Milyutin paid much attention to the problem of officer training. The main centers for training officers for the Russian army were the cadet corps, which provided both military and secondary education. The level of training in these buildings turned out to be low. Milyutin believed that the fact is that during training they are trying to solve two problems: to provide both general education and special military education. But as a result, it doesn’t work out. Therefore, the essence of the reform was to separate this. The cadet corps was liquidated, and the training of officers began to be carried out according to the following scheme: young men who expressed a desire to devote themselves to a military career entered special military gymnasiums. There, general education was given and a little introduction to military affairs was given. But there was military discipline. They provided a gymnasium education. The level of training there was very high.

Those who graduated from military gymnasiums entered military schools. They studied military affairs there. Officers for the army were trained there. Education was practical and lost its theoretical nature. Admission was classless; representatives of all classes, and not just nobles, could enter there.

Milyutin’s main brainchild was the introduction of universal conscription. In connection with the development of military technology, the era of mass armies began. And all the great powers, except England, switched to universal conscription.

The main disadvantage was the inability to have significant reserves of people who, if necessary, could be drafted into the army.

Recruitment service

How was the recruiting service? By the beginning of the Crimean War, the recruitment regulations of 1834 were in force. The total length of service in the army was 20 years. Of these, the first 15 years the person served in the field troops. After this period, he was enlisted in the reserve troops. He remained in the army, but the service was light. After 5 years, he left the army and transferred to the emergency leave category. He took off his uniform and became a civilian. But within 5 years he could be drafted into the army. These emergency vacation pay constituted a reserve. But there were few of them.

During the Crimean War, the total strength of the Russian army was more than 1 million people. According to the Ministry of War, urgent leave pay was about 200 thousand, and even then not all of it was suitable.

If universal conscription had been introduced in the 18th century, it would have been of no use. There was no possibility of quickly notifying the population and quickly transferring them to the theater of military operations. In the 18th century, this was impossible, given the vast expanses of Russia. By the time people reach the theater of military operations on their own, the war will already be over.

But in the 2nd half of the 19th century the situation began to change. Railways and a telegraph began to be built, which connected the remote outskirts with the center.

Milyutin began preparing for universal conscription back in the 1860s. But this measure met with strong opposition influential people. Why? Social egoism was at work; this was seen as an encroachment on the special position of the nobles, who were exempt from compulsory military service.

Introduction to military service

There was another argument against it. How much can you rely on the army in case of internal war? Will it be as reliable an instrument as an army composed of individuals recruited by conscription? Service in the army declassified a person, it knocked him out of his environment, as it was long. Contacts were not practiced, i.e. a person, leaving for service, broke with his environment. No one is waiting for him in the village; he is unaccustomed to peasant labor. You could count on such a soldier.

But universal conscription is a completely different matter. A person will serve for several years and return back.

But events in Europe accelerated the introduction of universal conscription. In 1870-71, the Franco-Prussian War broke out, ending in the complete defeat of France. It showed what enormous strength the Prussian army has, based on universal conscription. In addition, the war completed the unification of Germany. And a strong state arose at the borders of Russia, which had to be taken into account. All this led to the adoption of emergency measures to increase defense capability.

Valuev, while in Europe at that time, observed the Franco-Prussian war with his own eyes and upon his return presented Alexander 2 with a note: Thoughts of a non-military man about our military forces.

In 1874, the Charter on universal military service was approved.

From now on, military service was declared an all-class affair, and 21 years was established. Not everyone who was physically fit was enlisted in the troops. Persons of good health who had reached conscription age drew lots. Those who pulled out had to go to serve, the rest were enlisted in the reserves. About 30% were called up. Service life 6 years ground forces and 7 years in the Navy. This period was introduced only for migrants.

Universal conscription did not apply to some peripheral territories of Russia: the Caucasus, Central Asia, Finland. Its introduction made it possible to reduce the size of the army in peacetime, and therefore costs, but at the same time significantly increase it in case of war.

The introduction of GDP made it possible to increase Russia's defense capabilities. But this led to the spread of literacy. It was necessary to be able to read, write, and count.

Researchers have also encountered secondary illiteracy, since a person must train his knowledge. Returning to the village, the peasants forgot everything.

Universal conscription- the all-class obligation to perform military service, introduced by the manifesto of January 1, 1874. Replaced conscription. In accordance with the Charter of Military Service, males between the ages of 21 and 40 were subject to conscription.

Conscription, as a duty of military service defined by law common to all citizens, was established in Europe only in modern times. In the Middle Ages, the nobility carried out permanent military service, while the rest of the population was called upon to serve it only in cases of special danger to the country. Later armies were replenished by hiring hunters and then by forced recruitment. In Muscovite Rus', troops usually consisted of persons allocated land (estate) under the condition of service; in wartime, more datnik people were posted in proportion to the number of households and the space of land holdings.

History of the term

Peter I first founded a standing army on the compulsory service of nobles and the collection of Danish people, the so-called recruits. Little by little, the nobles were freed from duty - first the nobles (1762), then merchants, honorary citizens, and the clergy, so that its burden finally lay exclusively on the peasants and townspeople.

From 1874 to Russian Empire universal personal conscription was introduced, to which the entire male population of Russia was subject; cash ransom and replacement by hunters were no longer allowed. The number of people required for permanent troops was determined annually by law. The draft age was 21 years old. Entry into active service was determined by lot, and those not accepted for service were enlisted in the militia until the age of 39.

According to the law of April 26, 1906 on reducing the terms of service in the ground forces and navy in peacetime, in the ground forces in the infantry and foot artillery for those drawn by lot, the period of active service was 3 years. This was followed by a stay in the 1st category reserve (7 years) and in the 2nd category reserve (8 years).

In other branches of the military, the period of active service was 4 years. This was followed by a stay in the 1st category reserve (7 years) and in the 2nd category reserve (6 years).

In the navy, the period of active service was 5 years. This was followed by a stay in the 1st category reserve (3 years) and in the 2nd category reserve (2 years).

Benefits for serving compulsory military service

Educational benefits consisted of a shorter period of active service; The service life for those who completed the 1st category course (as well as 6 classes of the gymnasium) was 2 years plus 16 years in reserve. To serve preferential service as a volunteer, in addition to good health, an application was required upon reaching the age of 17 and a certificate of completion of a course at an educational institution of the 1st and 2nd category or passing a special exam. The service life for category I was 1 year and 12 years in reserve, for category II - 2 years and 12 years in reserve.

A deferment for serving conscription was given for physical disabilities (until recovery), for arranging matters regarding property status (up to 2 years) and for completing education in educational institutions(up to 27-28 years old).

Those who were completely unable to bear arms were exempted from service. There were also benefits for marital status of three categories: I category - for the only son in the family or the only family member capable of working; II category - for the only son capable of working with a capable father and incapable brothers; III category - for persons who are next in age in the family to a person already in active service. Clergy and some clergy were also exempt from service; those with degrees of doctor of medicine, doctor, veterinarians, pensioners of the Academy of Arts and teachers of government educational institutions were enlisted directly into the reserve for 18 years.

Those who entered service after the conscription year were enlisted in the reserve until the age of 43.

Native inhabitants of the Caucasus and Central Asia, according to the legislation of the Russian Empire, were not subject to conscription for military service.

Before the introduction of universal conscription, the Lapps, the Korels of the Kem district of the Arkhangelsk province, the Samoyeds of the Mezen province and all Siberian foreigners were not subject to conscription.

General military service was initially also not extended to all these foreigners, but then, starting from the second half of the 1880s, the foreign population of the Astrakhan, Tobolsk and Tomsk provinces, Akmola, Semipalatinsk, Turgai and Ural regions and all provinces and regions of Irkutsk and The Amur Governorate General, as well as the Samoyeds of the Mezen district, began to be called upon to serve universal military service on the basis of special provisions.

For the Muslim population of the Terek and Kuban regions and Transcaucasia, as well as for the Christian Abkhazians of the Sukhumi district and Kutaisi province, the supply of recruits was temporarily replaced by the collection of a special monetary tax; The same tax was imposed on foreigners of the Stavropol province: Trukhmens, Nogais, Kalmyks and others, as well as Karanogais settled in the Terek region, and residents of the Transcaucasian region: Ingiloy Christians and Muslims, Kurds and Yezidis.

Muslim Ossetians were granted the right to serve military service in person, on an equal basis with Christian Ossetians, on preferential terms provided to the native population of the Transcaucasian region, so that recruits were assigned to serve in the regiments of the Terek Cossack Army.

All counties European Russia were divided into three groups of recruitment areas: 1) Great Russian with a predominance of the Russian population by 75%, including more than half of Great Russians; 2) Little Russian with a predominance of Russian population by 75%, including more than half of Little Russians and Belarusians; 3) foreign - all the rest. Each infantry regiment and artillery brigade was staffed with conscripts from a specific county; guard, cavalry and engineering troops were recruited from all over the territory.

Rostunov I.I. Russian Front of World War I

Russia's Great War: Social order, public communication and violence at the turn of the Tsarist and Soviet eras Team of authors

Introduction of universal conscription in the late tsarist empire

The reforms of Alexander II represented an attempt - undertaken primarily by the "enlightened bureaucracy" - to modernize the Russian Empire. After the catastrophic defeat in the Crimean War, Imperial Petersburg wanted to overcome the gap with its European rivals, which was painfully perceived by the authorities. The reform of the armed forces, begun in 1874, was part of this project. Its developers took as a model the Prussian army, which, thanks to its brilliant victories over Austria and France in 1866 and 1871, convinced the European public that national army, recruited by conscription, belongs to the future. The discipline and moral stability of the soldiers, coupled with their willingness to sacrifice themselves for the sake of the unity of the nation, were believed to have a decisive influence on the outcome of the battle. The introduction of universal conscription was an attempt to recreate an exemplary type of national army, recruited by conscription, within the framework of an imperial and autocratic political system. An army of this type implied the presence of a homogeneous, close-knit community. So, the reformers took advantage of a model that ran counter to the realities of imperial Russia (106).

Already during the preparation of the reform and on the eve of its entry into force on January 1, 1874, it became obvious that the reformers overestimated their capabilities. In culturally very heterogeneous Russia, there were no unified administrative and legal structures. The relations of the imperial center with various regions where the non-Russian population predominated developed very differently, and they were influenced by different historical experiences. This also applied to the Muslim regions of the Russian Empire. If the Volga Tatars and Bashkirs became subjects of the Moscow state back in the 16th century, during the conquest of the Kazan and Astrakhan khanates, the Crimean Khanate was annexed to the Russian Empire only in 1783 under Catherine II. The Tsarist Empire conquered the Muslims of Transcaucasia at the beginning of the 19th century, as a result of the Russian-Persian Wars, while the conquest of Central Asia was gradually completed in the years when the Great Reforms had already started. In this regard, it is hardly surprising that during the implementation of army reform - despite ambitious declarations - the principle according to which all men fit for military service are obliged to carry out military service was not consistently implemented. Taking a look at the Muslim population of the Russian Empire, we find that reformers treated different regions very differently when it came to conscription. If the Bashkirs and Volga Tatars were called up for service in regular units, then the Crimean Tatars were allowed to serve in special units at their place of residence. For the Muslim population North Caucasus and Transcaucasia, as well as residents of Central Asia, military service did not apply at all (107).

However, the strategic goal of the reformers, as well as the tsar, was clearly outlined already in 1874: all male citizens of the Russian Empire, regardless of their ethnicity or religion, were to be recruited into the ranks of the regular army. If by and large no one disputed this strategic goal of the reform, opinions differed on the issue of timing and methods for achieving it. In the early 1880s, the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, Count A.M. Dondukov-Korsakov was instructed to develop the provisions of a universal military duty for the Caucasus region. In the presented draft, Dondukov-Korsakov initially strongly spoke out in favor of conscripting the local Muslim population for military service. The arguments presented by him and the General Staff are quite remarkable: they considered as an axiom the widely held opinion about the fanaticism of the Muslims of the Caucasus and about the supposedly low stage of their cultural development. The authors of the project believed that in the event of war, especially war with Muslim states such as Persia or the Ottoman Empire, no one could guarantee the political loyalty of Muslims. However, it would be a fundamentally wrong strategy not to attract Muslims to military service on this basis: after all, one cannot also encourage political disloyalty by exempting them from military service. In addition, the warlike Muslim tribes of the North Caucasus, in their mental make-up and in their physical form, can be said to be prepared for armed struggle (108). Although the War Ministry supported Dondukov-Korsakov's proposal, he failed to win the approval of the State Council, because the Muslims of the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia were believed to be more likely to remain loyal to Mecca and Medina than to the Russian state. Ultimately, the state did not involve the Muslim part of the population of the Caucasus in military service and instead decided to introduce a special tax designed to compensate for the unfair distribution of the burden of military service (109).

The example of army reform projects in the Caucasus reveals the dilemma that senior military officials faced when considering the long-term implementation of the 1874 reform - a dilemma that troubled them until the outbreak of the First World War and which they were ultimately unable to resolve. Everyone agreed that with the selective application of the principle of universal conscription, the “indigenous population” of Russia would experience injustice, since they would bear the brunt of the heavy duty of defending the fatherland. If this apparent injustice is consistently eliminated by calling up all citizens of the empire without exception for military service, then there is a risk that the empire will arm its enemies and, in the event of war, will experience the dangerous consequences of such a policy. And yet, the military leadership has repeatedly put forward a demand to extend military conscription specifically to unreliable Muslims in the Caucasus region. According to the military, army service on the outskirts of the empire could play a consolidating role. The need to attract foreigners into the ranks of the army already followed from the multi-ethnic and multi-confessional composition of the Russian Empire, which was clearly revealed at the latest as a result of the 1897 population census. At least, Russians constituted the majority of the population in their own empire only if Ukrainians and Belarusians were added to them. More than a third of the population were non-Russian. In the long term, the army could not refuse these human resources (110). And, although there were reasons to fear the disloyalty of “fanatical” Muslims, the educational power of army service was supposed to have an effect on the soldiers (111). The image of a “citizen in uniform” who, in gratitude for his political rights, sacrifices himself for the good of the nation, was not intended here. The military relied rather on a strict army routine, which would teach the soldiers to discipline and thereby develop their loyalty to the state.