. At that time, it was common practice to apply titles to various leaders of the state. For example, S.M. Kirov was called the “Leningrad Leader”. However, there must be only one leader, and this title went to Joseph Vissarionovich. In 1936, the first poems glorifying the “Leader of the People,” authored by Boris Pasternak, appeared in the Izvestia newspaper. At the same time, various objects, factories, streets and cultural centers are actively beginning to be named after Stalin. The theme of the leader constantly appears in literature, works of art, sculpture and painting. Through the efforts of creators in the mid-30s, the myth was created that Joseph Stalin is the “father of nations” and the “great teacher”, as well as the “genius of all times.”

A significant role in the formation and development of this myth was played by the massive resettlement of peasants to cities and their employment at various Soviet construction projects and industries. For most citizens of the 30s and 40s. 20th century Stalin socially really became more significant than his own fathers. The whole point is that the Stalinist regime was based on hysteria. This was greatly facilitated by sexual repression and repression of almost all manifestations of sexuality. For this reason, all the sexual energy of the people was directed towards Stalin himself.

Also, the growth of Stalin’s personality cult in the USSR was facilitated by the destruction of religious ideas and beliefs in society. Refusal of faith gave rise to aggression in the psyche of citizens and destroyed the harmony between reason and the unconscious. As a result, the empty niche began to be occupied not by religion and morality, but by the cults of the country’s leaders - V.I. Lenina, L.D. Trotsky and finally, I.V. Stalin.

Exposing Stalin's personality cult

The death of the “Leader of the People” on March 5, 1953 marked the beginning of a change in attitude towards the leader of the country, towards his personality and towards the entire period of his reign. Already two months after Stalin’s death, the publication of his works ceased; a year later, his prizes for strengthening peace and friendship between peoples, as well as in the field of literature, science and art, which later became state awards, were cancelled.

In addition, the composition of the leadership of the CPSU and the Soviet government was changed and the party secretariat was headed by the famous figure N.S. Khrushchev. It was he who had one of the central places in the work to debunk Stalin’s personality cult. Rehabilitation of victims of repression began, personnel renewal in the state security and internal affairs bodies began, and criticism of Stalin’s personality cult began to appear more and more often in the press. The main role was played by the report of N.S. Khrushchev at the 20th Congress of the CPSU “On the cult of personality and its consequences” in February 1956. The main theses of the report were information about mass repressions, a rethinking of his activities as the leader of the country and the negative character traits of the “leader of the people.” In fact, Khrushchev formed a myth that hides the real motives of the country's leaders. The delegates to the 20th Congress of the CPSU agreed with Khrushchev’s assessments of the period of Stalin’s personality cult. Thus, with his report and subsequent actions, Nikita Sergeevich actually destroyed the father of the people in the public eyes. A striking example of this was the removal of the “leader’s” body from the mausoleum on Red Square.

Since the myth of Stalin as the father of the people was firmly entrenched in the public consciousness, after his death and Khrushchev’s report, the so-called “Oedipus complex” was formed, which was characterized on the one hand by the destruction of the “father of nations”, and on the other hand by a deep sense of guilt before him. The rejection of the personality cult of Stalin led to the forced formation of arguments justifying such a symbolic destruction of the “Leader of the People.” And in the mass consciousness, such an argument was hatred of I.V. Stalin and everything that was created by him during his reign. The consequences of such destruction of Stalin's personality cult led to the fact that the majority of citizens of the Soviet Union received severe mental trauma, from which subsequent generations who grew up under the influence of parents who lived under the Stalinist regime cannot recover. The leaders of the authorities also suffered; under the influence of the same “Oedipus complex” they became incapable of adequate political activity in terms of the development of society, the economy and public administration. This has led to regression and corruption in almost all areas of activity. These are the results of Stalin's personality cult. And while Russian citizens will not be able to really comprehend what is behind the mythological images of the “leader of the people”, a real strategy for development and improvement of competitiveness will not appear in the country.

It is curious that in 2008, television elections “Name of Russia” took place, within the framework of which the most popular person in the history of the country should have been determined. Almost 4,498,840 people took part in the voting. And among the 12 great historical figures after Alexander Nevsky and P.A. Stolypin third place went to I.V. Stalin. This fact is more than significant, considering that not one of the 11 participants was cursed as much as the “leader of the people.”

The very concept of debunking Stalin’s personality cult appeared immediately after the leader’s death in 1953. The formation of the cult of personality began in the 20s of the twentieth century. At that time, it was common practice to apply titles to various leaders of the state. For example, S.M. Kirov was called the “Leningrad Leader”.

However, there must be one leader, and this title went to Joseph Vissarionovich. In 1936, the first poems glorifying the “Leader of the People,” authored by Boris Pasternak, appeared in the Izvestia newspaper. At the same time, various objects, factories, streets and cultural centers began to be actively named after Stalin. The theme of the leader has constantly appeared in literature, works of art, sculpture and painting. Through the efforts of creators in the mid-30s, the myth was created that Joseph Stalin is the “father of nations” and the “great teacher”, as well as the “genius of all times.”

Stalin's personality is very firmly entrenched in world history. A significant role in the formation and development of the myth of the cult of personality was played by the massive resettlement of peasants to cities and their employment at various Soviet construction sites and industries. For most citizens of the 30s and 40s. In the 20th century, Stalin really became more significant in social terms than his own fathers.

In the 30-50s of the twentieth century in the Soviet Union, Stalin appeared as the central ideological image in almost all literature. Communist works were also written about him abroad. Authors such as Pablo Neruda and Henri Barbusse paid special attention to the personality of the leader. In the USSR, these books were translated and widely distributed. Stalin's personality was also praised in folklore different nations countries. The cult of the leader could be traced in many types of art and painting of the Soviet Union at that time. The reasons for such popularity lie in the creation of an ideological image of the leader. Particular importance here was given to the distribution of posters of various subjects promoting Stalin. During his lifetime it was named after large number cities, streets, cultural buildings and significant factories. One of the first was Stalingrad. In many areas of Eastern Europe after the war, settlements, named in his honor.

Reasons and prerequisites for exposing the personality cult of I.V. Stalin

The 20th Congress of the CPSU was undoubtedly a turning point in the history of the USSR. From this moment it begins new stage development of Russian statehood, which ultimately led to radical changes in society and the state, to a turn away from totalitarian regime to normal, natural democratic development.

After many years of silence, violence, fear, subordination to a single ideology, society spoke openly about all the lawlessness and atrocities that had occurred, and, probably, one of the remarkable moments of this process was that the initiative came not only from representatives of the top party leadership, but at that time many interested in “promoting” a new ideology, or the intelligentsia, which historically was in opposition to totalitarianism, but also from the middle and lower strata of society, who overwhelmingly for many years perceived the situation as a natural necessity. Why did such drastic and largely unexpected changes occur? There are several reasons why this situation has arisen.

How can this be explained?

• Firstly, the main economic problems were solved. It should be noted that in the 30s, industrialization was completely completed in the country, noticeable successes were achieved in the agricultural sector, as well as in other sectors.
• Secondly, Stalin created a rigid and strong system of personal control and suppression, which was embodied in the most severe repressions. Stalin's authority was built on society's fear of the system.
• Thirdly, the victory in the Great Patriotic War played a huge role in the rise of Stalin. Patriotic War. The USSR became a state that dictated directions in world politics and did not accept the rules of Western capitalist countries. The USSR itself dictated these rules.
• Fourthly, we must take into account the personal qualities of Stalin, who demonstrated the traits of an excellent leader and organizer who knew how to manage people and subjugate them to himself.

But still, an outwardly unified system based on a regime of personal power could not fully govern the state. The enthusiasm of the people who put the country back on its feet in the 1920s was fading. Contradictions became noticeable among the masses, and a kind of protest grew. In the spiritual sphere, literature and artistic creativity, this protest began to be most clearly expressed in the early 50s.

Stalin tried to maximally strengthen his position of power. Almost all areas covered public life, to achieve his goals, Stalin used all possible methods. Hence - mass repressions, ideological dictatorship, which reached unprecedented proportions under Stalin, the “Iron Curtain” policy, designed to isolate a huge state from the world community, to build socialism “in a single country.”

Stalin had to preserve the “moral and political unity of society,” the powerful power that he concentrated in his hands. Most likely, drastic changes in the composition of the party leadership after the 19th Congress of the CPSU are also connected with this. There have been changes in the leadership of the party. Stalin was aware of the coming changes, that the cult of personality would die with him. Stalin did not see anyone who could replace him and continue the course of personal leadership, skillfully maintaining the strength and power of individual power. He assigned to those around him the role of assistants in his business, incapable of taking major steps, and therefore he saw an alternative to his power only in collective leadership. By pursuing this idea, Stalin simultaneously tried to prevent possible usurper claims to power by one of his comrades.

However, there is one most important objective reason for exposing Stalin’s personality cult, which played a decisive role in the changes that took place in the life of the USSR. This reason is the established Soviet system of power. Phenomena like the 20th Congress are built into the Soviet system as an internal condition for its renewal. The very existence of this system represents a two-pronged process, combining “epiphany” and exposure with confrontation of the entire authoritarian system, which spread to the consciousness of the entire society, forming the notorious Soviet doublethink. It is not for nothing that the trials of the 1930s were perceived with such enthusiasm by the majority of the people as a completely fair exposure of the sabotage of the Leninist guard.

One can argue for a long time about how the struggle for power would have unfolded in such a situation further, but history had its own way, and after the death of I.V. Stalin on March 5, 1953, it sharply turned its course in a different direction, accelerating the course of events.

Alignment of political forces on the eve of the 20th Congress of the CPSU

On March 6, 1953, a joint meeting of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR took place. Taking advantage of the state of shock under the pretext of the prevailing emergency circumstances and the need for high efficiency, Stalin's closest associates made an attempt to restore their undivided dominance in the leadership of the party and the country. In fact, at the meeting, the new composition of the Presidium of the Central Committee was approved, and the bureau of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was liquidated.

One of the main motives for revising the composition of the Presidium was precisely the inevitability of the issue of the cult of personality of I.V. Stalin, the regime of the Stalinist dictatorship. With a “reduced” composition, the Presidium of the Central Committee had the opportunity to determine the fate of the “personality cult” in its own interests, without fear of exposure from members who were not involved in lawlessness, which subsequently happened in practice. Thus, this was the first step towards exposing Stalin's personality cult.

After Stalin's death, all leading positions in the party and country remained with his closest associates. Malenkov became Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Molotov became Minister of Foreign Affairs, Beria became the head of the new Ministry of Internal Affairs, Bulgarin was appointed Minister of Defense of the USSR, Mikoyan - Minister of Domestic and Foreign Trade, Saburov - Minister of Mechanical Engineering, Pervukhin - Minister of Power Plants and Electrical Industry. Chairman Supreme Council Voroshilov was approved by the USSR, and Shvernik, who held this post, was appointed Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. In addition, it was considered necessary “that Comrade Khrushchev. concentrated on work in the Central Committee of the CPSU,” in connection with which he was relieved of his duties as first secretary of the Moscow Committee of the CPSU. Khrushchev formally remained in the rank of Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, but, being the only one of the secretaries (besides Malenkov) a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee, he naturally occupied a leading position among them. Khrushchev's position became even stronger after the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee granted Malenkov's request to relieve him of his duties as Secretary of the Central Committee due to the inexpediency of combining the functions of the Presovminmin and the Secretary of the Central Committee. Khrushchev was entrusted with leading the Secretariat of the Central Committee and presiding over its meetings.

In the current situation, the question of the regime’s attitude to Stalin’s personality cult acquired increasing political significance. The real danger in this direction came from Lavrentiy Beria, who launched active political activities. Beria strove in every possible way to strengthen his position, essentially placing himself outside the control of the highest party and government agencies, because he led such a powerful department as the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Having a “dossier” on each member of the leadership, Beria had every opportunity to eliminate any competitor. One should not discount the fact that he had a powerful apparatus for seizing power in his hands. In this regard, the Presidium of the Central Committee, with the support of the military, took decisive preventive measures. On June 26, 1953, Beria was arrested. Officially, Beria’s arrest was the result of his “criminal anti-party and anti-state actions,” which G.M. spoke about in his report at the July plenum of the CPSU Central Committee (1953). Malenkov. At the plenum, there was sharp criticism of the shortcomings and vices in the party leadership, violations of Leninist norms of party life that had accumulated over the previous years, and there were also questions about Stalin’s cult of personality, the elimination of its consequences, and the democratization of public and party life.

The party's Central Committee actually had two leaders and no official elected leadership. After eliminating Beria real opportunity Malenkov appeared to receive official leadership. However, as a mature and fairly sober politician, he realized that the burden of crimes during the period of Stalin’s personality cult would not allow him to gain the support of the party and the people. The candidacy of N.S. looked different. Khrushchev. Stalin's associates considered him one of their own; Khrushchev was also quite authoritative and was not fully identified with Stalin's inner circle. Taking all this into account, the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in September 1953 established the post of First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and unanimously elected N.S. Khrushchev to it.

Thus, by the fall of 1953, the alignment of political forces in the USSR was completed. Stalin's associates retained strong positions in the party and managed to create a fairly coherent system of top leadership, placing a new leader at the head of the party to ensure further achievement of their goals.

Report on Stalin's personality cult

The alignment of political forces on the eve of the 20th Congress was accompanied by a certain democratization of the entire society. New leaders, who in many ways did not belong to the “old guard” and were not associated with the crimes of the Stalinist regime, were appointed to leadership positions not only in the top leadership of the CPSU, but also in the leadership of the party in the republics and locally. Public opinion became more active, and the need to overcome the consequences of Stalin's personality cult became increasingly obvious. The question of the direct culprit, of personal responsibility for the lawlessness committed became increasingly acute.

Khrushchev took active steps. Why did Nikita Sergeevich gain such determination by the fall of 1955? One of the main reasons is Khrushchev's confidence that not a word will be said about his involvement in the crimes of the Stalin era. By this time, by order of Khrushchev, many of Beria’s papers, documents of Stalin and other party leaders were destroyed, and a large purge of the archives was carried out. Khrushchev was convinced that he personally protected himself from direct responsibility for the repressions.

In the fall of 1955, Khrushchev took the initiative to tell the delegates of the upcoming 20th Party Congress about Stalin’s crimes. Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich are actively opposed. In 1954-55, various commissions worked to review the cases of unfoundedly accused and illegally repressed Soviet citizens. On the eve of the 20th Congress, the Presidium of the Central Committee formed a commission to study materials on mass repressions. Pospelov's commission presented an extensive report in which it cited the most important documents on the basis of which mass repressions unfolded, noting that falsifications, torture and brutal destruction of party activists were sanctioned by Stalin.

On February 9, the Presidium of the Central Committee heard the report of Pospelov’s commission. The reaction was varied. During the ensuing discussion, two opposing positions emerged: Molotov, Voroshilov, and Kaganovich opposed the presentation of a separate report on the cult of personality at the congress. They were opposed by the remaining members of the Presidium, who supported Khrushchev. In the end, Khrushchev managed to smooth over the heated debate, and he said that he “does not see any differences” and “the congress must be told the truth.”

The materials of Pospelov’s commission formed the basis of the report “On Stalin’s personality cult and its consequences.” On February 13, 1956, the Plenum of the Central Committee decided to hold a closed meeting of the congress. Khrushchev invited Pospelov himself, who was preparing the report, to speak at the congress, but the members of the Presidium unanimously insisted that N.S. make the report. Khrushchev.

The main provisions of N.S. Khrushchev’s report “On the cult of personality and its consequences” at the 20th Congress of the CPSU

Few of the delegates to the 20th Congress of the CPSU imagined what awaited them at the morning closed meeting on February 25, 1956. For the majority of those present in the hall, N.S. Khrushchev’s report became a complete revelation, truly producing a shock effect. Before the report, the delegates of the congress were given a “Letter to the Congress” by V.I. Lenin. Many people knew about its existence, but until now it had not been published. The specific consequences of the fact that the party at one time did not implement Lenin’s recommendations, primarily in relation to Stalin, were carefully hidden and disguised. In Khrushchev's report, these consequences were made public for the first time and received an appropriate political assessment. The report stated, in part: “Now we're talking about about an issue of great importance both for the present and for the future of the party - we are talking about how the personality cult of Stalin is gradually taking shape, which at a certain stage turned into the source of a number of major and very serious distortions of party principles, party democracy, revolutionary legality " The rationale for exposing the cult of personality by Leninist principles is the first distinctive feature report by N.S. Khrushchev.

Of particular importance was the exposure of the Stalinist formula “enemies of the people.” This term, Khrushchev said, immediately freed from the need for strong evidence of the ideological wrongness of the person or people with whom you are conducting polemics: it gave the opportunity to anyone who disagreed with Stalin in some way, who was only suspected of hostile intentions, anyone who was only slandered, subjected to the most brutal repressions, in violation of all norms of revolutionary legality. This concept of “enemy of the people”, in essence, already removed and excluded the possibility of any ideological struggle or expression of one’s opinion.

Khrushchev openly raised before the delegates the question of the illegality and inadmissibility of repressive reprisals against ideological opponents, and although the report gave mainly the old (according to the “Short Course”) assessment of the ideological and political struggle in the party and the role of Stalin in it, it was undoubtedly a bold step and the merit of Khrushchev. The report said: “Attention is drawn to the fact that even in the midst of a fierce ideological struggle against the Trotskyists, Zinovievites, Bukharinites and others, extremely repressive measures were not applied to them. The fight took place on ideological basis. But a few years later, when socialism was already basically built in our country, when the exploiting classes were basically eliminated, when the social structure Soviet society, the social base for hostile parties, political movements and groups was sharply reduced, when the ideological opponents of the party were politically defeated long ago, repressions began against them.”

As for responsibility for repression, Stalin’s role in creating the regime of political terror is revealed in the report quite fully. However, the direct participation of Stalin’s associates in political terror and the true scale of the repressions were not named. Khrushchev was not ready to confront the majority of members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, especially since he himself belonged to this majority for a long time. Yes, this was not part of his task, the main thing was to “decisively, once and for all, debunk the cult of personality,” without which the political improvement of society would be impossible.

It was decided not to open a debate on the report. At the suggestion of N.A. Bulgarin, who chaired the meeting, the congress adopted a resolution “On the cult of personality and its consequences,” published in the press. On March 1, 1956, the text of the report with a note from Khrushchev and the necessary corrections was sent to members and candidate members of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. On March 5, the Presidium of the Central Committee adopted a resolution “On familiarization with the report of comrade. Khrushcheva N.S. “On the cult of personality and its consequences” at the 20th Congress of the CPSU.” It stated:

“1. Invite the regional committees, district committees and the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the union republics to familiarize all communists and Komsomol members, as well as non-party activists of workers, employees and collective farmers, with Khrushchev’s report. Khrushchev’s report should be sent out to party organizations marked “not for publication,” removing the “strictly secret” stamp from the brochure.

Thus. Although the highest party leadership of the USSR was able to take such a step as the nationwide exposure of the cult of personality, these measures were still quite weak and timid. This is confirmed by a number of facts, the main one of which is the reaction to Khrushchev’s report: the report itself was not published for almost 30 years. “Familiarization” was carried out at meetings of party and Komsomol organizations, in work collectives, under the organized control of party leaders, without discussion, behind closed doors.

Exposing Stalin's personality cult

Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov - the former elite of Stalin's entourage - after the 20th Congress of the CPSU took an antagonistic position towards Khrushchev. They often came into confrontation with him, jealous of the rapid growth and consolidation of his authority in the party and the people.

Since Khrushchev needed freedom of action with reliance on others, new forces in the party leadership had to disassociate themselves from the continuity of Stalin’s leadership and thereby establish themselves as the leader of a new, democratic course, breaking with the regime of the cult of personality. Therefore, Khrushchev faced the inevitability of a break with the “Malenkov group.” Khrushchev began his offensive even before the 20th Congress: Malenkov was relieved of his post as Presovminmin, and in 1956 both Molotov and Kaganovich lost their ministerial portfolios. The situation for “Stalin’s oldest associates” was created as threatening, and therefore they were the first to decide to take active action.

In the implementation of their plans, the “anti-party group” assigned a significant role to Bulgarin, since he held the post of Presovminmin, was power-hungry, and close to pro-Stalinist sentiments. Over time, Bulgarin became the de facto center of the group. At the last moment, the group attracted Voroshilov to its side, who as a political figure was not of particular value, but his voice as a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee could play a significant role; Moreover, his inner commitment to Stalinism was beyond doubt. As for Pervukhin and Saburov, their promotion and activities were also associated with Stalin’s time, and in conditions when Khrushchev was already
focused on the new cadres he nominated; in the “Malenkov group” they hoped to preserve themselves as prominent party and government figures. With this composition, the “anti-party group” came to the moment of the most decisive actions.

On the morning of June 18, 1956, Bulgarin scheduled a meeting of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. Under the pretext of discussing the issue of traveling to the anniversary celebrations of the 250th anniversary of Leningrad, the “anti-party group” could meet on neutral territory and finally agree on their actions. Khrushchev, having learned about this, replied that this was not necessary, since all issues related to this trip had already been resolved. Nevertheless, at the insistence of the majority of members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, the meeting convened.

From the very beginning, the meeting was attended by: members of the Presidium of the Central Committee - Khrushchev, Bulgarin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Molotov, Pervukhin; candidates for members of the Presidium - Brezhnev, Furtsev, Shvernik, Shepilov, then Zhukov arrived. Malenkov proposed removing Khrushchev from the presidency and recommended Bulgarin in his place. The proposal was adopted by six votes to two. Then Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich made statements and sharp criticism of Khrushchev. The group had significant political power to implement its plans and had a majority of votes in the Presidium of the Central Committee. The main goal was to remove Khrushchev from the post of First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and, having entered the secretariat of the Central Committee, take key positions in the party leadership, ensuring a calm future for himself. Given the instability of the numerical majority of the “anti-party group” in the Presidium, the issue of Khrushchev’s removal necessarily had to be resolved on the first day. In this situation, Khrushchev and Mikoyan announced that they would leave the meeting if all members and candidate members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, as well as the secretaries of the Central Committee, were not assembled.

At the meeting on June 19, the picture took on a completely opposite character. The full Presidium supported Khrushchev by Kirichenko, Mikoyan, Suslov, Brezhnev, Zhukov, Kozlov, Furtsev, Aristov, Belyaev, and Pospelov. The balance of forces of six against two at the meeting on July 18 was now seven (the absent Saburov was added) against four (Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Suslov, Kirichenko), but taking into account the votes of the candidates - thirteen against six in favor of Khrushchev.

Considering the situation, Malenkov’s group at the meeting on July 20 did not raise the issue of removing Khrushchev specifically, but talked about the fact that in the interests of more complete collegiality, the position of First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee should be completely eliminated. This proposal was made primarily with the aim of securing Bulgarin as the chairman of the Presidium and, with his help, establishing his influence in it, but this proposal did not receive a response from the majority of the meeting participants.

Members of the Central Committee became aware of the meeting of the Presidium. On July 21, they addressed the Presidium with a letter. It contained a demand to urgently convene a Plenum of the Central Committee and bring up the issue of the leadership of the Presidium of the Central Committee and the Secretariat. A group of 20 people was instructed to present this letter to the Presidium of the Central Committee. It was decided to convene a plenum on July 22.

Taking advantage of the moment, Khrushchev realized that it was necessary to prevent any decisions by the Presidium and transfer all issues to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the party, since he personally could not strike at Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich, without fear of no less weighty counter-accusations, but the Plenum of the Central Committee, whose composition changed radically during the period of the 19th-20th congresses, he could openly raise the question of the personal responsibility of the Malenkov group.

The Plenum unanimously condemned the group conspiracy and supported Khrushchev as First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The following decision was made: “1. Condemn, as incompatible with the Leninist principles of our party, the factional activities of the anti-party group of Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov and Shepilov, who joined them. 2. Remove the above-mentioned comrades from the membership of the Presidium of the Central Committee and from the composition of the Central Committee.” It was decided not to take such harsh measures with respect to the remaining members of the group, given that during the Plenum they realized their mistakes and helped expose the factional activities of Malenkov’s group.

On the same day, the Plenum adopted a resolution on the election of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee consisting of 15 members and 9 candidates. The following were elected members of the Presidium: Aristov, Belyaev, Brezhnev, Bulgarin, Voroshilov, Zhukov, Ignatov, Kirichenko, Kozlov, Kuusinen, Mikoyan, Suslov, Furtsev, Khrushchev, Shvernik; candidate members - Kalnberzin, Korotchenko, Kosygin, Mazurov, Mzhavanadze, Mukhitdinov, Pervukhin, Pospelov.

Some results of exposing the personality cult of J.V. Stalin and the lessons of the 20th Congress

Undoubtedly, there were many positive aspects in the fact that the 20th Congress with all its decisions took place as an important social and political event. Measures were taken to overcome Stalin’s personality cult, facts of lawlessness and violations of all kinds of rights were made public, specific documents were cited exposing the repressive regime of Stalin’s terror - all this could not but lead to the democratization of public life, now all these issues were openly discussed in society, a certain public opinion was formed.

On the other hand, the 20th Congress made it possible to carry out significant changes in the top party leadership, removing party members who were especially devoted to the cause of Stalin from leadership positions and bringing to the fore new leaders who think and act in a new way, not associated with the criminal Stalinist system, giving them the opportunity to implement and complete the reforms that have been started. At the same time, Khrushchev's position and authority as a skilled party leader and organizer increased. The party, in the person of Khrushchev, received a fairly strong and popular leader, capable of taking certain bold and promising steps. In general, after the 20th Congress, after a long period of party struggle and confrontation, a period of relative stability was established in society and the state.

But at the same time, there were certain negative aspects that were most likely connected not directly with the 20th Congress, but with the same Soviet system of power. Of course, the achievements of the 20th Congress are difficult to overestimate, especially considering the time in which these changes took place. But if you look at how these changes specifically affected each individual, and not on the entire huge party-state machine, then some kind of one-sidedness, one-sidedness of everything achieved becomes clear. After all, in essence, all the changes were carried out in the interests of a very narrow group of party and government leaders, while society was almost entirely drawn to the ideology, albeit a new one, now based on some democratic principles, but still the same for everyone. If earlier the official ideology praised Stalin and his policies in every possible way, now everyone rushed as one to condemn and expose him. The Soviet system of power suppressed personality, freeing a person from the need to make any decisions, regulating his entire existence in detail.

And another point. When analyzing the events after the 20th Congress, one gets the impression of some kind of fear or at least uncertainty of the authorities. Of all decisions made Almost none were published; documents about Stalin’s repressions were sent to archives and stored there for decades; revealing materials often did not go beyond the walls of party meetings. The reasons for this behavior of the authorities cannot be clearly stated: either it was uncertainty after such a grandiose work done and the expectation of its fruits; or fear, based on the fact that there are still many adherents of Stalin; or simply a reluctance to make all these facts widely public, because each of the leaders was involved in the crimes of the Stalinist regime.

Thus, the consequences of the 20th Congress of the CPSU were two sides of the same coin. Trying to lift the curtain of the past, abandon its criminal legacy, and democratize public and state life, the country's leaders, on the other hand, tried in every possible way to protect society from such truth. The 20th Congress practically split society, dividing it into two camps: Stalinists and anti-Stalinists. The echoes of this split can be heard to this day. And they will probably argue about this topic for a long time. But the fact that our country was able to overcome the barrier of lawlessness, violence and terror at the highest state level is an undoubted merit of the 20th Congress of the CPSU.