History of the Kuril Islands

Background

Briefly, the history of the "belonging" of the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin Island is as follows.

1.In period 1639-1649. Russian Cossack detachments led by Moskovitinov, Kolobov, Popov explored and began to explore Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. At the same time, Russian pioneers repeatedly swim to the island of Hokkaido, where they are peacefully met by local natives of the Ainu people. The Japanese appeared on this island a century later, after which they exterminated and partially assimilated the Ainu.

2.B 1701 Cossack constable Vladimir Atlasov reported to Peter I about the "subordination" of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands to the Russian crown, leading to the "wonderful Nipon kingdom."

3.B 1786. by order of Catherine II, a register of Russian possessions in the Pacific Ocean was produced, bringing the register to the attention of all European states as a declaration of Russia's rights to these possessions, including Sakhalin and the Kuriles.

4.B 1792. By decree of Catherine II, the entire ridge of the Kuril Islands (both Northern and Southern), as well as Sakhalin Island officially incorporated into the Russian Empire.

5. As a result of the defeat of Russia in the Crimean War 1854-1855 gg. under pressure England and France Russia forced was concluded with Japan on February 7, 1855. Treaty of Shimoda, through which four southern islands of the Kuril chain were transferred to Japan: Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir and Iturup. Sakhalin remained undivided between Russia and Japan. At the same time, however, the right of Russian ships to enter Japanese ports was recognized, and "permanent peace and sincere friendship between Japan and Russia" was proclaimed.

6.May 7, 1875 under the Petersburg Treaty, the tsarist government as a very strange act of "good will" makes incomprehensible further territorial concessions to Japan and transfers to it 18 more small islands of the archipelago. In return, Japan finally recognized Russia's right to the whole of Sakhalin. It is for this agreement referred most of all by the Japanese today, slyly silent that the first article of this treaty reads: "... and henceforth eternal peace and friendship will be established between Russia and Japan" ( the Japanese themselves violated this treaty in the 20th century repeatedly). Many Russian statesmen of those years sharply condemned this “exchange” treaty as short-sighted and harmful to the future of Russia, comparing it with the same short-sightedness as the sale of Alaska to the United States of America in 1867 for next to nothing (7 billion 200 million dollars). ), saying "now we're biting our own elbows".

7. After the Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 gg. followed another stage of humiliation of Russia. By Portsmouth peace treaty concluded on September 5, 1905, Japan received the southern part of Sakhalin, all the Kuril Islands, and also took away from Russia the right to lease the naval bases of Port Arthur and Dalniy. When Russian diplomats reminded the Japanese that all these provisions are contrary to the 1875 treaty g., those arrogantly and arrogantly answered : « War cancels all treaties. You have failed and let's proceed from the current situation ". Reader, remember this boastful declaration of the invader!

8. Next comes the time of punishment of the aggressor for his eternal greed and territorial expansion. Signed by Stalin and Roosevelt at the Yalta Conference February 10, 1945 G. " Agreement on the Far East"It was envisaged:" ... 2-3 months after the surrender of Germany, the Soviet Union will enter the war against Japan subject to the return to the Soviet Union of the southern part of Sakhalin, all the Kuril Islands, as well as the restoration of the lease of Port Arthur and Dalny(these built and equipped hands of Russian workers, soldiers and sailors in the late XIX-early XX centuries. geographically very convenient naval bases were donated to "fraternal" China. But these bases were so necessary for our fleet in the 60-80s of revelry " cold war"and intense combat service of the fleet in remote areas of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. I had to equip the forward base Cam Ranh in Vietnam for the fleet from scratch).

9.B July 1945 g. in accordance with Potsdam Declaration heads of the victorious countries the following verdict was passed regarding the future of Japan: "The sovereignty of Japan shall be limited to four islands: Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, Honshu, and such as WE SPECIFY". August 14, 1945 the Japanese government has publicly confirmed the acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, and on September 2 Japan unconditionally surrendered. Article 6 of the Instrument of Surrender reads: "... the Japanese government and its successors will faithfully fulfill the terms of the Potsdam Declaration to give such orders and take such actions as the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Powers shall require in order to carry out this declaration...”. January 29, 1946 Commander-in-Chief General MacArthur DEMANDED by Directive No. 677: "The Kuril Islands, including Habomai and Shikotan, are excluded from the jurisdiction of Japan." AND only after that legal action, a Decree of the Presidium was issued Supreme Council USSR dated February 2, 1946, which read: "All lands, bowels and waters of Sakhalin and the Kul Islands are the property of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics". Thus, the Kuril Islands (both Northern and Southern), as well as about. Sakhalin, legally And were returned to Russia in accordance with international law . This could put an end to the "problem" of the Southern Kuriles and stop all further verbiage. But the story of the Kuriles continues.

10. After the end of World War II US occupied Japan and turned it into their military foothold in the Far East. In September 1951 USA, UK and a number of other states (total 49) signed San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan, prepared in violation of the Potsdam agreements without the participation Soviet Union . Therefore, our government did not join the treaty. However, Art. 2, chapter II of this treaty, it is fixed in black and white: “ Japan renounces all legal grounds and claims ... to the Kuril Islands and that part of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty under the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905. However, even after this, the story with the Kuriles does not end.

October 11.19 1956 d. the government of the Soviet Union, following the principles of friendship with neighboring states, signed with the Japanese government joint declaration, according to which the state of war between the USSR and Japan ended and peace, good neighborliness and friendly relations were restored between them. When signing the Declaration as a gesture of good will and no more promised to give Japan the two southernmost islands of Shikotan and Habomai, but only after the conclusion of a peace treaty between the countries.

12. However The United States after 1956 imposed a number of military agreements on Japan, replaced in 1960 by a single "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security", according to which US troops remained on its territory, and thereby the Japanese islands turned into a base of aggression against the Soviet Union. In connection with this situation, the Soviet government announced to Japan that it was impossible to transfer the promised two islands to it.. And in the same statement it was emphasized that according to the declaration of October 19, 1956, "peace, good neighborliness and friendly relations" between the countries were established. Therefore, an additional peace treaty may not be required.
Thus, the problem of the Southern Kuriles does not exist. It's been decided a long time ago. AND de jure and de facto the islands belong to Russia . In this regard, it might be to remind the Japanese of their arrogant statement in 1905 g., and also indicate that Japan was defeated in World War II and therefore has no rights to any territory, even to her ancestral lands, except for those granted to her by the victors.
AND our foreign ministry just as harshly, or in a milder diplomatic form it would be necessary to declare this to the Japanese and put an end to this, FOREVER stopping all negotiations and even conversations on this non-existent and humiliating problem of the dignity and authority of Russia.
And again the "territorial question"

However, starting from 1991 , repeatedly held meetings of the President Yeltsin and members of the Russian government, diplomats with government circles in Japan, during which the Japanese side every time importunately raises the question of the "northern Japanese territories."
Thus, in the Tokyo Declaration 1993 signed by the President of Russia and the Prime Minister of Japan, was again acknowledged the "existence of the territorial issue", and both sides promised to "make efforts" to resolve it. The question arises - could our diplomats really know that such declarations should not be signed, because the recognition of the existence of a "territorial issue" is contrary to the national interests of Russia (Article 275 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation "Treason") ??

As for the peace treaty with Japan, it is de facto and de jure in accordance with the Soviet-Japanese Declaration of October 19, 1956. not really needed. The Japanese do not want to conclude an additional official peace treaty, and there is no need. He Japan needs more, as the side that was defeated in the Second World War, rather than Russia.

A citizens of Russia should know the “problem” of the South Kuriles, sucked from the finger , her exaggeration, periodic media hype around her and the litigation of the Japanese - there is consequence illegal Japan's claims in violation of the obligations it has assumed, to strictly comply with the international obligations recognized and signed by it. And such a constant desire of Japan to reconsider the ownership of many territories in the Asia-Pacific region pervades Japanese politics throughout the 20th century.

Why the Japanese, one might say, have seized the South Kuriles with their teeth and are trying to seize them again illegally? But because the economic and military-strategic importance of this region is extremely great for Japan, and even more so for Russia. This an area of ​​colossal seafood riches(fish, living creatures, marine animals, vegetation, etc.), deposits of minerals, and rare earth minerals, energy sources, mineral raw materials.

For example, January 29 of this year. short information slipped through the Vesti (RTR) program: a a large deposit of the rare earth metal Rhenium(75th element in the periodic table, and the only one in the world ).
Scientists allegedly calculated that it would be enough to invest only 35 thousand dollars, but the profit from the extraction of this metal will allow to bring the whole of Russia out of the crisis in 3-4 years. Apparently, the Japanese know about this and that is why they are so persistently attacking the Russian government with a demand to give them the islands.

It must be said that for 50 years of ownership of the islands, the Japanese have not built or created anything capital on them, except for light temporary buildings. Our border guards had to rebuild barracks and other buildings at the outposts. The entire economic "development" of the islands, which the Japanese are shouting to the whole world today, consisted in the predatory robbery of the riches of the islands . During the Japanese "development" from the islands rookeries of fur seals, habitats of sea otters disappeared . Part of the population of these animals our Kuril residents have already restored .

Today, the economic situation of this entire island zone, like the whole of Russia, is difficult. Of course, significant measures are needed to support this region and take care of the Kuril people. According to the calculations of a group of deputies of the State Duma, it is possible to extract on the islands, as reported in the program "Parliamentary Hour" (RTR) on January 31 of this year, only fish products up to 2000 tons per year, with a net profit of about 3 billion dollars.
In military terms, the ridge of the Northern and Southern Kuriles with Sakhalin constitutes a complete closed infrastructure of the strategic defense of the Far East and the Pacific Fleet. They enclose the Sea of ​​Okhotsk and turn it into an inland one. This is the area deployment and combat positions of our strategic submarines.

Without the South Kuriles, we will get a "hole" in this defense. Control over the Kuriles ensures free access of the fleet to the ocean - after all, until 1945, our Pacific Fleet, starting from 1905, was practically locked in its bases in Primorye. The means of detection on the islands provide long-range detection of air and surface enemy, the organization of anti-submarine defense of the approaches to the passages between the islands.

In conclusion, one should note such a feature in the relationship of the Russia-Japan-US triangle. It is the United States that confirms the "legitimacy" of the ownership of the islands of Japan in spite of all international treaties they have signed .
If so, then our Foreign Ministry has every right, in response to the claims of the Japanese, to offer them to demand the return of Japan of its "southern territories" - the Caroline, Marshall and Mariana Islands.
These archipelagos former colonies of Germany, captured by Japan in 1914. Japan's dominion over these islands was sanctioned by the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. After the defeat of Japan, all these archipelagos came under US control.. So Why shouldn't Japan demand that the United States return the islands to her? Or lack of spirit?
As you can see, there is explicit double standard in Japanese foreign policy.

And one more fact that clarifies the general picture of the return of our Far Eastern territories in September 1945 and the military significance of this region. The Kuril operation of the 2nd Far Eastern Front and the Pacific Fleet (August 18 - September 1, 1945) provided for the liberation of all the Kuril Islands and the capture of the island of Hokkaido.

The accession of this island to Russia would be of great operational and strategic importance, since it would ensure the complete isolation of the "fencing" of the Sea of ​​​​Okhotsk by our island territories: the Kurils - Hokkaido - Sakhalin. But Stalin canceled this part of the operation, saying that with the liberation of the Kuriles and Sakhalin, we had resolved all our territorial issues in the Far East. A we don't need foreign land . In addition, the capture of Hokkaido will cost us a lot of blood, unnecessary losses of sailors and paratroopers in the most last days war.

Stalin here showed himself to be a real statesman, taking care of the country, its soldiers, and not an invader, coveting foreign territories that were very accessible in that situation for the capture.
Source

From the editors of "Russia Forever":At the end of 2016, the Kuril problem in relations between the Russian Federation and Japan became extremely urgent again. It is not even the long-term systemic and strategic persistence of Japanese diplomacy that is striking, but the acceptability of the logic of certain compromises on our part in the issue of the South Kuriles.

If at the beginning of 2016 the Kremlin declared that the topic of the South Kuril Islands was closed, and Russian sovereignty over them was not in doubt, then in September a new formula appeared:Kuriles in exchange for close cooperationas it was done with China. The Russian leader openly stressed that in exchange for economic cooperation, we gave up the territory that had been under the jurisdiction of the USSR since 1929. And if Japan is ready to cooperate, then it can get the lands that belonged to it until 1945 - a deal with China became possible "against the very high level of trust that had developed between Russia and China by that time. And if we achieve the same high level confidence with Japan, then here we can findsomecompromises."

But it was the territorial deal with China in 2004, at the same time, that immediately launched new round Japanese demands on Russia as a potentially successful event with due diplomatic perseverance in bargaining and consistent media aggression on the issue of territorial claims.

Here is a detailed analysis of the history of the Kuril issue and the problem of bilateral relations caused by the territorial claims of Japan, considered from the point of view of Russia's national interests, published in 2005, but extremely revealing from today.

Then, in 2004-2005, there was a landmark stage of the aforementioned aggravation of Japanese claims to the Kuriles, but a decade has passed, and things are still there? Or already... - the reader can judge for himself whether the Russian position in defense of its territorial sovereignty has now strengthened?

Article "The 'Kuril Problem' and Russia's National Interests"published in: Bulletin of the Pacific State Economic University. 2005. No. 4. S. 106-124.

In Russian-Japanese relations, the year 2005 was marked by a number of memorable dates. This is the 150th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, and the 100th anniversary of the end of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, and the 60th anniversary of the victory over Japan in World War II. All these dates are connected with the most acute problem of bilateral relations caused by Japan's territorial claims.

The unexpected transfer of 2.5 Russian islands to China (1), the statements of V. Putin and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation S. Lavrov about the possibility of transferring Shikotan and the Habomai ridge to Japan, the visit of the President of the Russian Federation to Japan in 2005 again exacerbated the issue of the so-called "northern territories". As the well-known researcher B.I. Tkachenko notes, “the basis for the correct solution of the“ Kuril problem ”and other problems in the field of international relations should be the national interests of Russia, the Russian people - the current and future generations of Russian citizens, of course, in dialectical harmony with the norms international law and on the basis of assessments of the effectiveness of foreign policy and specific foreign policy measures, directions and doctrines of foreign policy ...

It is the duty of historians, together with international lawyers, to comprehensively and convincingly show the Russian and international community the unlawfulness of Japanese claims to the Russian Far Eastern territories - the Kuriles and South Sakhalin.

What are these islands, how legitimate are Japan's claims, and what is Russia's national interest?

Usually they talk about Japan's claims to four islands: Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Habomai. However, this is not entirely true. The Kuril Islands consist of two parallel ridges of islands - the Greater Kuril (divided into 3 groups: southern, middle and northern) and the Lesser Kuril. The large islands of Iturup (length about 200 km, area - 6725 km²) and Kunashir (length - 123 km, area - 1550 km²) belong to the southern group of the Great Kuril ridge. The Lesser Kuril Ridge consists of 6 small islands: Shikotan, Zeleny, Anuchin, Polonsky, Yuri, Tanfilyev, as well as small reef groups of islands included in this ridge: Demina, Lisya, Shishki; islands Signalny, Storozhevoy and surface rocks Cave and Surprising.

The islands of the Lesser Kuril Ridge, with the exception of the largest Shikotan (average size - 28 × 10 km, area - 182 km²), the Japanese call Habomai, after the name of the village in the eastern part of the island. Hokkaido. Their total area is about 200 km². The Lesser Kuril Ridge is extended 105.5 km to the northeast, counting from the extreme eastern cape of Hokkaido, in a line parallel to the Greater Kuril Ridge 48 km south of the latter. Thus, even without counting the small islands, Japan disputes not 4, but 8 islands, which even psychologically significantly changes the situation.

The Kuril Islands are of strategic importance for maintaining the defense capability, preserving the guarantees of sovereignty and independence, and the national security of Russia. All the straits leading from the Sea of ​​Okhotsk to the Pacific Ocean pass through the Kuril Islands. In the event of the transfer of Iturup and Kunashir to Japan, it will fully control the Catherine Strait. Through it, free, unhindered and uncontrolled passage of submarines of the US and Japanese navies will be fully realized. This, in turn, will reduce the combat stability of Russia's strategic nuclear forces and, above all, nuclear submarines. According to military experts, the loss of at least part of the Kuriles will lead to violations of the military infrastructure and the integrity of the unified strategic defense in the Russian Far East.

Iturup, Kunashir and Shikotan have naturally prepared areas for the deployment of armed forces, especially missile defense systems. The deep-water Kasatka Bay on Iturup is a unique place in military-strategic terms: here in 1941 the Japanese Navy was able to covertly place itself before a surprise attack on the US fleet in Hawaii (Pearl Harbor). The same territories can be used militarily against the Russian Pacific Fleet with equal success.

From the point of view of geopolitics, the main wealth of any country is land, since the population of the planet is constantly growing, and resources are limited. The area of ​​the South Kuril Islands is more than 8600 km², which is several times larger than Luxembourg and roughly corresponds to the area of ​​Cyprus, Lebanon, Jamaica. Therefore, the importance of this subregion will only increase. And if we take into account the continental shelf and sea areas, then the area of ​​the South Kuriles subregion significantly exceeds the territories of many European states (2). In addition, the South Kuril Islands are a completely unique combination of natural, recreational and territorial resources.

Speaking about the important economic significance of these islands, it should be noted that 65 thousand hectares are reserved lands. Wild, almost untouched nature, hot mineral springs and balneological mud make it possible to use these territories as a recreation and tourism zone, as well as medical and recreational activities. The southern islands of the Kuril archipelago are covered with forests (spruce, fir, velvet, etc.), suitable, especially in Kunashir, for use as timber. Fur-bearing animals (mink, fox, beaver, etc.), rookeries of sea animals (fur seals, seals, sea lions, etc.), bird nests are of high economic value. The water area adjacent to the islands is rich in various hydrobionts, the area is promising for mariculture and the production of seaweed. It has the richest concentrations of red algae in the world, accounting for 89% of the reserves used for biotechnology in the entire Far East region.

The nature of the Southern Kuriles is unique. In a relatively small area, the reserves of marine bioresources reach 5 million tons, which makes it possible to annually catch up to 1.5 million tons of fish, including valuable species, and, according to some estimates, can bring Russia up to 4 billion US dollars a year .

Fish processing plays a major role in the economy of the islands. The leading and largest enterprise in this industry in the Far East, ZAO Ostrovnoy Fish Processing Plant, is located on Shikotan. CJSC Krabozavodsky is also located here. Yuzhno-Kurilsky Kombinat LLC operates in Kunashir, and the Kuril Fish Factory works in Iturup.

In addition, the Japanese have long appreciated the colossal importance of other economic resources. The islands disputed by them are the richest sources of minerals. The valuation of only explored reserves and probable resources of gold is approximately 1.2 billion US dollars, silver - 3.4 billion (at world market prices at the beginning of 1988). The total cost estimate of the predicted resources of copper, zinc and lead is -9.7 billion US dollars, sulfur - 5.6 billion. The total explored mineral reserves in the South Kuriles, without reserves of titanomagnetites, at world prices are estimated at least at 45.8 billion USD .

The main mineral resource of the South Kuril shelf is titanomagnetite ores in the form of placers with an admixture of rare earth elements. According to the Institute of Mining of the Far Eastern Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, from titanium-magnetite raw materials only in the hall. Prostor at Iturup can produce final products in the form of metallic titanium, iron powder and vanadium (excluding rare earths) with a total value of 2252.277 billion US dollars. at world market prices in 1992. In addition, Iturup has the only deposit of rhenium - a rare "space" metal, 1 kg of which costs 3600 US dollars.

Among other things, according to the weekly "Arguments and Facts", the richest oil deposits worth tens of billions of dollars are hidden in the shelf of the South Kuriles, there are gas reserves. Hydrocarbon reserves on the continental shelf are estimated at 1.6 billion tons of standard fuel. According to preliminary estimates, the entire complex of natural resources of the South Kuril subregion is at least 2.5 trillion. USD .

Thus, the economic and military-strategic value of these territories, which some forces are trying to present as bare rocks, cannot be overestimated.

Disputes about the "originality" of these territories are pointless and counterproductive. The indigenous population of the Kuriles, like Hokkaido, were the Ainu (Kuril race), who did not have their own statehood. Japan and Russia began the development of these territories at about the same time. Until 1855, there was no officially established border between the two powers, and each of them considered the Kuriles to be its territory.

This state of affairs led to various conflicts. Thus, the famous Russian navigator Vice-Admiral V. M. Golovnin, who made two round-the-world voyages (in 1807-1809 on the Diana and in 1817-1819 on the Kamchatka), was captured during the exploration of the Kuriles on Kunashir the Japanese. Together with him, 8 crew members were captured. The future corresponding member of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences (1818) spent 26 months in Japanese captivity (1811-1813) and was released only after news of Russia's victory over Napoleon reached Japan.

The Russian government has repeatedly offered Japan to sign a border treaty, but Japan has consistently refused. Only during the hardest for Russia Crimean War (1853-1856), when Russia waged an unequal struggle against England, France, the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Sardinia, Japan considered that the time had come for territorial demarcation. It should be noted that during this war Japan provided its bases to the Anglo-French squadron for attacks on Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and actually threatened Russia with joining the enemy coalition. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the Russian mission (headed by Vice-Admiral E.V. Putyatin), having lost the Diana frigate in a shipwreck, found itself in a difficult situation, because it was in danger of colliding with British and French warships, constantly cruising along the Far East coast of Russia.

Under these conditions, on February 7 (today this date in Japan is celebrated as the "Northern Territories Day"), 1855, the Russian-Japanese Treaty "On Trade and Borders" was signed in the Japanese city of Shimoda. It should be noted that, despite the difficult circumstances of the signing of the treaty, it marked the beginning of the establishment of Russian-Japanese diplomatic and trade relations, opened the ports of Shimoda, Hakodate and Nagasaki for Russian ships. It is important to emphasize that the first article of this document proclaimed "eternal peace" between our countries. The agreement established the border between the islands of Urup and Iturup, Sakhalin was declared "undivided". Thus, the South Kuriles, which she now claims, went to Japan, and the rest of the Kuril Islands became the territory of Russia.

The next bilateral treaty on territorial delimitation was concluded only 20 years later. During this time, the situation has changed significantly. In 1867, accelerated modernization began in Japan, known as the "Meiji revolution", there was a transition from isolationism to a policy of active expansion. However, an attempt that same year to send 300 Japanese colonists to Sakhalin ended in failure. At the same time, Russia was successfully developing Sakhalin, gaining a foothold in Primorye and the Amur region, but the European (Balkan) direction remained the main one for it. Russia was preparing for a war with the Ottoman Empire in order to take revenge for the heavy defeat in the Crimean War, restore its authority, liberate the fraternal Slavic and Orthodox peoples from Turkish oppression and increase its influence in this region. For the sake of solving this main task, Russia was ready to make significant sacrifices, especially since there were clearly not enough resources for all areas. So, in 1867, Russia sold Alaska to the United States for a symbolic price with the right to buy it after 100 years.

Against this background, on April 25 (May 7), 1875, a new Russian-Japanese treaty was concluded in St. Petersburg. According to the Petersburg Treatise, Russia exchanged 18 central and northern Kuril Islands for Japan's rights to Sakhalin. The Petersburg Treaty, as noted by Yu. Georgievsky, Candidate of Historical Sciences, author of the book "The Kuriles - Islands in the Ocean of Problems", is the only historical example in Russian-Japanese relations of a cardinal solution of the territorial problem by peaceful means on the basis of mutual concessions and with maximum consideration of the strategic interests of the parties on This moment .

However, in the future, the geopolitical interests of the two powers increasingly contradicted each other. The onset of the imperialist era of the military redistribution of the world was marked in relations between the two countries by the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. It should be emphasized that the aggressor was Japan, which attacked Russia without declaring war. Despite the fact that the Japanese did not manage to win a complete victory, this war was unsuccessful for our country. A series of serious defeats "from a backward Asian country" and dissatisfaction in society with the terms of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty led to the revolution of 1905-1907. According to Article 9 of the Peace Treaty, Russia ceded to Japan in perpetual and complete possession of the southern part of Sakhalin Island up to the 50th parallel.

Japan, seeking to justify the demand for the cession of South Sakhalin to it, which clearly contradicted the provisions of the Petersburg Treaty, put forward the thesis that the war crosses out previous international legal agreements, and achieved recognition of this thesis by the Russian delegation. Thus, Annex No. 10 to the Portsmouth Peace Treaty states that as a result of the war, "all trade agreements between Japan and Russia were canceled." Thus, Japan deprived itself of the opportunity to appeal to all treaties concluded before the Second World War. Moreover, by attacking Russia in 1904, Japan grossly violated the "eternal peace" proclaimed in the first article of the Shimoda Treaty, thereby losing the opportunity to refer to this document.

Japan grossly violated the Portsmouth Peace Treaty itself. For example, in April 1918 the Japanese imperialists invaded Vladivostok. In 1918-1925. they occupied and tried to seize Primorye, the Amur Region, Transbaikalia and Northern Sakhalin. Even against the background of other interventionists, the Japanese were distinguished by aggressiveness and cruelty (3).

As the candidates of historical sciences A.M. Ivkova and E.V. Cheberyak rightly note, "Japanese militarism is a monster comparable to Nazism." Back in 1931, the Japanese invaders occupied Manchuria, creating a springboard for further aggression. Thus, two years before A. Hitler came to power, the first hotbed of the Second World War appeared. On July 7, 1937, Japanese troops continued their aggression against China. Already on July 28, 1937, Beijing fell. The invaders behaved extremely cruelly towards the civilian population. So, on December 13, 1937, the Japanese fascists captured Nanking, where they exterminated about 300 thousand people. It should be especially noted that in modern Japan they are trying to hush up these crimes, which can be qualified as genocide against the Chinese people. According to the Kommersant-Vlast magazine, about 10 million civilians were killed in China during the years of Japanese occupation.

It is not surprising that Japan's attempts to rewrite school textbooks, removing these hard facts from them, caused a storm of indignation in the PRC, the Republic of Korea and the DPRK. At the same time, the silence of Russia is surprising. This is all the more strange, since Japanese propaganda, hushing up its crimes and inflating "human rights violations" in relation to the Japanese population of South Sakhalin and the Kuriles and Japanese prisoners of war, seeks to turn the main ally of Nazi Germany into an innocent victim, and the Soviet Union into an aggressor and occupier , who illegally seized "originally Japanese territories." It is characteristic that Japanese propaganda, inflating revanchist sentiments towards Russia, simultaneously teaches its citizens to forgive the Americans. But it was the United States that not only bombed and occupied the Japanese islands, but also dropped nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

In Hiroshima alone, according to 2004 data, 237,062 inhabitants died (most from radiation sickness). In fact, these were acts of genocide for which the Americans are not going to apologize. Even one of the fathers of the atomic bomb, the Hungarian immigrant physicist Leo Szilard, admitted: “This is a disgusting war crime, an inhuman massacre. If the Germans had done this, we would have tried them in Nuremberg and hanged them. But we got away with everything.”

Now the United States is Japan's main ally, so they are forgiven everything, even hundreds of thousands of mercilessly killed civilians. But Russia is a completely different matter, it does not know how to strictly and consistently protect its national interests, and Japan is not going to forgive anything for it. Therefore, from the entire history of the Second World War, Japanese propaganda seeks out only those facts that suit it and fit into the version of the "illegal seizure of the northern territories." Even the Hiroshima museum gives information that "after the atomic bombing, Stalin treacherously attacked Japan, as a result of which the legitimate Japanese territories were torn away."

As a result of this "study of history", according to the press service of the Hiroshima Prefecture, 25% of Japanese schoolchildren believe that the Soviet Union dropped an atomic bomb on them. If our country continues to take a passive position and do nothing, then soon we will have to justify ourselves for the crimes of others.

Russia and other countries of the anti-fascist coalition should remind the presumptuous falsifiers of history about the real role of Japan in World War II, including the inhuman treatment of prisoners of war, who were cut with samurai swords and who were tested with chemical and biological weapons.

They should also be reminded of the aggression against the USSR in the area of ​​Lake Khasan in July-August 1938, which ended in the defeat of the 19th Japanese division. In May 1939, the Japanese invaders attacked the closest ally of the USSR, the Mongolian People's Republic. Under the Mutual Assistance Treaty, the USSR provided military support to the MPR. During the fighting in May-September 1939, the Soviet-Mongolian troops under the leadership of commander G.K. Zhukov completely defeated the invading aggressors. These serious defeats were one of the main reasons why Japan did not dare to attack the USSR during the Great Patriotic War.

During almost the entire Second World War (September 1939 - September 1945) Japan and the Soviet Union were not at war, because. in April 1941, a Neutrality Pact was concluded between them for a period of 5 years. However, both sides viewed this Pact as more of a tactical gain in time. The USSR needed it to concentrate all its forces against Germany, and Japan needed it to continue aggression in the Pacific.

It should be noted that during the Second World War, the Japanese militarists did not stop military provocations. In 1944 alone, about 200 such violations were recorded, including many cases of shelling of Soviet territory. At sea, the aggressor's warships detained and sank Soviet merchant ships. In addition, the Japanese supplied the Nazis with intelligence information. To repel a possible Japanese attack, the USSR was forced to keep up to 47 divisions and 50 brigades in the Far East, as well as the Pacific Fleet. Thus, Japan actually grossly violated the neutrality treaty.

You can often hear that it would be very difficult for the USSR to wage a war on two fronts (against Germany and Japan). However, Japan did not have the resources for a war on two fronts (against the USSR in the West and the USA, Great Britain and their allies in the Pacific theater of operations). Therefore, Japan's non-participation in the war against the USSR was caused not by the good will of the Japanese government, but by pragmatic considerations. The Japanese concentrated the millionth Kwantung Army on the border of our country and waited for Germany to inflict a decisive defeat on the USSR. In this case (for example, after the fall of Moscow or Stalingrad), they were ready to enter the war and, with minimal losses, capture the resource-rich territories of Siberia and the Far East (the Japanese General Staff developed specific plans for a war against the USSR with exact dates beginning and end of hostilities). However, these plans were not destined to come true, since the Soviet Union defeated Nazi Germany and its allies in Europe.

At the same time, the war in the Pacific theater of operations continued. The governments of Britain and the USA recognized in 1945 that if the USSR did not go to war with Japan, then they would need a 7 million army to invade the Japanese islands, while at the beginning of 1945 the American-British ground forces in the Pacific Ocean and in Southeast Asian countries numbered about 2 million people. In this case, according to the forecasts of the allies, the war would have dragged on for 18 months after the defeat of Germany. It should be noted that protracting the war and attempting to land on the Japanese islands would have led to huge casualties, and the governments of the Western powers, unlike the Stalinist leadership of the USSR, sought to minimize their losses as much as possible.

At the Yalta Conference in 1945, the USSR, the USA and Great Britain agreed on the entry of the Soviet Union into the war with Japan 2-3 months after the end of the war in Europe, provided that South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands were returned to it after the end of the war. On April 5, 1945, the Soviet government announced that the neutrality treaty had become null and void through the fault of the Japanese side. However, this warning did not bring Japan to its senses, and it rejected the US, British and Chinese demand of 26 July for unconditional surrender. The USSR began hostilities against Japan on August 9, 1945, and in August-September liberated Northeast China, North Korea, South Sakhalin and the Kuriles from the Japanese invaders. On September 2, 1945, Japan signed an act of unconditional surrender, thereby agreeing to any peace conditions proposed by the allies. In 1946, in accordance with this act and the decisions of the allied powers, South Sakhalin and the Kuriles were included in the USSR.

In 1951, a peace treaty was signed in San Francisco between Japan and the Allies, according to which Tokyo renounced all rights, titles and claims to South Sakhalin and the Kuriles. It was during that period that a third, the United States, seriously interfered in relations between the two countries.

It would seem that the Americans should have been grateful to the USSR. The Soviet Union was their ally in World War II and, having suffered huge losses in it, nevertheless, true to its allied duty, entered the war with Japan, thereby saving many lives of American soldiers. However, the US ruling circles have always acted according to the well-known principle of all imperialists since the ancient rome- "divide and rule". In the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Britain and the United States supported Japan, hoping to subsequently weaken both her and Russia in the first place. As a result, they received a new powerful enemy in the face of Japan.

Their alliance with the USSR was forced and tactical. The monstrous in its cynicism phrase of Harry Truman, said at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, is well-known: "If the Russians win, we should help Germany, and if the Germans win, we should help Russia, and let them kill as many as possible." The situation changed after Pearl Harbor, when the US became involved in a war against the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis. In this situation, the USSR turned out to be a natural ally for them. Western powers provided the Soviet people the right to endure the main hardships of the war against fascism, but at the same time they were preparing for the struggle for the post-war redivision of the world. They used the power of the Soviet army to defeat Japan, but back in April 1945, Truman, who had just become US President, said that if the atomic the bomb will explode, "I'll have a club against these Russian guys." Subsequently, he ordered the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, seeking to scare not so much Japan as the USSR.

It should be noted that the USSR, which inflicted the largest defeat on the Japanese troops, did not receive its occupation zone on the Japanese islands. By the way, if Stalin managed to insist on his own and achieve the inclusion of Hokkaido in the occupation zone of the USSR, Japan could have expected the fate of Germany or Korea, which became divided countries, and against this background, the Kuriles would seem like an insignificant loss.

With the end of World War II, the USSR turned for the United States from an ally into an adversary in the Cold War. At the same time, the "spirit of the Elbe" was still strong in Western public opinion, so the United States had to disguise its true intentions. The United States used the "Kuril issue" to drive a wedge between the USSR and Japan, to prevent their possible rapprochement and to keep Japan forever in the orbit of its influence. Subsequently, one more goal was added to these goals: with a successful combination of circumstances, to establish military control over the South Kuriles and the strategically important Sea of ​​\u200b\u200bOkhotsk through allied Japan.

It should be noted that the San Francisco conference took place at the height of the Cold War. Moreover, the context of the Korean War (June 25, 1950 - July 27, 1953), which was the bloodiest in the second half of the 20th century, left its mark on it. It must be recalled that American troops fought on the side of South Korea, while the PRC and the USSR were secretly helping the DPRK. Mao Zedong sent about a million "volunteers" to the war, and Stalin sent the 64th air corps: 3 air divisions, 3 anti-aircraft gunnery divisions and a separate regiment of night fighters. There was a real threat of a new world war. Since January 1950, the USSR did not participate in the work of the UN Security Council in protest against the UN policy towards communist China, whose place in this organization was occupied by representatives of the Kuomintang government, which lost the war and was based in Taiwan.

In this situation, the United States did not allow the delegation of the PRC, the main ally of the USSR, to participate in the conference, which predetermined the position of the Soviet leadership, which refused to sign the treaty. A similar position was taken by other countries of the socialist camp: Poland and Czechoslovakia.

In the San Francisco peace treaty developed by the United States and England, signed on September 8, 1951, Japan's refusal from the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin, agreed with the USSR in Yalta, was recorded. But this agreement was drawn up very ambiguously, and it did not indicate to whom exactly the Kuriles should go, the islands were also not named, which was one of the reasons why the USSR did not sign the San Francisco Treaty.

Prominent Russian statesman Yu.M. Luzhkov (4) considers Stalin's refusal to sign the San Francisco Treaty a gross mistake. In his opinion, the territorial issue fell victim to the globalist passions of the then party leadership, which considered it small compared to the strategic alliance with communist China. As Luzhkov rightly believes, with the signing of the treaty, even in its degraded final version, the USSR did not lose anything; on the contrary, all contradictions in relations with Japan would be removed. At the same time, according to Luzhkov, the fact of not signing the treaty in no way cancels the fullness of Russia's rights to the Kuril Islands.

Thus, Japan renounced all rights and titles to all the Kuril Islands. Consequently, she did not even have the right to raise the issue of the return of some territories. Moreover, the country that signed the unconditional surrender could not put any conditions on the winners.

However, there was no peace treaty between the USSR and Japan. According to international law, a peace treaty must include 4 mandatory clauses:

1. Termination of the state of war.

2. Restoration of diplomatic relations.

3. Solving the issue of reparations.

4. Fixing new state borders.

All these issues were not resolved due to the non-signing of the San Francisco Treaty by the Soviet Union, and they had to be settled on a bilateral basis. In the meantime, the Japanese economy was developing rapidly, and the United States skillfully directed the revanchist aspirations of the country they occupied into an anti-Soviet channel. The issue of the "northern territories" became a kind of outlet for the infringed Japanese self-consciousness.

Under such conditions, from June 1955 to October 1956, negotiations were held between Japan and the Soviet Union with the aim of concluding a peace treaty, which did not lead to an agreement: the Japanese side stated that Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and the Habomai ridge were the territory of Japan and demanded their return, and the Soviet side was ready to compromise: transfer the relatively small Shikotan and Habomai to Japan, but retain the larger Iturup and Kunashir.

As a result, instead of a peace treaty, Japan and the USSR signed a Joint Declaration on October 19, 1956, which provided for the termination of the state of war and the restoration of diplomatic relations. In addition, the USSR renounced all reparations and claims against Japan, undertook to release and repatriate to Japan all its citizens convicted in our country. The signing of the declaration opened the way for Japan to the UN, since the USSR undertook to support its request to join this organization. Article 9 of this document states that after the establishment of diplomatic relations, the parties will continue negotiations on the conclusion of a peace treaty; and the USSR, as a gesture of goodwill, agrees to the transfer after the conclusion of a peace treaty of the Habomai ridge and Fr. Shikotan. Thus, the declaration gave Japan much more than the USSR. But in 1960, Japan signed a military treaty with the United States, which secured the presence of American bases on its territory. In the USSR, this pact was rightly regarded as aggressive.

A "memorandum" was sent to Tokyo stating that a new situation was emerging in which it was impossible to fulfill the promise to hand over Habomai and Shikotan.

As it became known after the declassification of the archives, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, known as the inspirer and promoter of the policy "from a position of strength" and "balancing on the brink of war", exerted brutal pressure on Japan. In particular, he sent a message to the Japanese government, in which he stated that if Japan agreed to sign an agreement with the transfer of only two islands, then the United States would take Okinawa from her. After that, Japan abruptly changed its position, demanding all four islands at once (5). Following this, the USSR declared that while foreign troops were on the territory of Japan, the implementation of the declaration was impossible.

Early 60s - mid 80s. The Japanese government actively supports and stimulates the "Public Movement for the Return of the Islands", but does not officially raise these demands to the principle of state policy, without linking it with the development of economic and cultural ties with the USSR. This indirectly indicates that Japan understands the weakness of its argumentation. This is also evidenced by attempts to "scientifically substantiate" the belonging of the islands of Shikotan and Habomai to about. Hokkaido: not being able to deny their rejection of all the Kuriles, the Japanese are undertaking a "workaround", trying to prove that the islands they dispute "do not belong to the Kurils." Naturally, these "evidence" does not stand up to scrutiny.

The situation has been changing since the mid-1980s, when a thaw in Soviet-Japanese relations is planned. This is happening against the background of the growth of the political, economic and military power of Japan and the beginning of the collapse of the USSR. In this situation, Tokyo hoped for territorial concessions from the USSR in exchange for economic assistance. On April 18, 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev signed the "Joint Soviet-Japanese Statement", paragraph 4 of which provided for the development and conclusion of an agreement between Japan and the USSR, "including the problem of territorial delimitation, taking into account the positions of the parties on the ownership of the Habomai Islands, Shikotan Island, Kunashir Island and the Iturup".

Thus, for the first time in an official document, the USSR acknowledged the existence of a "territorial problem", which, of course, is a strategic mistake. However, this statement does not mention the transfer of any territories to Japan after the conclusion of the peace treaty. Moreover, in his speech at a joint meeting of the chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, M.S. Gorbachev commented on the official position of our country regarding the Tokyo Declaration of 1956: “It speaks not only of the end of the state of war and the restoration of diplomatic relations, but also of the transfer Japan of the two islands after the conclusion of a peace treaty. We believe that one should rely only on that part of the document that became a historical reality, had international legal and physical consequences. after 30 years to reanimate. The chance was then missed. Since then, new realities have arisen. From them we must proceed ".

Thus, despite all subsequent accusations, Gorbachev was not going to make any territorial concessions, but in the conditions of the political tug-of-war between Gorbachev and Yeltsin, Japanese diplomacy made a bet on the leadership of the RSFSR, which sought to seize the initiative in international affairs from the "center". In fact, B.N. Yeltsin crossed out the entire policy of the USSR in 1960-1991, declaring the unconditional recognition of the 1956 Declaration. Moreover, in the "Tokyo Declaration on Russian-Japanese Relations", signed on October 13, 1993 by the Russian President and Prime Minister Japan, it is planned to create a joint Russian-Japanese commission to develop the text of a peace treaty by resolving the issue of belonging to the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Habomai.

It is significant that the transfer of Iturup and Kunashir was not even envisaged by the 1956 Declaration. But the parties did not move further than this, since the issue acquired a wide public response and the injustice of Japanese claims was so obvious that their satisfaction would have been political death for Yeltsin.

President Vladimir Putin feels much more confident inside the country, which gives him reason to try to solve the territorial problems he inherited. He intends to solve them through compromise, but according to the sad tradition that has developed recently, compromise at the expense of Russia. On this basis, the border issue with China was finally resolved.

Russia, as already noted, has lost 2.5 islands, but, as Foreign Minister S. Lavrov explained, this is not a loss of territory, but "a clarification of borders." According to the same scheme, the Russian leadership intends to "clarify" the borders with Japan. Its official representatives declared that they recognized the 1956 declaration and were ready to transfer Habomai and Shikotan to Japan after the signing of the peace treaty. However, even these obvious concessions are not enough for Japan. She perceives them only as a signal to increase pressure on Russia, believing that by agreeing to give up two islands, Russia will give up all four. Thus, Japan deprives the Russian leadership of the opportunity to create at least the appearance of a compromise and "save face." Thus, during his pre-New Year's press conference in 2004, the Russian president found himself in an extremely uncomfortable position when a Japanese journalist said: "Two islands are not enough for us, we want four."

In response, Vladimir Putin ruled out the possibility of transferring the four southern islands of the Kuril chain to Japan and recalled that only two islands were mentioned in the Soviet-Japanese declaration of 1956, which was ratified by both Japan and the Soviet Union. "If Japan ratified the declaration, why does Japan raise the issue of four islands?" the president said. "Russia is the legal successor of the USSR, and we will try to fulfill all the legal obligations that the USSR assumed, no matter how difficult it may be." According to Putin, Article 9 of the 1956 declaration states that "as an obligatory precondition possible transfer between the two islands is the signing of a peace treaty, which unequivocally reads as a settlement of all further territorial disputes. "In addition, Putin drew attention to the wording contained in the declaration:" The Soviet Union is ready to transfer the two islands, but it does not say under what conditions to transfer, when to transfer and whose sovereignty will extend to these territories.

One of Putin's closest associates, B.V. Gryzlov (6), stated that "by and large, there are no problems," since Japan was deprived of the Kuriles "as punishment for more than 50 years of aggression against near and far neighbors in the Pacific basin." It should be noted here that Articles 77, 80, 107 of the UN Charter, as a punishment for unleashing the Second World War, provide for the withdrawal of territories that served as the base of aggression. The Kuril Islands were such a base of aggression not only against the United States, but also against the USSR, creating a threat to security in the Far East. “The claims to the South Kuriles,” Gryzlov noted, “is, in fact, an attempt to revise the results of the Second World War, question many more borders drawn by the victorious countries in the Second World War, and politically return the world 60 years ago.” According to Gryzlov, the transfer of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan was a gesture of goodwill and "was stipulated by conditions that were not met by the Japanese side, so it did not take place" .

Here the following should be noted.

Firstly, the declaration differs from the treaty in that it is rather a protocol of intent, is adopted on the basis of the clause "while the previous conditions remain" and does not oblige the parties to strictly follow the declared, especially after half a century. N.S. Khrushchev believed that such a prospect would keep Japan from military-political cooperation with the United States. But a few years later, Japan and the United States completely changed the conditions - the 1960 treaty created a real threat that, in response to a gesture of goodwill, military bases directed against the USSR (Russia) would be created on the transferred islands. NATO's advance towards our western borders, contrary to verbal promises and assurances of friendship, once again confirms the reality of this threat.

Secondly, the declaration cannot be taken out of the general context. It in no way cancels either the results of World War II, or the San Francisco Peace Treaty, or Japan's renunciation of any rights, titles and claims to all the Kuriles, and, consequently, Russia's full sovereignty over these territories.

Third, a peace treaty should not be an end in itself, and if it is impossible to sign it without losing part of its territory, then there is no point in signing it at all.

In his September 2005 televised interview with Russian citizens, Putin also confirmed that all four islands are "under the sovereignty of Russian Federation, this is enshrined in international law, these are the results of the Second World War. "In practice, the" Kuril problem "could be closed on this, but Putin declared his readiness to continue negotiations, giving Japan hope to achieve its own. To pressure on Russia" an ally in the anti-terrorist coalition " The U.S. and Japanese Foreign Ministers held consultations in Washington on February 19, 2005, which resulted in a joint statement. northern territories". That is, Russia is offered to pay for the membership card of the Japanese-American club, which guarantees security in Asia, with the South Kuriles. It is characteristic that this happens exactly 60 years after the Yalta Conference, where the United States asked the USSR to enter the war with Japan in exchange for Kuriles and South Sakhalin.

The Russian Foreign Ministry immediately expressed bewilderment at the attempt to "internationalize the problem of a peace treaty with Japan," pointing out that "such "hints" with the involvement of a third party are unlikely to have a beneficial effect on the dialogue on such a difficult and delicate issue" .

On the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of Japan's unconditional surrender, the head of the Japanese government, D. Kaizumi, issued a statement in which he apologized for his country's crimes in World War II and its aggressive policy in the first half of the 20th century. However, territorial claims against Russia, which are nothing more than an attempt to revise the results of the Second World War, and other steps taken by Japan do not give grounds to believe in the sincerity of such statements. In particular, Japan has immortalized the memory of Emperor Hirohito, who led the country during World War II and, along with Hitler and Mussolini, bears full responsibility for its unleashing. In May 2005, the Japanese parliament passed a law renaming Greenery Day (April 29, Hirohito's birthday) as Siowa Era Day (Siowa is the name chosen by the late emperor for his reign).

Summing up, we can state that the transfer of the South Kuriles to Japan (in whole or in part) will lead to a number of negative consequences:

1 . Lowering the prestige of the Russian Federation in the international arena, as territorial concessions to a foreign power do not add respect to the state and raise doubts about the independence of its foreign policy.

2 . Russia will be neutralized geopolitically as a "center of power" in the Far East, while the geostrategic positions of the United States and Japan in the immediate vicinity of our country's borders will be strengthened.

3 . The solution of the issue of the transfer of the Kuril Islands to Japan in essence will be the first step in revising the results of the Second World War, which may be followed by German territorial claims against Russia (Kaliningrad region), Poland (Silesia), the Czech Republic (Sudet), Finland against Russia (Karelia), Japan to the USA (islands and archipelagos in the Pacific Ocean), etc.

4. The territorial cession to Japan will create a dangerous precedent and against the background of the redistribution of the post-Soviet space will become a signal for the redistribution of Russia itself. (Secret talks between the US and China have already taken place on this issue.)

5 . The transfer of the islands will not solve the Kuril problem. Firstly, it can be assumed that Japan's appetites will not be limited to only two or four islands, it can raise the question of the entire Kuril chain, and then, possibly, of Sakhalin (Japan has forces and even parliamentary political parties who advocate just such a broad interpretation of the "territorial question"). Secondly, there may well be forces in Russia that will consider this decision unfair and will fight for the revision of the treaty, using all possible means, including violent ones.

6 . The authority of the leadership inside the country will inevitably fall, which can lead to mass protests with unpredictable consequences (suffice it to recall that even the defeat of Russia in a football match with Japan at the 2002 World Cup led to mass pogroms in the center of Moscow).

7 . Perhaps the emergence of "Transnistrian syndrome". Disagreement with the decision of the "center" may stimulate the growth of separatist tendencies in the Far East region, which will aggravate the political situation in the country as a whole. We must not forget the statements of the Sakhalin Cossacks about their readiness to defend the Kuriles with weapons in their hands in the event of their transfer to Japan, their calls to create secret weapons stores in the taiga, to prepare for guerrilla war.

8. There will be problems of immigrants from the Kuril Islands and related issues of employment, housing, schools, kindergartens, material assistance, etc.

9 . Russia will suffer huge economic damage. It is quite possible that the standard of living of the population of the Russian Federation will decrease due to additional expenses for the resettlement and improvement of the inhabitants of the islands. The problem of the country's food supply will become aggravated due to the loss of the main region for providing the country with seafood.

10. Significant damage will be done to the country's defense capability.

11 . New interethnic problems may arise (between those Russians who will remain to live on the islands and the Japanese). Inevitably, there will be problems of pairing two ways of life (two mentalities) based on different socio-political, economic, spiritual and cultural values. We have no experience in solving such problems.

12. By partially returning the territories over which we entered the war, Russia indirectly recognizes the injustice of the war with Japan, which will give a powerful impetus to Japanese revanchism.

13 . Veterans and national identity will be insulted, which can lead to a "brown revolution" or a complete loss of national self-respect, national identity and, as a result, the collapse of the country.

Thus, the "clarification" of the borders with Japan can lead to a national catastrophe. It should be emphasized that the consequences would be catastrophic even if "only" the islands of the Lesser Kuril Ridge were transferred. Of course, in this case, the economic damage will be significantly lower, and the damage to the military infrastructure will be less, but the political and moral consequences will not decrease. As B.I. Tkachenko rightly notes, "The very fact of conducting interstate negotiations on the Russian-Japanese "territorial problem" is already Japan's connivance in not recognizing the results of World War II and their conceptual revision" .

At the same time, Tkachenko theoretically admits the possibility of transferring two islands: "the transfer of the islands of the Lesser Kuril ridge to Japan in accordance with the Declaration of 1956 is possible in principle, but subject to an indispensable condition, namely: the elimination of foreign military bases and foreign military presence on Japanese territory in any form, the transformation of Japan into a neutral country, friendly to Russia. In this case, the requirements of domestic law regarding the change of the territory of Russia must be observed.

It should be noted that, firstly, the probability that Japan and the United States will agree to this reasonable condition is zero. And secondly, according to clause 8 of the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the RSFSR of June 12, 1990, "the territory of the RSFSR cannot be changed without the will of the people, expressed through a referendum." A referendum is necessary even when internal borders are changed, so the opinion of the people is indispensable. However, such a referendum is not beneficial to the current government, since holding it will turn it into a convenient target for the opposition. Therefore, the option outlined by Tkachenko is unrealizable in practice.

In this situation, when all Japan's claims are legally invalid and we have every reason to defend our positions, the inability to protect vital national interests can only be explained by political lack of will. Russia lacks a foreign policy strategy, as even retired diplomats admit. Thus, according to the former ambassador to Turkey (1998-2003) Alexander Lebedev, who worked in the Foreign Ministry for a decade and a half, "Russia has no coherent and intelligible foreign policy after the collapse of the USSR, in principle." Different government institutions, organizations, not to mention companies, have their own interests and approaches, but there is no unified national policy that provides for a long-term strategy of action, a clear hierarchy of goals (what is the main priority and what is a field for compromise), etc. . Therefore, "protection of national interests" remains only a declaration, not filled with concrete content.

Russia’s lack of a clear strategy (this applies not only to foreign policy) is due to two main reasons: a sharp change in the geopolitical (due to the collapse of the USSR) and socio-economic (due to the ongoing global transformation of Russian society) situation and the inadequacy of the domestic, primarily political, elite modern challenges.

In characterizing the contemporary Russian political elite, two main points should be noted. First, after the surge of upward mobility in 1991-1993. the upper strata of society began to close more and more to replenish with fresh forces "from below". The change of elites due to the peculiarities of the Russian political system and the absence of real competition between different political forces is practically excluded. The circulation of elites is also extremely difficult. The main criterion for moving up the social ladder is not professionalism, but personal devotion to superiors, thanks to which obedient performers who are not able to think independently and take initiative make a career. As a result of this negative selection, both the shortage of bright political leaders and the obvious lack of fresh ideas have become more and more acute in recent years.

Secondly, there was a delegitimization of the selection process for the political class, as a result of which the ruling elite was replenished with a mass of random people, including people from a criminal environment. Hence its low quality as a subject of strategic management of society, group egoism and the highest level corruption.

Moreover, the term "comprador" is applicable to a significant part of the Russian elite, since it mediates between foreign (primarily American and Western) capital, ideas, values, and Russia. This elite is supranational and cosmopolitan; for them, Russia is not their homeland, but a place of enrichment, "this country." The comprador elite is closely connected with the interests of the "civilized countries" and supports them to the detriment of national interests.

At a press conference in Moscow following the results of the Russia-EU summit on May 10, 2005, Russian President Vladimir Putin commented on the territorial claims of the Baltic neighbors as follows: "We are ready to sign a border agreement with Estonia and Latvia, but we hope that they will be accompanied by stupid claims of a territorial nature... Today in Europe, in the 21st century, when one side makes territorial claims to the other and at the same time wants to sign a border treaty, this is complete nonsense, soft-boiled boots. Japan's claims are no less "stupid";

D.Yu.Alekseev

NOTES

(1) During the visit of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin to China on October 14, 2004, an agreement was signed on the transfer of the Big Islands on the Argun River, Tarabarov and part of the Bolshoi Ussuriysky Island at the confluence of the Ussuri into the Amur (the last two islands were part of the composition of Khabarovsk). The total area of ​​these islands is 337 km². This is more than the area of ​​Malta or the areas of Liechtenstein, San Marino, Monaco, Gibraltar and the Vatican combined. The new border should pass through the summer cottages of Khabarovsk residents, in addition to economic damage, Russia will lose two frontier posts and the fortified area created to defend the city will lose its significance. It is also possible that the runway of the Khabarovsk airport will have to be moved, because. takeoff and landing approach glide path is located over the islands of Tarabarov and Bolshoi Ussuriysky.

(2) The area of ​​the 200-mile economic zone is 296,000 km²; for comparison, the area of ​​Italy is 301,200 km².

(3) The scope of this article does not allow dwelling in detail on the crimes of the Japanese interventionists, so I will give only one example: p. Ivanovka (a regional center in the Amur Region) was completely burned by the Japanese invaders, along with the inhabitants driven into a barn.

(4) Mayor of Moscow, co-chairman of the "Council of Wise Men" of Russia and Japan.

(5) The broadcast of the program "Mainland. The Kuril Islands: will we raise or lose?", Which was released on the channel "Litsa-TVC" on July 1, 2005.

(6) Chairman of the State Duma Federal Assembly Russian Federation, leader of United Russia.

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Relations between Russia and Japan have intensified to such an extent that they have not been in all 60 years since the restoration of diplomatic ties between the countries. The leaders of both countries constantly meet, discussing something. What exactly?

It is publicly stated that joint economic projects are the subject of discussion, but a number of experts believe otherwise: the real reason for the meetings is the territorial dispute over the Kuril Islands, which is being resolved by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. And then there's the Nikkei newspaper published information that Moscow and Tokyo seem to be planning to introduce joint management of the northern territories. So what - the Kuriles are preparing to transfer to Japan?

The thaw in relations became especially noticeable six months ago, during Shinzo Abe's May visit to Sochi. Then the Japanese prime minister called Russian President to "you", explaining that in Japan they refer only to a friend. Another sign of friendship was Tokyo's refusal to join the economic sanctions against Russia.

Abe proposed to Putin an eight-point economic cooperation plan in various areas - industry, energy, the gas sector, and trade partnerships. In addition, Japan is ready to invest in Russian healthcare and transport infrastructure. In general, a dream, not a plan! What about in return? Yes, the painful topic of the Kuril Islands was also touched upon. The parties agreed that the solution of the territorial dispute is an important step towards the signing of a peace treaty between the countries. That is, there were no hints about the transfer of the islands. Nevertheless, the first stone in the development of a sensitive topic was laid.

Danger of angering the dragon

Since then, the leaders of Russia and Japan have met on the sidelines of international summits.

In September, during the Economic Forum in Vladivostok, Abe again promised economic cooperation, but this time he directly addressed Putin with a call for joint efforts to solve the problem of the northern territories, which has been overshadowing Russian-Japanese relations for several decades.

In the meantime, the Nikkei newspaper reported that Tokyo expects to establish joint control over the islands of Kunashir and Iturup, while hoping to get Habomai and Shikotan in full in the future. The publication writes that Shinzo Abe should discuss this issue with Vladimir Putin during their meeting scheduled for December 15.

Nihon Kezai also wrote about the same: the Japanese government is discussing a project of joint governance with Russia as a measure that will help move the territorial problem off the ground. The publication even reports: there is information that Moscow has begun the process of setting goals.

And then came the poll results. It turns out that already more than half of the Japanese "are ready to show flexibility in resolving the issue of the Kuril Islands." That is, they agree that Russia not hand over four disputed islands, but only two - Shikotan and Habomai.

Now the Japanese press is writing about the transfer of the islands as a practically resolved issue. It is unlikely that information on such an important topic is sucked from the finger. The main question remains: is Moscow really ready to give up territories in exchange for economic cooperation with Japan and its help in the fight against sanctions?

Obviously, with all the goodness of Putin’s communication with Abe, it is hard to believe that the President of the Russian Federation, after the annexation of Crimea, earned himself the fame of a “collector of Russian lands”, will agree to a soft and gradual, but still loss of territories. Especially on the nose of the 2018 presidential election. But what will happen after them?

All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion in last time conducted a survey on the transfer of the Kuril Islands in 2010. Then the vast majority of Russians - 79% - were in favor of leaving the islands to Russia and stop discussing this issue. It is unlikely that public sentiment has changed much over the past six years. If Putin really wants to go down in history, he is unlikely to be pleasantly associated with unpopular politicians who have already attempted to transfer the islands.

However, they transferred the lands to China, and nothing - the public was silent.

On the other hand, the Kuriles are a symbol, which is why they are well-known. But if you want an explanation, you can find anything. Moreover, there are arguments for mass consumption. Thus, the Tokyo correspondent of TASS Vasily Golovnin writes: as compensation for the transfer of the South Kuril Islands, Japan promises to establish a post office and hospitals in Russia, equipping clinics with equipment for early diagnosis of diseases at its own expense. In addition, the Japanese intend to offer their developments in the field of clean energy, housing construction, as well as year-round growing vegetables. So there will be something to justify the transfer of a couple of islands.

Moscow's friendship with Tokyo alarms Beijing

However, this issue has another side. The fact is that Japan has territorial claims not only to Russia, but also to China and South Korea. In particular, there is a long-standing dispute between Tokyo and Beijing over the status of an uninhabited piece of land called Okinotori. According to the Japanese version, this is an island, but China considers it rocks, which means it does not recognize Tokyo's international law to establish a 200-mile exclusive economic zone around it. The subject of another territorial dispute is the Senkaku archipelago in the East China Sea, 170 kilometers northeast of Taiwan. Japan is arguing with South Korea over the ownership of the Liancourt Islands, located in the western part of the Sea of ​​Japan.

Therefore, if Russia satisfies the territorial claims of Japan, there will be a precedent. And then Tokyo will begin to seek similar actions from its other neighbors. It is logical to assume that these neighbors will regard the transfer of the Kuril Islands as a "setup." Should we quarrel with China, our main strategic partner in Asia? Especially now, when the construction of the second branch of the Russian gas pipeline to China has begun, when the Chinese are investing in our gas companies. Of course, policy diversification in Asia is a useful thing, but one that requires the Kremlin to be very careful.

How the Kuriles tried to return to Japan

Nikita Khrushchev, when he was the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, offered to return to Japan two islands that lie closest to its borders. The Japanese side ratified the treaty, but Moscow changed its mind due to the increased US military presence in Japan.

The next attempt was made by the first president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin. The then Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev was already preparing documents for the visit of the head of state to Japan, during which it was supposed to formalize the transfer of the islands. What prevented Yeltsin's plans? There are different versions of this. Major General of the FSO in the reserve Boris Ratnikov, who from 1991 to 1994 worked as the first deputy head of the Main Security Directorate of the Russian Federation, said in an interview how his department upset Yeltsin's visit to Japan, allegedly for security reasons. According to another version, Anatoly Chubais dissuaded Yeltsin, actually embodying a scene from the film "Ivan Vasilyevich Changes His Profession", where the thief Miloslavsky throws himself at the feet of the false tsar with the words: "They did not order to execute, they told to say the word."

In the chain of islands between Kamchatka and Hokkaido, stretching in a convex arc between the Sea of ​​Okhotsk and the Pacific Ocean, on the border of Russia and Japan are the South Kuril Islands - the Habomai group, Shikotan, Kunashir and Iturup. These territories are disputed by our neighbors, who even included them in the Japanese prefecture. Since these territories are of great economic and strategic importance, the struggle for the South Kuriles has been going on for many years.

Geography

Shikotan Island is located at the same latitude as the subtropical city of Sochi, and the lower ones are at the latitude of Anapa. However, there has never been a climatic paradise here and is not expected. The South Kuril Islands have always belonged to the Far North, although they cannot complain about the same harsh Arctic climate. Here winters are much milder, warmer, summers are not hot. This temperature regime, when in February - the coldest month - the thermometer rarely shows below -5 degrees Celsius, even the high humidity of the sea deprives negative impact. The monsoonal continental climate here changes significantly, since the close presence of the Pacific Ocean weakens the influence of the no less close Arctic. If in the north of the Kuriles in the summer it is +10 on average, then the South Kuril Islands constantly warm up to +18. Not Sochi, of course, but not Anadyr either.

The ensimatic arc of the islands is located at the very edge of the Okhotsk Plate, above the subduction zone where the Pacific Plate ends. For the most part, the South Kuril Islands are covered with mountains, on Atlasov Island the highest peak is more than two thousand meters. There are also volcanoes, since all the Kuril Islands lie in the Pacific fiery volcanic ring. Seismic activity is also very high here. Thirty-six of the sixty-eight active volcanoes in the Kuriles require constant monitoring. Earthquakes are almost constant here, after which the danger of the world's largest tsunami comes. So, the islands of Shikotan, Simushir and Paramushir have repeatedly suffered greatly from this element. The tsunamis of 1952, 1994 and 2006 were especially large.

Resources, flora

In the coastal zone and on the territory of the islands themselves, reserves of oil, natural gas, mercury, and a huge number of non-ferrous metal ores have been explored. For example, near the Kudryavy volcano there is the richest known rhenium deposit in the world. The same southern part of the Kuril Islands was famous for the extraction of native sulfur. Here, the total resources of gold are 1867 tons, and there are also a lot of silver - 9284 tons, titanium - almost forty million tons, iron - two hundred and seventy-three million tons. Now the development of all minerals is waiting for better times, they are too few in the region, except for such a place as South Sakhalin. The Kuril Islands can generally be regarded as the country's resource reserve for a rainy day. Only two straits of all the Kuril Islands are navigable all year round because they do not freeze. These are the islands of the South Kuril ridge - Urup, Kunashir, Iturup, and between them - the straits of Ekaterina and Friza.

In addition to minerals, there are many other riches that belong to all mankind. This is the flora and fauna of the Kuril Islands. It varies greatly from north to south, since their length is quite large. In the north of the Kuriles there is rather sparse vegetation, and in the south - coniferous forests of amazing Sakhalin fir, Kuril larch, Ayan spruce. In addition, broad-leaved species are very actively involved in covering island mountains and hills: curly oak, elms and maples, calopanax creepers, hydrangeas, actinidia, lemongrass, wild grapes and much, much more. There is even magnolia in Kushanir - the only wild species of obovate magnolia. The most common plant that adorns the South Kuril Islands (landscape photo is attached) is the Kuril bamboo, whose impenetrable thickets hide mountain slopes and forest edges from view. The grasses here, due to the mild and humid climate, are very tall and varied. There are a lot of berries that can be harvested on an industrial scale: lingonberries, crowberries, honeysuckle, blueberries and many others.

Animals, birds and fish

On the Kuril Islands (the northern ones are especially different in this regard), there are about the same number of brown bears as in Kamchatka. There would be the same number in the south if it were not for the presence of Russian military bases. The islands are small, the bear lives close to the rockets. On the other hand, especially in the south, there are many foxes, because there is an extremely large amount of food for them. Small rodents - a huge number and many species, there are very rare ones. Of the terrestrial mammals, there are four orders here: bats (brown earflaps, bats), hares, mice and rats, predators (foxes, bears, although they are few, mink and sable).

Of the marine mammals in the coastal island waters, sea otters, anturs (this is a species of island seal), sea lions and spotted seals live. A little further from the coast there are many cetaceans - dolphins, killer whales, minke whales, northern swimmers and sperm whales. Accumulations of eared sea lion seals are observed along the entire coast of the Kuril Islands, especially a lot of them on the season. Here you can see colonies of fur seals, bearded seals, seals, lionfish. decoration of marine fauna - sea otter. The precious fur animal was on the verge of extinction in the very recent past. Now the situation with the sea otter is gradually leveling off. Fish in coastal waters is of great commercial importance, but there are also crabs, and mollusks, and squids, and sea cucumbers, all crustaceans, and seaweed. The population of the South Kuril Islands is mainly engaged in the extraction of seafood. In general, this place can be called without exaggeration one of the most productive territories in the oceans.

Colonial birds make up huge and most picturesque bird colonies. These are silly, storm-petrels, cormorants, various gulls, kittiwakes, guillemots, puffins and many, many more. There are many here and the Red Book, rare - albatrosses and petrels, mandarins, ospreys, golden eagles, eagles, peregrine falcons, gyrfalcons, Japanese cranes and snipes, owls. They winter in the Kuriles from ducks - mallards, teals, goldeneyes, swans, mergansers, sea eagles. Of course, there are many ordinary sparrows and cuckoos. Only on Iturup there are more than two hundred species of birds, of which one hundred are nesting. Eighty-four species from those listed in the Red Book live in.

History: seventeenth century

The problem of ownership of the South Kuril Islands did not appear yesterday. Before the arrival of the Japanese and Russians, the Ainu lived here, who met new people with the word "kuru", which meant - a person. The Russians picked up the word with their usual humor and called the natives "smokers". Hence the name of the entire archipelago. The Japanese were the first to draw up maps of Sakhalin and all the Kuriles. This happened in 1644. However, the problem of belonging to the South Kuril Islands arose even then, because a year earlier, other maps of this region were compiled by the Dutch, led by de Vries.

The lands have been described. But it's not true. Friz, after whom the strait he discovered is named, attributed Iturup to the northeast of the island of Hokkaido, and considered Urup to be part of North America. A cross was erected on Urup, and all this land was declared the property of Holland. And the Russians came here in 1646 with the expedition of Ivan Moskvitin, and the Cossack Kolobov with the funny name Nehoroshko Ivanovich later colorfully spoke about the bearded Ainu inhabiting the islands. The following, slightly more extensive information came from the Kamchatka expedition of Vladimir Atlasov in 1697.

18th century

The history of the South Kuril Islands says that the Russians really came to these lands in 1711. The Kamchatka Cossacks rebelled, killed the authorities, and then changed their minds and decided to earn forgiveness or die. Therefore, they assembled an expedition to travel to new uncharted lands. Danila Antsiferov and Ivan Kozyrevsky with a detachment in August 1711 landed on the northern islands of Paramushir and Shumshu. This expedition gave new knowledge about a whole range of islands, including Hokkaido. In this regard, in 1719, Peter the Great entrusted reconnaissance to Ivan Evreinov and Fyodor Luzhin, through whose efforts a whole range of islands was declared Russian territories, including the island of Simushir. But the Ainu, of course, did not want to submit and go under the authority of the Russian Tsar. Only in 1778, Antipin and Shabalin managed to convince the Kuril tribes, and about two thousand people from Iturup, Kunashir and even Hokkaido passed into Russian citizenship. And in 1779, Catherine II issued a decree exempting all new eastern subjects from any taxes. And even then conflicts began with the Japanese. They even banned the Russians from visiting Kunashir, Iturup and Hokkaido.

The Russians did not yet have real control here, but lists of lands were compiled. And Hokkaido, despite the presence of a Japanese city on its territory, was recorded as belonging to Russia. The Japanese, on the other hand, visited the south of the Kuriles a lot and often, for which the local population rightly hated them. The Ainu did not really have the strength to rebel, but little by little they harmed the invaders: either they would sink the ship, or they would burn the outpost. In 1799, the Japanese had already organized the protection of Iturup and Kunashir. Although the Russian fishermen settled there relatively long ago - approximately in 1785-87 - the Japanese rudely asked them to leave the islands and destroyed all evidence of Russian presence on this land. The history of the South Kuril Islands already then began to acquire intrigue, but no one knew at that time how long it would be. For the first seventy years - until 1778 - the Russians did not even meet with the Japanese in the Kuriles. The meeting took place in Hokkaido, which at that time had not yet been conquered by Japan. The Japanese came to trade with the Ainu, and here the Russians are already catching fish. Naturally, the samurai got angry, began to shake their weapons. Catherine sent a diplomatic mission to Japan, but the conversation did not work out even then.

Nineteenth century - a century of concessions

In 1805, the famous Nikolai Rezanov, who arrived in Nagasaki, tried to continue negotiations on trade and failed. Unable to bear the shame, he instructed two ships to make a military expedition to the South Kuril Islands - to stake out the disputed territories. It turned out to be a good revenge for the destroyed Russian trading posts, burned ships and expelled (those who survived) fishermen. A number of Japanese trading posts were destroyed, a village on Iturup was burned. Russo-Japanese relations approached the last pre-war brink.

Only in 1855 was the first real demarcation of territories made. Northern islands - Russia, southern - Japan. Plus joint Sakhalin. It was a pity to give away the rich crafts of the South Kuril Islands, Kunashir - especially. Iturup, Habomai and Shikotan also became Japanese. And in 1875, Russia received the right of undivided possession of Sakhalin for the cession of all the Kuril Islands without exception to Japan.

Twentieth century: defeats and victories

In the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, Russia, despite the heroism of the worthy songs of cruisers and gunboats, which were defeated in an unequal battle, lost along with the war half of Sakhalin - the southern, most valuable one. But in February 1945, when the victory over Nazi Germany was already predetermined, the USSR set a condition for Great Britain and the United States: it would help defeat the Japanese if they returned the territories that belonged to Russia: Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, the Kuril Islands. The Allies promised, and in July 1945 the Soviet Union confirmed its commitment. Already in early September, the Kuril Islands were completely occupied by Soviet troops. And in February 1946, a decree was issued on the formation of the Yuzhno-Sakhalin region, which included the Kuriles in full force, which became part of the Khabarovsk Territory. This is how the return of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands to Russia happened.

Japan was forced to sign a peace treaty in 1951, which stated that it does not and will not claim rights, titles and claims regarding the Kuril Islands. And in 1956, the Soviet Union and Japan were preparing to sign the Moscow Declaration, which confirmed the end of the war between these states. As a sign of goodwill, the USSR agreed to transfer two Kuril Islands to Japan: Shikotan and Habomai, but the Japanese refused to accept them because they did not refuse claims to other southern islands - Iturup and Kunashir. Here again the United States had an impact on the destabilization of the situation when it threatened not to return the island of Okinawa to Japan if this document was signed. That is why the South Kuril Islands are still disputed territories.

Today's century, twenty-first

Today, the problem of the South Kuril Islands is still relevant, despite the fact that a peaceful and cloudless life has long been established in the entire region. Russia cooperates with Japan quite actively, but from time to time the conversation about the ownership of the Kuriles is raised. In 2003, a Russian-Japanese action plan was adopted regarding cooperation between the countries. Presidents and prime ministers exchange visits, numerous Russian-Japanese friendship societies of various levels have been created. However, all the same claims are constantly made by the Japanese, but not accepted by the Russians.

In 2006, a whole delegation from a public organization popular in Japan, the Solidarity League for the Return of Territories, visited Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. In 2012, however, Japan abolished the term "illegal occupation" in relation to Russia in matters relating to the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin. And in the Kuril Islands, the development of resources continues, federal programs for the development of the region are being introduced, the amount of funding is increasing, a zone with tax benefits has been created there, the islands are visited by the highest government officials of the country.

The Problem of Ownership

How can one disagree with the documents signed in February 1945 at Yalta, where the conference of the countries participating in the anti-Hitler coalition decided the fate of the Kuriles and Sakhalin, which would return to Russia immediately after the victory over Japan? Or did Japan not sign the Potsdam Declaration after signing its own Instrument of Surrender? She did sign. And it clearly states that its sovereignty is limited to the islands of Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and Honshu. All! On September 2, 1945, this document was signed by Japan, therefore, and the conditions indicated there were confirmed.

And on September 8, 1951, a peace treaty was signed in San Francisco, where she renounced in writing all claims to the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin Island with its adjacent islands. This means that its sovereignty over these territories, obtained after the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, is no longer valid. Although here the United States acted extremely insidiously, adding a very cunning clause, because of which the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia this agreement didn't sign. This country, as always, did not keep its word, because it is in the nature of its politicians to always say "yes", but some of these answers will mean - "no". The United States left a loophole in the treaty for Japan, which, having slightly licked its wounds and released, as it turned out, paper cranes after nuclear bombings, resumed its claims.

Arguments

They were as follows:

1. In 1855, the Kuril Islands were included in the original possession of Japan.

2. The official position of Japan is that the Chisima Islands are not part of the Kuril chain, so Japan did not renounce them by signing an agreement in San Francisco.

3. The USSR did not sign the treaty in San Francisco.

So, Japan's territorial claims are made on the South Kuril Islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir and Iturup, whose total area is 5175 square kilometers, and these are the so-called northern territories belonging to Japan. In contrast, Russia says on the first point that the Russo-Japanese War annulled the Shimoda Treaty, on the second point - that Japan signed a declaration on the end of the war, which, in particular, says that the two islands - Habomai and Shikotan - the USSR is ready give after the signing of the peace treaty. On the third point, Russia agrees: yes, the USSR did not sign this paper with a cunning amendment. But there is no country as such, so there is nothing to talk about.

At one time, it was somehow inconvenient to talk about territorial claims with the USSR, but when it collapsed, Japan plucked up courage. However, judging by everything, even now these encroachments are in vain. Although in 2004 the Minister of Foreign Affairs announced that he agreed to talk about the territories with Japan, nevertheless, one thing is clear: no changes in the ownership of the Kuril Islands can occur.

The dispute over the southernmost Kuril Islands - Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Khabomai - has been a point of tension between Japan and Russia since they were taken over by the Soviet Union in 1945. More than 70 years later, Russian-Japanese relations are still not normal due to the ongoing territorial dispute. To a large extent, it was historical factors that prevented the solution of this issue. These include demographics, mentality, institutions, geography, and economics, all of which encourage tough policies rather than willingness to compromise. The first four factors contribute to the persistence of the stalemate, while the economy in the form of oil policy is associated with some hope of a resolution.

Russia's claims to the Kuriles date back to the 17th century, which occurred as a result of periodic contacts with Japan through Hokkaido. In 1821, the border was de facto established, according to which Iturup became Japanese territory, and Russian land began from Urup Island. Subsequently, according to the Shimodsky Treaty (1855) and the St. Petersburg Treaty (1875), all four islands were recognized as the territory of Japan. The last time the Kuriles changed their owner as a result of the Second World War - in 1945 in Yalta, the allies, in fact, agreed to transfer these islands to Russia.

The dispute over the islands became part of Cold War politics during the negotiations for the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Article 2c of which forced Japan to renounce all of its claims to the Kuril Islands. However, the refusal of the Soviet Union to sign this agreement left these islands in a state of limbo. In 1956, a joint Soviet-Japanese declaration was signed, which de facto meant the end of the state of war, but failed to resolve the territorial conflict. After the ratification of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960, further negotiations were stopped, and this continued until the 1990s.

However, after the end of the Cold War in 1991, there seemed to be a new opportunity to resolve this issue. Despite the tumultuous events in world affairs, the positions of Japan and Russia on the Kuriles have not changed much since 1956, and the reason for this situation was five historical factors that were outside the Cold War.

The first factor is demographic. Japan's population is already declining due to low birth rates and aging, while Russia's population has been declining since 1992 due to excessive drinking and other social ills. This shift, together with the weakening of international influence, has led to the emergence of retrospective tendencies, and both nations are now basically trying to resolve this issue by looking backwards rather than forwards. In the presence of such attitudes, it can be concluded that the aging populations of Japan and Russia are depriving Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Vladimir Putin of the opportunity to negotiate because of firmly entrenched views on the issue of the Kuriles.

Context

Is Russia ready to return two islands?

Sankei Shimbun 10/12/2016

Military construction in the Kuriles

The Guardian 06/11/2015

Is it possible to agree on the Kuril Islands?

BBC Russian service 05/21/2015
All this also plays into the hands of the mentality and perception of the outside world, which are formed on the basis of how history is taught, and more broadly on the basis of how it is presented by the media and public opinion. For Russia, the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major psychological blow, accompanied by a loss of status and power as many former Soviet republics seceded. This has significantly altered Russia's borders and created significant uncertainty about the future of the Russian nation. It is well known that in times of crisis, citizens often display stronger patriotic feelings and feelings of defensive nationalism. The Kuriles dispute fills a void in Russia and also provides an opportunity to speak out against the perceived emotionally historical injustice committed by Japan.

The perception of Japan in Russia was largely shaped by the issue of the Kuril Islands, and this continued until the end of the Cold War. Anti-Japanese propaganda became common after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, and it was reinforced by Japanese intervention during the Russian Civil War (1918-1922). This led many Russians to believe that as a result, all previously concluded treaties were annulled. However, Russia's victory over Japan in World War II ended the previous humiliation and reinforced the symbolic meaning of the Kuril Islands, which came to represent (1) the irreversibility of the results of World War II and (2) Russia's status as a great power. From this point of view, the transfer of territory is seen as a revision of the outcome of the war. Therefore, control over the Kuriles retains an important psychological significance for the Russians.

Japan is trying to define its place in the world as a "normal" state, located next to an increasingly powerful China. The question of the return of the Kuril Islands is directly linked to the national identity of Japan, and these territories themselves are perceived as the last symbol of defeat in World War II. The Russian offensive and the capture of Japan's "inalienable territory" helped reinforce the victim mentality that became the prevailing narrative after the end of the war.

This attitude is reinforced by the Japanese conservative media, which often support foreign policy government. In addition, nationalists often use the media to viciously attack academics and politicians who hint at the possibility of reaching a compromise on this issue, leaving little room for manoeuvre.

This, in turn, has an impact on the political institutions of both Japan and Russia. In the 1990s, President Boris Yeltsin's position was so weak that he feared possible impeachment if the Kuril Islands were handed over to Japan. At the same time, the central Russian government was weakened as a result of the growing influence of regional politicians, including the two governors of the Sakhalin region - Valentin Fedorov (1990 - 1993) and Igor Fakhrutdinov (1995 - 2003), who actively opposed the possible sale of the Kuriles to Japan. They relied on nationalist sentiments, and this was enough to prevent the completion of the treaty and its implementation in the 1990s.

After President Putin came to power, Moscow subjugated regional governments, but other institutional factors also contributed to the continued stalemate. One example is the idea that the situation should mature, and then some issue or problem can be solved. During the initial period of his rule, President Putin was able, but not willing, to negotiate with Japan over the Kuriles. Instead, he decided to devote his time and energy to resolving the Sino-Russian border conflict through the issue of the Kuril Islands.

Since returning to the presidency in 2013, Putin has become increasingly dependent on the support of nationalist forces, and it is unlikely that he will be ready to cede the Kuriles in any meaningful way. Recent events in Crimea and Ukraine clearly demonstrate how far Putin is willing to go to defend Russia's national status.

Japanese political institutions, while different from Russia's, also support a hard line of negotiation over the Kuriles. As a result of the reforms carried out after the end of World War II, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) dominates Japan. With the exception of the period from 1993 to 1995 and from 2009 to 2012, the LDP had and continues to have a majority in the national legislative assembly, and in fact its party platform for the return of the four southern islands of the Kuril ridge since 1956 is integral part national policy.

In addition, the real estate crash of 1990-1991 saw the Liberal Democratic Party nominate only two effective prime ministers, Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe, both of whom rely on nationalist support to maintain their positions. Finally, regional politics in Japan plays an important role, and elected politicians in Hokkaido are pushing the central government to take a assertive stance in this dispute. Taken together, all these factors do not contribute to a compromise that would include the return of all four islands.

Sakhalin and Hokkaido emphasize the importance of geography and regional interests in this dispute. Geography influences how people see the world and how they observe policy making and implementation. The most important Russian interests are in Europe, followed by the Middle East and central Asia, and only after that Japan. Here is one example - Russia devotes a significant part of its time and efforts to the issue of NATO expansion to the east, in eastern part Europe, as well as the negative consequences associated with the events in Crimea and Ukraine. As far as Japan is concerned, the alliance with the United States, China, and the Korean Peninsula take precedence over relations with Moscow. The Japanese government must also take into account public pressure to resolve issues with North Korea about kidnapping and nuclear weapons which Abe promised to do several times. As a result, the issue of the Kuriles is often relegated to the background.

Probably the only factor contributing to a possible resolution of the Kuril issue is economic interests. After 1991, both Japan and Russia entered a period of prolonged economic crisis. The Russian economy reached its lowest point during the crisis of its national currency in 1997, and is currently facing serious difficulties due to the collapse in oil prices and economic sanctions. However, the development of oil and gas fields in Siberia, in the process of which Japanese capital and Russian natural resources are combined, contributes to cooperation and a possible resolution of the Kuriles issue. Despite the sanctions imposed, 8% of Japan's oil consumption in 2014 was imported from Russia, and the increase in oil and natural gas consumption is largely due to the consequences of the disaster at the nuclear power plant in Fukushima.

In their totality, historical factors largely determine the continued stagnation in resolving the issue of the Kuril Islands. The demographics, geography, political institutions, and attitudes of the citizens of Japan and Russia all contribute to a tough negotiating position. Oil policy provides some incentive for both nations to resolve disputes and normalize relations. However, so far this has not been enough to break the impasse. Despite the possible change of leaders around the world, the main factors that have driven this dispute to a standstill are likely to remain unchanged.

Michael Bacalu is a member of the Council on Asian Affairs. He received his master's degree in international relations from Seoul University, South Korea and a bachelor's degree in history and political science from Arcadia University. The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author as an individual and do not necessarily reflect the views of any organization with which he has ties.

The materials of InoSMI contain only assessments of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the editors of InoSMI.