Battleship Emperor Nicholas 1 main dimensions. The last battleship of the Russian Empire

R.M. Melnikov

"Emperor Nicholas I"

(Gangut No. 8)

“Emperor Nicholas I” is a “hybrid” ship, reflecting a period of particularly deep fluctuations in shipbuilding of a controversial design type and dramatic fate, the second of the Baltic battleships provided for by the 20-year (1883-1902) shipbuilding program, did not receive further development in the Russian fleet and became one of the most expensive experiments, although in its type (due to the objective laws of progress) a number of new technical solutions were adopted, which were developed in subsequent ship projects.

During the construction of this ship, the generosity of the Russian land for talents - from the nugget P. A. Titov to the future academician A. N. Krylov - was combined with deep flaws in the system of Russian state-owned shipbuilding, which is organically alien to the freedom of creativity and entrepreneurship. Having failed to free itself from the burden of inconsistencies that the era of the emperor, whose name was given to the ship, endowed it with, domestic shipbuilding in the post-reform period not only did not move forward towards a rational and effective organization, but also made a clear regression towards even greater centralism than under the unforgettable emperor . The history of the ship turned out to be extremely rich in events of important and even pivotal international significance. He participated in the celebrations on the occasion of the arrival of French ships in Kronstadt in 1891 and in the return visit of the Russian squadron to Toulon in 1893, unheard of in scale of honors that strengthened the foundations of the Russian-French alliance, and in the celebrations in New York on the occasion of the 400th anniversary of the discovery of America. The only battleship in the Russian Naval Forces in the Pacific in 1895, the Emperor Nicholas I played a prominent role in the bloodless and most outstanding peaceful victory of the Russian fleet at that time, when the threat of Russian ships concentrated in Chefoo forced Japan to abandon its claims to possession of already taken from China as a result of the war by Port Arthur. But the ruler of the harsh turned out to be unable to preserve the fruits of the success achieved, and 10 years later the same “Emperor Nicholas I”, by the will of fate, found himself at the head of the last detachment of ships that survived after Tsushima, with his surrender to the superior forces of the Japanese fleet that surrounded him, was forced to put the last end to events of that war at sea. And it is impossible to escape this fact, as well as the subsequent more than 10-year service of the ship in the Japanese fleet, such is the story.

In the photo: Squadron battleship "Emperor Nicholas I" in the dock

Beginning the implementation of the 20-year (1883 - 1902) program of armored shipbuilding and forming assignments for the design of the first Baltic battleships in October 1882, the head of the Naval Ministry, Vice Admiral I. A. Shestakov, saw in them the type of “strong” (of course not such, as in the Black Sea), capable of operating in European waters with ships similar to the German battleships Sachsen or Helgoland, “of the same displacement and low cost.” As a result of repeated alterations, based on the comments of I. A. Shestakov, who continually changed his requirements, the project of the first battleship, called “Emperor Alexander II,” was developed and began to be implemented in August 1884. It would seem that after such a long (almost two years) and deep study, the project could become a standard one for the construction of all subsequent ships. But this was not the case with I. A. Shestakov, in whose nature concerns about government savings were surprisingly combined with lordly extravagance that ruined the treasury. Without attaching importance to the benefits of serial construction of ships of the same type, he saw savings only in reducing their size. The assignment he issued on March 3, 1884 ordered the second Baltic battleship (the future “Emperor Nicholas I”) to be designed “smaller in size against the one under construction” (“Emperor Alexander II”). It was proposed to build the new battleship on the model of the Brazilian (built in 1883 in England) battleship Riachello, which the minister liked, but armed not with 229 mm artillery (two guns in two turrets), but with two 305 mm long-range guns, also in two separate turrets . Thus began a new, completely unrelated to the design of “Alexander II”, period of creative quests for the engineers of the Marine Technical Committee (MTK), who were exhausted from the initiatives of the Minister of Engineering. Larger domestic towers and, as it soon turned out, steam engines modeled on those installed on the cruiser Vladimir Monomakh (7000 hp). demanded an increase in displacement from 5,700 tons (Riachello) to 7,374 tons. On November 5, 1884, an order was issued to work out a new option - instead of machines similar to those installed on the cruiser Vladimir Monomakh, use machines (together with boilers) that the minister intended to remove from the steamship “Experience” (the unsuccessful brainchild of A. A. Popov, “Livadia” demoted from the imperial yachts).

In the photo: “Emperor Alexander II” - a type of small battleship for the Baltic Sea

But the removal of two onboard vehicles from the Experience threatened to worsen the controllability of this ship, which the Black Sea Fleet command hoped to use as a capacious military transport. Then a new idea appeared in St. Petersburg - to rent only the middle car, ordering a second one based on its model. The absurdity of this unique order (involving sketches of completely unfamiliar mechanisms) apparently did not interest the minister at all. Having received such an assignment, the mechanical department of the MTK reported on April 10, 1885 that “the construction of a new machine” was quite possible, after which negotiations began with the Baltic Shipyard, where it was planned to build the ship itself.

In the meantime, a new weapon option was already being considered: the installation of two 305-mm long-range non-declining ones (in open barbettes) and two 229-mm guns or 254-mm, “depending on their relative strength and weight.” The latter, however, were not in service with the fleet, and therefore, at the suggestion of the artillery department of the MTK, they decided to settle on 305- and 229-mm long-range guns with a barrel length of 30 calibers.

By April 1885, the design of battleship “No. 2” (Table 1) already bore little resemblance to its Brazilian prototype (of which only the length of the hull was preserved), whose main design advantage was the diagonal arrangement of the turrets, which made it possible to concentrate the fire of all their guns along the sides and ends , - almost immediately consigned to oblivion. The ship's displacement was already 7572 tons. Without any displacement reserve, the theoretical drawing of the new battleship and its structural midsection frame were approved, and two months later the specification developed on their basis with more than 1000 tons of displacement savings (in comparison with the Emperor Alexander II"). The project provided for open barbette installations, a mixed caliber of main artillery (a pair of bow 305 mm and a pair of stern 229 mm guns), an increased number of rapid-fire 152 mm guns (instead of the original seven there were already ten), a complete set of mine weapons that became standard with five "ejection apparatuses", a supply of Whitehead mines (torpedoes) for them and barrage mines for installation from mine rafts. However, in comparison with the design of the battleship "Emperor Alexander II", the draft of the new ship increased to 7.16 m, instead of the 6.1 m that was once specified for the Baltic battleships, and became even greater than that of the "Alexander II". The cruising range at full speed was no longer calculated for six days, as I. A. Shestakov himself once demanded, and not even for four, as was calculated for “Alexander II,” but only for three days. Accordingly, fuel reserves decreased (from 680 to 546 tons) and the distance traveled at 15 knots speed (from 1425 to 1086 miles). What exactly were the advantages of the new ship over the one already under construction (Emperor Alexander II) remained a mystery. Meanwhile, MTK magazine No. 115 dated May 30, 1885, “the dimensions of the members and connections of the hull and other data shown in the specification” were recognized as “satisfactory for the strength of the vessel”, the artillery armament was in agreement with the “instructions of His Excellency” (Admiral I. A. Shestakov . - R.M.), and the supply of supplies - “corresponding to the purpose and service of the vessel.” Thus, MTK, having developed the drawings and specifications, approved it itself “for guidance during construction.” I. A. Shestakov expressed complete satisfaction with the project with his resolution “I agree”, favorably, even when the theoretical drawing was approved on April 3, 1885, who accepted the proposal of the MTK to entrust the construction of the ship to the Baltic Shipyard.

Table 1

Characteristics of the first and second Baltic battleships approved by I. A. Shestakov

Characteristics	“No. 1, being built in the New Admiralty”*	“No. 2, newly designed”**
Length between perpendiculars, m	99,36	93,11
Maximum width, m	20,42	17,17
Draft, m	7,01	7,16
Displacement, English T.	8734	7572
The same, clarified, English. T.	8440	-
Mechanism power, l. With.	8000	7500
The same, refined, hp.	8500	-
Speed, kt	15	15
Coal reserves, t	680	546
Cruising range at full speed, miles	1425	1080
Number of armored towers	1	2
Number and caliber in mm of long-range guns (number of charges per gun)	2-305 (100), 4-229 (125), 8-152 (125)	2-305 (50), bow tower, 2-229 (50), aft tower, 10-152 (100)
Armor thickness, mm:
According to GVL: in the middle part of the body - at the ends	356-203	330
Traverses	-	305
Tower armor: upper-lower tiers	254-254	152-127 (bow tower), 127-102 (aft tower)
Deck armor: in the middle - at the ends	64	51-76

* "Emperor Alexander II"

** The proposed project of the future “Emperor Nicholas I”, for the construction of which on October 25, 1885 a contract was ordered to be concluded and which I. A. Shestakov abandoned on October 31, deciding to return to type “N” 1"

But by the fall, plans had changed: I. A. Shestakov considered it necessary to cancel the order already issued to the Baltic Plant. The ship was entrusted to be built by the Franco-Russian plant on the “Galern Island”, guided by the project of “Emperor Alexander II”, abandoning all previous work on both the project No. 2 of the ship itself and its power plant, ordering the main mechanisms from the English Napier plant based on the model built by him for the battleship "Sinop". In this regard, the director of the office of the Maritime Ministry, Vice Admiral N.N. Andreev, on October 26, 1885, demanded that the development of the technical conditions of the order be accelerated so that the conclusion of the contract with the Franco-Russian plant would take place “certainly in the first half of November.” At the same time, it was possible to resolve the issue of placing an order for the construction of a ship on the “Galern Island”, where the boathouse was “easily expanded by removing the pillars supporting the rolling crane.”

The Society of Franco-Russian Factories (the former plant of K. Berd), as it was written on its letterhead, was created, apparently, not without the participation of I. A. Shes-takov (his wife Maria Ivanovna was related to the chief authorized engineer of the company P. C. Du Buis). The Company received for free rental use the entire territory, equipment and structures of the Galerny Island, where the construction of the steel corvettes Vityaz and Rynda began in August 1883. Realizing the inadequacy of the horizontal steam engines provided on these ships, the Society, having received an order for the construction of the battleship, took the initiative to use vertical engines, not double (as on Alexander II), but triple expansion, which was, although not without hesitation, approved by the Ministry of Transport and Communications.

The great success of the Franco-Russian plant was the invitation (on the recommendation of S.K. Dzhevetsky) to the position of chief naval engineer of the shipyard of the talented self-taught practitioner P.A. Titov. Rare natural abilities, phenomenal engineering intuition, enriched by long experience in shipbuilding, allowed him to find optimal design and technological solutions. All design strength checks undertaken by the naval engineer N. E. Kuteynikov supervising the construction invariably confirmed the correctness of P. A. Titov’s decisions. By increasing the accuracy of laying out and unrolling stringers on the plaza and marking holes for rivets, P. A. Titov was able to do without the use of expensive construction fish. By improving the stamp of the hole-punching press and using shoulders when countersinking holes for rivet heads, he solved the problem of monotony of drilling for riveting, eliminated the possibility of the appearance of “blind holes,” and ensured the utmost cleanliness and accuracy of rivet seams. An innovative, exceptionally conscientious attitude to work, mastery of any tool, the ability to organize work at the lowest cost, rare abilities as a draftsman and designer (“he drew by hand... always with a pen and with extraordinary speed,” recalled A. N. Krylov) won P. A. Titov's exceptional authority among the workers allowed him to quickly form their staff and bring the enterprise to the level of high design and technological culture. The overall high quality of the construction of the battleship (all flaws, however, could not be excluded) was also facilitated by the extremely strict, meticulous and qualified supervision on the part of N. E. Kuteynikov, who, according to A. N. Krylov, was at that time “the most educated ship engineer in our fleet,” and participation in the work of the future academician A. N. Krylov, who, with the rank of midshipman, three years after graduating from the Naval School, from August 1887 to October 1888, underwent a shipbuilding internship at the plant before entering the Naval Academy. Having already discovered exceptional mathematical abilities, A. N. Krylov, on the instructions of N. E. Kuteynikov, performed the most important and complex calculations for the ship design. Among them was a study (by two independent methods) of the strength of the tower installation, which became the first scientific publication of A. N. Krylov on shipbuilding.

The armored ship "Emperor Nicholas I": a - longitudinal section; b - top view; c - plan of the battery deck; d - side view diagram.

1 - aft balcony; 2 - wardroom; 3 - tiller compartment; 4 - mainmast; 5 - chimney; 6 - ventilation socket of the boiler room; 7 - conning tower; 8 - 305 mm gun; 9 - command room; 10 - chain box; 11 - torpedo tube; 12 - cellar of 305 mm shells; 13 - boiler room; 14 - galley; 15 - engine room; 16 - cellar of 229 mm shells; 17 - skylight of the wardroom; 18 - 14-oar boat; 19 - 229 mm gun; 20 - mine boat; 21 - 6-oar whaleboat; 22 - mine net pole; 23 - steam boat of the “Bird” type; 24 - 20-oar longboat; 25 - turret of 305 mm guns; 26 - mine network; 27 - spire; 28 - companionway; 29 - nasal bridge; 30 - 6-oar yawl; 31 - 16-oar work boat; 32 - 47 mm gun; 33 - 152 mm gun; 34 - officer's buffet; 35 - engine room skylight; 36 - neck of the coal pit; 37 - barbette turret of 305 mm guns

The activities of these three outstanding engineers were limited, however, only to issues of quality in the implementation of the project given from above and not subject to change. Fundamental technical decisions were not subject to their control; they were still subject to the undivided sole authority and discretion of the manager of the Naval Ministry. The entire system of state-owned shipbuilding remained unshakable, with endless delays in the decisions of the Ministry of Transport and Communications on the drawings submitted to it for approval with continuous design changes. Anticipating these circumstances, the plant, when signing on December 20, 1885, a contract for the construction of the hull of a battleship with a displacement of 8,400 tons “according to the type of Emperor Alexander II,” stipulated the right to extend the delivery date of the ship in the event of a deviation from the Ministry of the Navy from the approved project. In the meantime, it was assumed that the ship with with the installed “underwater” parts of the mechanisms, it will be ready for launching in the spring of 1888 and fully prepared for delivery no later than July 1889. The contract price of the hull was 2,853,756 rubles.

On April 9, 1886, a contract was signed for the supply of main engines with a capacity of 8,000 hp. With. (for some reason, 500 hp less than on Alexander II) and cost 1 million 338 thousand rubles. For failure to achieve the contract power, fines were provided, and if the power was less than 7000 hp. s., the plant was obliged to dismantle the machines and replace them with new ones. All these harsh guarantees, designed to protect the interests of the treasury, did not, however, contain the obligation of the Maritime Ministry to provide the plant with a comprehensively and fully developed project before the start of construction. The contract documents were only specifications for the hull and mechanisms, while working drawings, according to the custom of that time, were to be developed during the construction of the ship.

Concluding a contract for the construction of a battleship “on the type of Emperor Alexander II,” the plant expected to make extensive use of the latter’s working drawings. However, almost all of the design documentation had to be developed anew and it was considered as if there was no predecessor for the ship under construction. The most depressing thing was that , that in the overwhelming majority of changes in the project were not of the nature of fundamentally important innovations.

In May 1887, a change in the internal layout of the ship followed, caused by the replacement of 30-caliber 305-mm guns with 35-caliber ones. At the same time, by the way, midshipman A. N. Krylov, “attached to the construction,” performed a calculation for the tower installation to “determine the magnitude of bending moments for each of the radial beams of the tower.” In December, due to the novelty of the case, the drawings and calculations were discussed and were approved “in the meeting of the city of naval engineers of the St. Petersburg port.”

At the same time, instead of forged iron, the propeller shaft brackets were ordered from well-proven cast steel from the Aleksandrovsky plant, the issue of additional furniture “for the reception hall under the poop and the cabins of the flag captain and staff officers on the battery deck was decided,” and the search for the structural design of the poop began, which lasted more than a year. At the same time, it became necessary to order foreign teak wood for the middle outer keel (a rudiment of wooden shipbuilding) (domestic oak was considered harmful for the steel structures associated with it) and the steering drive of the Stapfer and Duclos system, which had already been sufficiently tested on a number of French ships.

In May 1888, the Main Directorate of Shipbuilding and Supply (GUKiS) entered into a contract with the Franco-Russian plant for the additional supply (with installation on the ship) of auxiliary mechanisms, which included two auxiliary water-tube boilers of the Belleville system, four steam drainage “turbines” (centrifugal pumps), two ejectors, two steam piston pumps, one fire pump (pump) of the Shand-Mason system, two auxiliary refrigerators. At the same time, the stern part of the ship underwent extensive alterations, where the requirements for the placement of artillery (the British on similar ships of the Victoria type installed a 254-mm cannon at the stern) struggled with the tasks of providing comfortable living conditions for the flagship, its staff ranks and the ship's officers. Ultimately, the aft deckhouse that was originally intended, as was done on the Emperor Alexander II, was expanded to the edge of the side and turned into an impressive deck, giving the ship the appearance of a passenger steamer from the stern. Its aesthetic design amounted to a whole epic, in which, under the guidance of an observer and according to the instructions of the chief inspector of shipbuilding, the plant carried out two versions of the design. Of these, during an interim review in March, the MTC chose the one where the deck flooring was level with the bridge, which was lowered by 152 mm to coordinate their heights. At the same time, the location of the barbette installation was approved, increasing the diameter of its armored contour and the armored pipe for supplying ammunition, and specifying the location of the “hydraulic devices.” The MTK's comments were also taken into account, amounting to 21 points, such as: to make the engine hatch modeled on the cruiser "Dmitry Donskoy", to increase the size of the officer's buffet, to move the mine devices, etc. In May 1888, we once again had to return to the design of the aft part ship. I. A. Shestakov unexpectedly demanded that the cabins under the poop be equipped with windows, and on the outside on the sides “not to make a collar that would serve as a continuation of the gunwale,” to place the boats with the keel at the height of the gunwale, and not the bridge, in order to improve the view from the commander’s cabin, etc. In the end, all these researches of the minister (with the construction of a multi-sided model that demonstrated two versions of the quarterdeck) resulted, according to P. K. Du Buis, in an additional payment of 93 thousand 500 rubles. with a corresponding overload of 48.45 tons, for which the plant declined responsibility. No less serious delays in work were caused by alterations undertaken by the ministry in the bow section. Since March 1888, all work related to the installation of 305 mm guns had to be stopped. A drawing of its improved (following the example of “Emperor Alexander II”) and still barbette design, but with an increase in the height of the gun axis by 0.305 m, N. E. Kuteynikov presented on July 16, 1888 (according to the strictly observed order) to the commander of the St. Petersburg port from where it was, by virtue of the same “procedure”, and, as a rule, without any comments, it was forwarded for consideration to the MTK.

From the updated load attached to the tower design it followed that the design displacement of the ship (8440 tons) was already exceeded by 213 tons. The overload, largely due to the large (7.7 m) diameter of the installation, forced the MTK to once again reconsider its design. Ultimately, the Admiral General, according to the MTK report on December 29, 1888, “deigned to approve in principle” the replacement of the barbette installation on the battleship with a “closed turret of small diameter.” The placement on the ship of this new design, proposed by the director of the St. Petersburg Metal Plant, with his participation and under the leadership of the supervisor N.E. Kuteynikov, was proposed to be worked out by the Franco-Russian plant. On January 31, 1889, along with the next series of drawings developed by the plant, N. E. Kuteynikov presented to the chief naval engineer of the St. Petersburg port a project for a new tower installation “with cover according to the Krell system” (director of the Metal Plant). On February 3, the acting port commander, Rear Admiral A.K. Shefner, forwarded the project to the MTK, where it was approved with rare efficiency by the magazine dated April 4, 1889, No. 71.

The new turret (taking into account the changes made by MTK) still turned out to be 44.9 tons heavier than the previous installation. This overload was reduced to 30 tons due to a smaller supply of shells and charges (70 each instead of 80, originally intended for the 305 mm gun) and reducing the weight of the conning tower. The ship acquired an imperceptible so far (1.27 cm) trim on the bow, which, however, was masked by the slope of the upper deck towards the bow, which was preserved following the example of “Emperor Alexander II” (for the sake of the opportunity to hit the enemy with a direct fire salvo during a ramming attack). More noticeable was the re-deepening, which amounted to 0.152 m due to the overload increased to 243 tons. The protracted resolution of these issues disrupted the launch of the ship planned in 1888. For six months, due to the uncertainty of the tower’s design, the plant was deprived of the opportunity to carry out hull work near its location. As a result, on October 21, the Main Naval Staff notified the commander of the St. Petersburg port that “due to the onset of cold weather, the launch of the battleship Emperor Nicholas I is postponed until the spring of next year.”

In the photo: “Emperor Nicholas I.” View from the stern

On the same days, communicating with the chairman of the MTK and being concerned about the proper aesthetics of the new ship, the Admiral General “deigned to verbally order to consider” whether the bust of Emperor Nicholas 1, left over from the one of the same name (excluded from the lists in 1874), would be suitable as a nasal decoration. wooden sailing ship. Admiral N.M. Chikhachev, who replaced I.A. Shestakov, who died on November 21, reported on the basis of research carried out by the Ministry of Transport and Communications that the bust of the emperor was disproportionately large and, due to its specific design (in relation to the crown of an ancient ship), did not fit with the stem of a modern battleship. They decided to order a new bust, but based on the previous one, from the famous sculptor M. O. Mikeshin, who had carried out similar orders before. But soon, apparently mindful of the devastating cost of such academic orders for the treasury, at a special meeting at the MTK they decided to entrust the production of the bust to an amateur naval sculptor, Captain 2nd Rank Pushchin. The case dragged on until 1893. After several trial busts on different scales had passed the Grand Duke’s strict examination, the MTK was still discussing the fate of the bust already made for the ship. Instead of sawing the bust in half as proposed by the commander (to make it more convenient to hide the bust in a shelter during a stormy voyage), they agreed to provide the bust with additional anchor bolts and cover it at sea with a cover made of the strongest canvas. The emperor, crucified on a pole and swaddled in canvas, was not the decoration of the ship for long: the grand duke’s idea turned out to be clearly untenable and after several sailing experiments the bust had to be disposed of.

In addition to the first full-size turret installation, which for the first time in the Russian fleet ensured the loading of guns independently of each other and began the development of turrets for subsequent types of ships, the “Emperor Nicholas I” could also become the owner of the first hydraulic steering drive. Roller drives, which had recently replaced the widely used steering cables to the rudder, became (due to their multi-link nature) unreliable on large ships, and proposals arose to replace them with hydraulics, which were widely used in artillery installations. There were no private companies in Russia capable of offering a ready-made solution to the problem. MTK, due to the extremely small number of its members, the abundance of control functions assigned to it and ongoing concerns, was not able to initiate and coordinate the creation of new equipment.

The hydraulic steering drive was once developed by the Kronstadt Steamship Plant for the cruiser “Vladimir Monomakh” “at the private request” of the commander, captain 1st rank J. A. Giltebrandt, who, having become the commander of the “Emperor Nicholas I”, forced the MTK to return to this issue. But since there was no ready-made project, the previous system of rollers and “countless gears” continued to be developed for the ship. Meanwhile, the St. Petersburg manufacturer R. Krug, having taken the problem seriously, was able to develop a hydraulic system in which all the steering wheels duplicated the action of the working steering column, their indicators also consistently showed the angle of deflection of the steering wheel, which made it possible to transfer control to another column at any time. Thus, control posts could be located in any room of the ship, for example, under a protected armored deck; damage to any one of the steering columns did not affect the operation of the others. Maintaining the entire system in good working order was also very simple. These advantages, which, according to the company, J. A. Hiltebrandt reported on July 18, 1890 to the chairman of the MTK K. P. Pilkin, prompted him to become interested in R. Krug’s system, and already in September the company presented N. E. Kuteynikov with drawings of a system with two independent hydraulic columns. In December, the MTK approved this drive to the spool of the steam steering machine and allowed it to be installed as an experiment (R. Krug, relying on advertising, offered to do this free of charge). But the roller wiring was also retained (due to doubts about the reliability of the hydraulics). Having not received official citizenship rights from the MTC, the system, ahead of its time, apparently did not last long and shared the fate of other similar innovations. A decade later, MTK, still indifferent to this innovation, allowed it to be ordered for the battleship Retvizan and the cruiser Varyag, which were built according to the design of V. Kramp’s company in America - also “in the form of an experiment” and also with the preservation of the backup roller drive. But even at this time the system turned out to be premature - it was not used on ships. A device for disconnecting the low-pressure cylinder from the shaft line also turned out to be a promising innovation, but, as often happened then, it was not completed. Having approved the project proposed by P. C. Du Buis, the MTK did not show any interest in its fate, and after a number of breakdowns during voyages, the device was dismantled under the pretext of lack of fuel economy.

The presence of a developed hydraulic system, which also served the turret installation, allowed the Franco-Russian plant to use it to drive the lifting of mine boats. But instead of the 10-15 s required by MTC, the lifting time was a full minute and MTC, having abandoned both steam and hydraulic drives for now, settled on a truly Solomon solution - to allow the crew to lift the boats manually, and after a year, if necessary, to return to considering the feasibility mechanical drives. The problem of ventilation of the dynamo compartment was also easily solved. The commander’s arguments about installing electric fans following the example of those already used on the mine cruiser “Lieutenant Ilyin” were rejected on the grounds that the ship had all the conditions for normal ventilation - inlet and exhaust (into the mast) pipes and even, as K suggested without further ado. . P. Pilkin, - just through the open door.

This, frankly, frivolous attitude towards ventilation systems was an obvious legacy of the sailing era, when the spacious decks of ships were naturally ventilated through numerous hatches and gun ports, and all technical means of ventilation were limited to canvas windsail sleeves. Now, in the era of armored ships divided into many compartments, in order not to spend money on a special ventilation system that seemed unusually burdensome, they came up with the idea of ​​using for this purpose the pipes of the drainage and drainage systems that are “free” under normal operating conditions. In accordance with this European fashion, which did not last long, however, they developed a ventilation system for “Emperor Nicholas I”. Sending the drawings developed by the plant to the chief naval engineer of the St. Petersburg port, N. E. Kuteynikov considered them completely worthy of approval. Of course, it is too bold, as is proposed in the West, to also recycle the main main pipe of the drainage system for ventilation - it still must be ready for its intended purpose. The use for ventilation purposes of an essentially auxiliary drainage pipe and pipelines for emergency flooding of crew chambers, bomb, mine and cartridge magazines, especially when these pipes are of large diameter, would, in the opinion of the observer, be quite rational. By avoiding the construction of “a special special pipe system with many valves and taps,” the proposed combined system eliminated doubts “about the proper use of all mechanical devices in a combat situation or in the event of an accident.” And for the system to operate even in conditions of flooding of some compartments, it is enough to provide appropriate valves in it, allowing the remaining unflooded pipes to continue to be used for ventilation. Decrying the complexity of the special ventilation system and at the same time proposing an even more complex combined air-water system, which threatened with the danger of fatal errors, N. E. Kuteynikov fell into an obvious contradiction with logic. In the end, the overly bold innovation was abandoned.

The ship was launched on May 20, 1889, three years after the start (March 8, 1886) of construction. If previously the plant had been almost forcefully forced to launch the ship as quickly as possible, now there was increasing pressure to quickly transfer the ship to Kronstadt, where it arrived on September 26, 1890 with only partially installed armor plates (31 side, seven beam and 14 delivered from England stationary for the tower) and hastily assembled main machines.

Sea trials carried out in October revealed the need for significant improvements to the power plant. The installation of armor plates resumed only on November 1 and continued for more than six months. During this time, 11 slabs (254 mm thick) of the rotating parts of the turret, four slabs (152 mm) of the bow beam, five slabs (152 mm) of the conning tower, delivered from England, were installed, followed by the belated 12 slabs of 38 mm covering the rotating parts of the turret. On May 18, 1891, having completed the installation of the side plates (152 and 356 mm), we carried out stripping and trimming work, caulked the joints of the armor plates and, with the permission of the Ministry of Transport and Trade, painted the armor side along with the entire hull. On July 13, the ship, urgently prepared for the roadstead, took part in a naval parade held in honor of the arrival in Kronstadt of a squadron of French ships under the command of Admiral Gervais. Fire tests of artillery installations and hulls carried out that same summer included testing the effects of gases from turret guns on the servants of nearby 229- and 152-mm guns (sheep and rams were tied in their regular places), but the extent of the impact of fire on humans remained unclear.

In September, major equipment work was completed on the ship, including the installation of racks in the crew chambers and bomb magazines. During repeated sea trials, the power of the mechanisms did not reach the contractual level. Despite the lower power of the vehicles compared to the battleship "Emperor Alexander II" (8000 instead of 8500 hp), in reality they received only 7842 hp.

In the photo: “Emperor Nicholas I” in various colors

As a result, having a significantly higher overload (displacement instead of 8440 tons was 9594 tons), the ship reached only a speed of 14 knots. Such disappointing test results became the subject of study by a naval investigator and the chief naval prosecutor. Appointed by order of the head of the Maritime Ministry N.M. Chikhachev, a special expert commission chaired by Captain 1st Rank A.A. Birilev was proposed in May 1893 to repeat the tests under the same load conditions, sea conditions, coal quality and propeller pitch.

The proceedings with the claims of the Franco-Russian plant, which was at a loss, also became lengthy. The bill, which on November 19, 1890, was presented to N. E. Kuteynikov, who was overseeing the construction of the ship, was presented by P. C. Du Buis. Thus, the strengthening of the longitudinal and transverse bulkheads of the engine and boiler rooms performed by the plant was estimated at 12,250 rubles. silver, installation of additional ribs at each frame in the side corridor compartment, doubling of racks in the bow crew chamber and bomb magazines, strengthening with rods of the bow transverse coal pits and longitudinal bulkheads of the side coal pits - 5140 rubles, rearrangement and alteration of the longitudinal bulkheads of the bow of the hull for crew chambers and bomb magazines - 3,360 rubles, installation of partitions in these bulkheads for the turret pipe - 2,985 rubles, installation of additional bulkheads in the longitudinal corridor of the cockpit - 2,985 rubles, sealing doors in the crew chamber of 305 mm ammunition - 4,175 rubles, alteration of the ports of four 229 mm, eight 152 mm guns and six Hotchkiss guns - 18,500 rubles. Such extensive lists that accompanied the construction of each ship are a bitter confirmation of the enormous costs and unproductive expenses with which the state had to pay for the anarchic order of design and construction of ships, far from any elements of a systematic approach. Drawing up a complete set of working drawings in advance, as was already beginning to become a custom in the West, could save the country from most of these ridiculous and senseless expenses, but for this, completely different people would have to be at the head of the fleet and shipbuilding.

In a petition sent a month later to the manager of the Maritime Ministry for compensation for losses incurred by the plant due to the fault of the ministry, P. C. Du Buis estimated them at 151,628 rubles. Even then - on December 30, 1890, the plant, due to the extension of the work period, only paid for the contractually obligatory hull insurance instead of 88 thousand rubles. paid 127 thousand. The plant justified its right to compensation for losses by the fact that instead of the expected construction of the battleship “Emperor Alexander II” according to the worked out drawings, it was necessary to build a ship that had “nothing similar” to it. Among the reasons for the repeated stoppages of work, P. C. Du Buis singled out a three-fold change in the decision on the caliber of large guns, the system and size of their turret, a corresponding three-time stoppage of work on the installation of hook chambers and bomb magazines (the final decision on which took place after 4.5 years after the start of construction), a year-long stoppage of work in the rear part of the hull, a forced transfer of work on installing armor (due to its delay) from the factory site prepared for this work to the unequipped and cramped Kronstadt dock. Constant delays in work were also created by the lengthy review of the drawings submitted to it for approval by the Ministry of Transport and Communications. Deprived for all these reasons of the opportunity to plan work in any stable manner, the plant was forced to bear the costs of paying for the workers’ downtime that happened every now and then (according to the law of July 3, 1886, they could be fired only after two weeks’ notice). The validity of the plant's claims was recognized by the MTK only on January 1, 1892, when, at the request of GUKiS, they decided to recognize as payable all those 253 tons of hull structures (117 tons had already been paid for by that time), which, according to the requirements of the MTK, were manufactured in excess of the design weight of the hull. Recognizing the ministry’s guilt due to “resolving the issue of the tower and the late delivery of armor for the tower and wheelhouse,” the MTK considered it possible to determine the duration of the delay from the weight log by a specially created commission. In the meantime, a fair decision suggested itself to release the plant from the fine stipulated in the contract for the delay in the ship’s readiness. The proceedings dragged on for a long time, and back in October 1892, one of the former assistants to the supervising naval engineer, E. A. Vvedensky, who was completing the work, continued to respond to requests from the Ministry of Transport and Communications about the circumstances of the construction.

In the photo: “Emperor Nicholas I” under the flag of Admiral S. O. Makarov in Chefoo

table 2

Analogues and contemporaries of the battleship "Emperor Nicholas I"

Ship name (country)	Construction plant, year of launching	Displacement, t design/actual	Main dimensions: length according to GVL x width x average draft, m	Mechanism power, l. With.	Travel speed, ultrasonic	Fuel reserve, t normal/full	Cruising range at 10-knot speed	Armament: number of guns-caliber (mm)/length, calibers; number of mine vehicles (n - surface, n - underwater)	Armor thickness, mm: B - sides along GVL, P - decks, R - conning tower, BS - towers, BB - barbettes, K - casemates, T - traverses
"Peter the Great" (Russia)	State shipyard "Galerny Island" St. Petersburg, 1872	9665/10400	100.5 x 19.3 x 7.2	7000/8250	14,3	950/1300	2900	4-305/20, 2-229 mortars, 4-87, 2-44.2	B-356-203, P-76-64, BSh-336, K-356
"Catherine II" (Russia)	State Admiralty, Nikolaev, 1886	10100/11050	100.9 x 21 x 8.1	900/9100	15	700/90	2800	6-305/30, 7-152/35, 2-64, 8-47, 4-37, 7 n	B-406-203, P-57, R-229, K-305-223
"Emperor Alexander II" (Russia)	New Admiralty, St. Petersburg, 1887	8440/9240	101.6 x 20.4 x 7	8500/830	15/15,3	1000/110	3200	2-305/30, 4-229/35, 8-152/35, 4-64, 10-47, 8-37, 6 n	B-356-152, P-64, R-203, K-76-50, T-152, BB-254
"Emperor Nicholas I" (Russia)	Franco-Russian plant (“Galley Island”), 1889	8440/9594	Same	8000/7842	15/14	847	2630	Same	B-356-152, P-57, R-152
"Gangut" (Russia)	New Admiralty, St. Petersburg, 1890	6592/7880	85.6 x 18.9 x 6.4	6000/5970	15/13,46	552	2000	1-305/30, 4-229/35, 4-152/35, 4-64 (or 87), 6-47, 14-37, 6 n	B-406-203, BSh-229, K-203, R-152, P-64
"Sachsen" (Germany)	"Volcano", Stettin, 1877	7400	91 x 18x 6	5600	13,63	430	-	6-260/22, 4-105, 6-88, 2 small, 3 n, 2 p	B-254-152, BB-406, P-76
Oldenburg (Germany)	Stettin, 1884	5200	75 x 18 x 6	3900	14	500	1800	8-240/30, 2-149/27, 2-88, 6 small, 4	B-330, K-203, P-86
"Victoria" (England)	Newcastle, 1887	10470	103.6 x 21.3 x 8.1	14000	17	750/1200	-	2-413/30, 1-254/32, 12-152/26, 31 small, 4 n, 2 p	B-406-456, BSh-457

Despite the complete completion of all work, as it seemed to the plant back in September 1891, due to the new requirements of the ministry, they continued throughout 1892. Thus, in February, due to the increase in crew size from 500 to 576 people, it became necessary to build additional bed nets (light deck cabinets) for 60 beds around the bridges. A new contribution to the aesthetics of the ship that he loved was made by Admiral General Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich, free from the worries and worries of practical shipbuilding. On August 3, 1891, the chief commander of the Kronstadt port, Vice Admiral S.P. Schwartz, informed the MTK that when he visited the ship “Emperor Nicholas I” when he was in Kronstadt, His Highness deigned to draw attention to the “inharmoniousness of the ship’s mast due to the shortness of the topmasts and topsail yard “and that, by his, Schwartz’s, order, the Mars yardarms were replaced with extended ones, and the drawing of this extension has already been sent for approval to the MTK. Having probably marveled in his soul at the excellent management of the seasoned serviceman Schwartz, who had gotten involved in his own business, K. P. Pilkin noted that “even the enlarged topsail yards did not add harmony” and that it would be more reasonable “to not allow such huge lower yards as on “Kornilov”, “Alexander” and “Nicholas”. For his part, N. E. Kuteynikov, who had already been finally transferred to the MTK by this time, explained that “the long and heavy lower yards of the ship “Emperor Alexander II”, from which the spar was copied and for the ship “Emperor Nicholas I” they appeared as a result of the desire to have a means of lifting relatively light objects onto the deck from the water.” The topmasts and topsails, which had no special purpose other than raising signals, were made shorter.

Summing up the creation of the second Baltic battleship (“Peter the Great” does not count), we have to state that it turned out to be almost a worse version of the “Emperor Alexander II”, this, according to the caustic remark of A. N. Krylov, the ancestor of the “ridiculous type of vessel” . Even in the “harmoniousness” of its appearance, it was clearly inferior to its predecessor. Against the background of a nondescript lonely tower with short cannons lost somewhere on the forecastle, the massive bulk of a three-decker hull with rows of windows, embrasures and portholes, with a wide stern and two tiers from side to side of stretching and elegantly decorated with latticed gilded balconies, dominated over it. On the Alexander II, the stern was still a tier lower, and the only balcony did not look so provocative. Initially, the artillery of both “emperors” was conceived to be the same: two 305/30, four 229/35, eight 152/35, ten 47- and eight 37-mm revolver (five-barreled) Hotchkiss guns, four 64-mm Baranovsky guns. The mine armament of "Nicholas I" was strengthened. Instead of two bow mine devices that were available on the Alexander II, they installed one, but instead of two onboard ones, they installed four, retaining the stern one. Superior to "Alexander II" in the thickness of the side armor at the ends (152 mm instead of 102 and 127 mm), "Emperor Nicholas I" was inferior to it in the thickness of the conning tower armor (152 mm instead of 203 mm), coal reserves (847 tons instead of 967 tons) and, accordingly, in cruising range, and most importantly, in speed (14.5 instead of 15.5 knots). The only consolation for the future was the fundamental technical innovations (turret installation, triple steam expansion machines), which opened the way for their use on subsequent ships.

On May 2-11, 1893, at the Konstantinovsky dock, the underwater part of the battleship was painted, the pitch of the propellers was changed: the ship was preparing to cross the Atlantic for the celebrations of the 400th anniversary of the discovery of America. The tests envisaged by the naval prosecutor, N. M. Chikhachev ordered to be postponed until the return of the ship. On May 30, the Emperor Nicholas I set sail. In Falmouth and the Azores, the ship was replenished with coal reserves and, having completed a 12-day passage across the ocean at a 9-knot speed (daily fuel consumption was 38 -39 tons), the battleship arrived in New York on July 12, having another 300 in the pits. tons of coal According to the review of the head of the Russian Atlantic squadron already in America, Vice Admiral N. N. Kaznakov, who inspected the ship, the ship (under the command of Captain 1st Rank R. R. Dicker) was “in very good shape for a ship that had just arrived from Kronstadt.” . Among the shortcomings that were not discovered during short-term voyages in the Baltic, a very significant leak was pointed out along the rivets of the side plating in the bow (which forced the evacuation of the ship's officials located there in the cabins) and under the anchor fairlead cushions. Supervision of the technical condition of the ship (in order to carry out the necessary corrections upon return) was entrusted to naval engineer P. F. Veshkurtsov, who arrived on the cruiser “Admiral Nakhimov”.

On the way back, the battleship became part of the Mediterranean squadron, which, under the flag of Rear Admiral F.K. Avelan, responding to the visit to Kronstadt in 1891 of the ships of Admiral Gervais, visited Toulon on October 1, 1893.

The battleship spent the entire year of 1894 in the Mediterranean Sea, and in January of the following year, under the flag of the new squadron commander, Rear Admiral S.O. Makarov, having hastily completed painting and dry-docking in Malta, it set out for the Far East. Arriving in Nagasaki on April 6, “Emperor Nicholas I” became part of the Russian United Mediterranean and Pacific squadrons. The ship became the first domestic turret-type battleship in the Pacific Ocean. Concentrating in the Chinese port of Chefoo, the squadron (an armadillo, five cruisers, two gunboats, two mine cruisers, a destroyer) was preparing for what then seemed to be an almost inevitable war with Japan. Then, in particular, the ships, each at the choice of the commander, were for the first time painted in protective, various kinds of experimental colors, including those approaching the modern ball color. On May 2, 1895, the tension was relieved - Japan, without risking a military clash with Russia, renounced, having negotiated monetary compensation, its claims to ownership of the Liaodong Peninsula with the fortress and fleet base of Port Arthur. This undoubtedly outstanding diplomatic victory and the triumph of the fleet as a means of international politics, however, confronted Russia with the need for a new round of the naval arms race, which from that moment was begun by Japan, which was thirsty for military revenge.

“Events of 1894-1895. they revealed to us another enemy, more dangerous in the East than England,” S. O. Makarov wrote in his report on the actions of the fleet in those days.

Until the end of 1896, "Emperor Nicholas I" sailed in the waters of the Far East, and throughout 1897 - in the Mediterranean Sea, where the ship marked the beginning of Russia's participation in peacekeeping activities on the island. Crete, whose population, after the just ended Greco-Turkish war, continued to seek secession from the Turkish empire. In April 1898, the ship returned to the Baltic.

On December 14, 1899, the MTK decided to re-equip the ship, which had begun repairs, for sailing as part of an artillery training detachment. Along with the replacement of the previous fire-tube boilers with 16 new Belleville water-tube systems, the upper tier of the aft superstructure with its luxurious balcony was cut off on the ship. Of the revolving guns, only two 37 mm were left, two of the four 64 mm were removed, sixteen 47 and two 37 mm single-barreled and four machine guns were installed.

In the photo: “Emperor Nicholas I” - the flagship of the detachment of Rear Admiral N. I. Nebogatov

But the ship was still required for active service, and in September 1901 she joined the Mediterranean squadron, replacing the Emperor Alexander II, which had sailed there since 1896. In the summer of 1903, “Emperor Nicholas I”, again, as in 1895, was supposed to lead a detachment of new ships (battleships “Oslyabya”, “Tsesarevich” and the cruiser “Bayan”) under the flag of the head of the Mediterranean squadron, which, due to a new aggravation of relations with Japan they were going to send for reinforcements to the Far East. Upon arrival in Port Arthur, the ship was expected to be returned to the Mediterranean “at the first opportunity.” In the confusion of plans constantly changing in that pre-storm period, both the composition of the detachment and its commander became different. The campaign of "Nicholas I" to Port Arthur was replaced by the escort (together with the cruisers "Dmitry Donskoy" and "Almaz") of a group of destroyers to Sabang, but this plan did not take place. A witness to the mediocre failure of this entire multi-stage strategic operation coordinated by 3. P. Rozhestvensky (in the end, only the Tsarevich and Bayan were able to make it to Port Arthur before the start of the war), the old ship, retired from participation in the war, continued to carry his peaceful Mediterranean service. Due to its obsolescence, it was not included in the 2nd Pacific Squadron sent in October 1904, and in December, when the last ships in Port Arthur were killed under the fire of Japanese siege mortars, the Naval Ministry decided that “Emperor Nicholas I” was hopelessly outdated, never updated artillery, with unreliable 229-mm gun locks that almost fell out of the treasury, were sent to the Far East (the “Emperor Alexander II” was supposed to go after it in the second echelon of the 3rd Pacific Squadron). A transverse bridge for two rangefinders was urgently installed on the deck, two more rangefinders were installed on the bow bridge, a charthouse was mounted on the stern and a brass cabin for the main compass was mounted on it. They sealed the holes in the mine apparatus, installed a wireless telegraph cabin, mounted a winch for Temperley's boom, two platforms on the main top for two searchlights, installed four 47-mm cannons on the poop deck, and in the admiral's office an additional, but still hopelessly outdated, 35-mm gun. caliber 152-mm gun and did many other works, including replacing wooden decking with metal, which they hoped would bring the ship into combat-ready condition. As part of the detachment of Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatov, the ship, like an old soldier, meekly made a new forced march to the Far East, safely passed the battle of Tsushima and the nightmare of night mine attacks, but on the morning of May 15, 1905, when “Emperor Nicholas I” , leading the ships that survived the battle, headed for Vladivostok, their path was blocked by the main forces of the Japanese fleet. As if considering yesterday’s extermination of the fleet as not yet a sufficient lesson, fate prepared a new test and reduced the most incapable ships to the last detachment of the squadron: two coastal defense battleships, the newest, but extremely beaten up, battleship “Eagle”, which barely stayed afloat, and the little damaged, but hopelessly outdated "Emperor Nicholas I". They were accompanied by the light cruiser Izumrud, which had maintained its speed. And when, regardless of the enemy’s superiority, the admiral accepted an unequal battle and ordered to open fire, the guns of “Nicholas I” remained silent. The artillerymen were trained to shoot at an accessible target, but the Japanese, who were 70 kb away, were beyond the reach of the Emperor's guns. One can only try to imagine the state of 29-year-old Lieutenant A.A. Pelikan, when, as the ship’s senior artillery officer and fire manager, he had to report to the admiral that the ship needed to almost halve the distance to the enemy, since the maximum firing distances for its guns are: 51 kb (for 305 mm) and 46.5 kb (for 229 mm), and for nine 152 mm (and even then only abeam) - 48 kb. The Japanese, apparently well aware of the state of the Russian ships, meanwhile approached them to a safe distance of 56 kb and slowly began to shoot the Russian flagship with targeted single shots...

And the heart of the admiral trembled, unable to bear the burden of the immense weight of responsibility that fell on his shoulders for the fate of the people entrusted to his power, the nonsense of the upcoming extermination of the entire detachment (and without any chance of even saving the crews), the shame of the entire lost war with the utmost mediocrity. The last order of the commander was carried out, and the admiral's and St. Andrew's battle flags quietly slid down from the masts. The ships of the detachment surrendered, the Emerald managed to break through, but fate, like the last edification, prepared death for it on its shore.

Thus, the era of Admiral Shestakov came to a logical and, alas, inevitable conclusion for the fleet, and “Emperor Nicholas 1”, created according to his plan, was destined to put a final end to it. Now it depended on all of Russia whether the rudder of its statehood would be turned away from the abyss that was already clearly visible ahead.

Sources and literature

1. RGAVMF, f. 417, op. 1, d. 932; f. 418, op. 1, d. 5884; f. 421, op. 1, d. 747, 842, 963; f. 763, op. 1, no. 359.

2. Krylov A. N. Memoirs and essays. M.: Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences, 1956.

3. Makarov S. O. Documents. T. II. M.: Voenizdat, 1960.

4. Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 The work of the historical commission to describe the actions of the fleet in the war of 1904-1905. at the Naval General Staff. Introduction. Part 1. Russian naval forces in the Far East from 1894 to 1901. Pg., 1918.

5. Russo-Japanese War. Book six. Campaign of the 2nd Pacific Squadron to the Far East. Pg., 1917.

6. Russo-Japanese War. Book seven. Tsu-shima operation. Pg, 1917.

Externally, the project differed from ships of the "Empress Maria" type in that it had modified bow contours to reduce the bow wave that arose during the move, carried out at the suggestion of the head of the Shipbuilding Department of the State Administration, Lieutenant General P. F. Veshkurtsov. As a result of a number of measures to improve the project, Emperor Nicholas I became somewhat heavier and larger than the first three ships in the series. Total displacement increased to 27,830 tons; the greatest length was 182.4 m, width - 28.9 m, draft - 9 m.

Booking

The ship was unique in terms of armor, constructed as a result of experimental firing carried out in the Russian fleet on the full-scale compartment of a battleship. Such a compartment, which included side armor, armored decks, a casemate, internal structural protection with an armored bulkhead and a conning tower, was built according to the drawings of the Baltic battleship Sevastopol and built on one side into the hull of the battleship Chesma delivered to the port.

The very first test firing of the decommissioned battleship revealed a significant lack of armor for all ships of the project. The rigid supporting contour on which the armor plates were superimposed did not interfere with their deflection, as a result of which the thin skin behind the armor tore, forming a leak. This problem could be solved only by making the belt monolithic, that is, by tying the plates together so that they would not allow the projectile to push the plate inside the body. Therefore, a radical change in the design was undertaken - a monolithic armor belt appeared from plates connected by dowels of the “double dovetail” type (before this, keyed fastenings of armor plates were implemented on the Izmails)

Armament

The battleship was planned to be armed with 356-mm main battery artillery, but the project was revised under the pretext of the difficulty of supplying different-caliber artillery and the requisition by Great Britain of the Turkish battleship "Reshadiye" with a 13.5-inch (343-mm) main battery, so that the "Nicholas I" was equipped with the usual 305 -mm guns. The resulting displacement reserve (about 4,000 tons) was used to strengthen the armor - the thickness of the armor bevel and longitudinal torpedo armor bulkhead was increased to 75 mm, and the middle deck armor was increased to 63 mm, and the side bevels on the lower to 75 mm. By eliminating the aft conning tower, the armor of the forward conning tower (walls 400 mm, roof 250 mm), main battery artillery towers (front 300 mm, roof and side faces 200 mm) and elevators (300-225 mm) was strengthened.

This battleship could bear the honorary nickname "ship of admirals." Specially designed as a flagship, she saw many "excellent" commanders on her decks. Other admirals who raised their flag on it wrote their names in gold in the history of the Russian fleet, but one person was found, and the honorable service of the ship was crossed out by the shame of surrendering to the enemy....

Design and construction
"Emperor Nicholas I" in many books is called a ship of the same type as the hero of our previous series, "Emperor Alexander II", this statement is generally true, but this similarity was formed as if "in hindsight". For at first, Admiral Shestakov, issuing on March 3, 1884, the task of developing a project for a new battleship, had in mind to build a smaller ship with different artillery, and, if possible, to use on it the steam engines stored in warehouses from the steamer "Experience" ("demoted" from the imperial yachts third popovka "Livadia"). However, as more and more new ideas were introduced into the project, the size of the ship (still on paper) grew and grew until it became smaller and in some places even surpassed the Alexander. Finally, in April 1885, the admiral approved the design of the ship and seemed to have decided to give an order for it to the Baltic Shipyard, but by the fall he changed his mind and on December 20, the contract was signed with the Society of Fraco-Russian factories, former Berd - the oldest enterprise in Russia in the field of steam shipbuilding . At the same time, the plant was supposed to be guided by the “Emperor Alexander II project” with the amendments made.
These changes were made continuously throughout the ship's construction, delaying construction schedules and causing headaches for the builders. In 1887, it was decided to replace the main caliber guns with longer-range 35-caliber ones, the barbette turret with a “closed turret of small diameter”, they decided to place premises for the admiral and squadron headquarters at the stern, etc. and so on. Finally, on May 20, 1889, the battleship was solemnly launched.


(May 20, 1889 - Launching of the battleship "Emperor Nicholas I")
The ship continued to be completed afloat. at the end of September 1890, the battleship was transferred to Kronstadt for final completion and testing. The speed of the battleship turned out to be less than desired and less than that of its "sistership", a special commission of the naval department began to find out the reason for this. Work on the ship proceeded so slowly that the Franco-Russian plant filed an invoice with the Maritime Department demanding compensation for losses due to constant changes to the design. Officials denied it for a long time, but on January 1, 182, the Ministry recognized the validity of the factory’s claims and agreed to release the factory from the fines specified in the contract for the unavailability of the ship by the appointed date. Only at the beginning of navigation in 1893, the battleship, which had been stalled in construction (and let us remember, it had been under construction since 1885!), entered service...

On long voyages (service)
The ship's service began before its completion was completed. On May 13, 1891, he took part in a naval parade in honor of the arrival of Admiral Gervais' squadron of French warships in Kronstadt.
On May 30, the newly commissioned ship set off on its first long voyage - to the shores of America, where it took part in the celebrations associated with the 400th anniversary of the discovery of this continent.


(In the port of Ponta Delgada during the first overseas voyage in 1893)
In 1894, the ship was sent to the Mediterranean Sea, where it became the flagship of the Russian Mediterranean squadron. This formation of ships played a dual role - it harmed Russia’s interests in the southern waters of Europe, and at the same time served as a forward reserve to strengthen the Russian Pacific Squadron. At that moment, the squadron was commanded by Admiral Avelan, the future manager of the affairs of the naval department.


(From the stern, the formidable battleship really looks like a peaceful steamship)
However, on December 2 of the same year he was replaced by Rear Admiral Stepan Osipovich Makarov, and already on January 24, 1895, having received a secret order from St. Petersburg, the squadron left for the Far East. There, from the squadrons of the Mediterranean Sea and the Pacific Ocean, a new formation was formed - united squadrons under the command of Vice Admiral S.P. Tyrtova.
The concentration of a powerful formation of the Russian navy in the Chinese port of Chifoo became a good tool in the hands of Russian diplomacy when Russia intervened in the revision of the results of the Sino-Japanese War. Japan yielded to a virtual ultimatum from three European powers, backed by impressive naval power.


(Under the flag of Admiral Makarov)
In 1896, the United Squadrons were disbanded and the Emperor Nicholas I returned to the Mediterranean.
In 1899, the ship underwent a minor modernization during which it parted with its aft superstructure and second balcony. Seriously, however, the fighting qualities of the battleship did not increase, but he again took his place in the Mediterranean Sea.
And in the Far East, the clouds of the Russian-Japanese conflict were gathering with might and main. The naval headquarters of the empire hastily pulled warships to Port Arthur and Vladivostok. In the summer of 1903, a detachment of Admiral Virenius appeared in the Mediterranean Sea, which included the “Emperor Nicholas I”. However, the order was soon revised and the battleship was ordered to continue to remain in the warm waters between Europe and Africa.
Modern historians believe that the reason for this decision was the reluctance of the command of the Pacific squadron to get involved with this obsolete ship - alas, although not even 10 years had passed since the battleship entered service, it had already fallen into the category of obsolete... Moreover, when the war began, the ship received order... to return to the Baltic.

LAST hike
Admiral Rozhdestvensky also did not consider it necessary to include “Nikolai” in the Second Pacific Squadron entrusted to him, however, after the fall of Port Arthur there was no longer a choice. And “Emperor Nicholas I” became the flagship of the Third Pacific Squadron; Rear Admiral Nikolai Ivanovich Nebogatov raised his flag on its mast.
At the head of a detachment of 5 warships, the battleship last passed a well-known route, and on April 26, 1905, off the Anama coast they met with the squadron of Admiral Rozhdestvensky. Nebogatov's battleships formed her third armored detachment.
What happens next is well known. You can write a lot, but it will be a story about people, and we are writing about ships.
On May 14, "Emperor Nicholas I" took part in a naval battle for the first time in its ship life - the Battle of Tsushima began.
The next day, the battleship, on the orders of the admiral who had betrayed the Emperor and his oath, lowered the flag and surrendered to the Japanese.....


("Emperor Nicholas I" after Tsushima. There are Japanese sailors on the tower)
Under the flag of the Mikado
The outdated battleship was unlikely to be of significant combat value for the fleet of the island empire, however, as a symbol of the Japanese victory, the enemy's flagship taken in battle, it undoubtedly raised the spirit of the sailors of the land of the rising sun, and therefore, under the name "Iki", sailed as part of the Mikado fleet until 1918.
According to other sources, converted into a target ship, it was sunk by the fire of Japanese dreadnoughts in 1915, and in 1922 it was torn to pieces


(Armored ship "Iki" under the Japanese flag, 1912)

Warships of the world

Those. editor V.V. Arbuzov

Typing Yu.V. Rodionov

Proofreader S.K. Bochurina.

S - Petersburg. 2005

Cover: on pages 1 - 4 there are photographs of the battleship "Emperor Paul I" during various periods of service

Warships of the world

Historical and cultural center of ANO "Eastflot"

Samara: 2005. - 136 p.: ill..

The publisher expresses gratitude to V. Arbuzov, D. Vasiliev, D. Yashkov and S. Kharitonov for the photographs provided

ISBN 5-98830-013-8

1. Design

The book covers the history of the design, construction and service of the battleship "Emperor Paul I", which entered service in 1912.

Its structure, the atmosphere that reigned in the Baltic Fleet during the First World War, participation in the February and October revolutions, as well as the fates of the people who served on this ship are described in detail.

For a wide range of readers interested in military history.

The squadron battleship "Emperor Paul I", of the same type as the "St. Andrew the First-Called", was designed during the period when the Russian fleet was completing the shipbuilding program of 1898–1905. Russian shipbuilding at that time had an extensive creative reserve - a whole family of projects for completely modern battleships. More recently, in 1897, in St. Petersburg, with the direct participation of members of the MTK and under their direct supervision, a successful project for the squadron battleship “Prince Potemkin-Tavrichesky” was developed. This project did not come “from the minds” of the designers, but was a consistent development of the battleships “Three Saints” and “Peresvet” chosen as prototypes. The design of the "Emperor Paul I" as a ship of the new program is discussed in the author's work "Battleship "Andrew the First-Called"" (St. Petersburg, 2002).

To continue the construction of ships by order of Emperor Nicholas II in a Special Meeting chaired by Count D.M. Volsky on December 14, it was decided to release 12 million rubles for 1903. towards the future shipbuilding program. The same amount was allocated for the next year. The type of "modified Borodino" ("to maintain the same type") and with the replacement of 152-mm guns with 203-mm guns was chosen at a meeting on January 27, 1903, chaired by the head of the General Staff, Vice Admiral F.K. Avelan. They expected to receive the modified project within three months, however, it was soon necessary to make sure that taking into account all the changes (in particular, they wanted to place the boilers along the hull), the displacement according to the project increases to 16,000 tons (with a corresponding increase in the main dimensions), and by the start of construction less than a year later. will not be able to start.

On January 20, 1903, the emperor decided this year to begin building two battleships of the improved Borodino type for the Baltic Fleet. “For the possible integration of the largest means of protection and defense on them,” the displacement was allowed to be increased to 16,500 tons. On January 27, 1903, under the chairmanship of Pavel Petrovich Tyrtov, manager of the Naval Ministry (who soon passed away on March 13), a discussion took place on projects-tasks developed by the MTK and the department Chief ship engineer of the St. Petersburg port D.V. Skvortsova. As once happened with the Rurik cruiser project, MTK and its subordinate structure wanted to keep the project entirely under the treasury. The Baltic Shipyard, in contrast to the previous practice of working with the Borodino project, was not invited to participate in the design.

The projects did not find any significant difference. In the MTK project, Bertin's armored longitudinal bulkhead, instead of 1.8 m (as on Borodino), was installed from the side at a distance of 4.87 m, and to increase the survivability of two groups of boilers, they were installed on high (2.44 m) foundations, using them space for storing ammunition magazines. D.V. Skvortsov installed the longitudinal bulkhead 2.44 m from the side and increased the number of main transverse bulkheads.

On January 30, 1903, based on the decisions of the meeting on January 27, the Chief Naval Engineer of the St. Petersburg port Skvortsov was instructed, with the participation of the MTK, to develop a project for an “improved battleship of the Borodino type.” The characteristics were set as follows: displacement not exceeding 16,500 tons, speed not less than 18 knots, the depth in a normal load is no more than 26 ft. Artillery was provided with four 12-dm 40-caliber guns in two rotating turrets, protected by the same armor as on the Borodino and 12 8-dm 50-caliber guns in six turrets. -mm semi-automatic guns, like on the Borodino, were supposed to be covered with 3-inch armor. It was also necessary to provide 20 47-mm semi-automatic and 37-mm automatic, two 75-mm landing guns, 8 machine guns, five underwater and one surface (in the stern). ) mine vehicles. "The network barrier must be restored."

Reservation of the sides at length and height - “as on the Borodino”, but with an increase in the thickness of the armor of the lower belt to 9 dm, and the upper - 7 dm, or with an increase in the thickness of both belts to 8 dm in the event that it would be more advantageous in terms of “considerations about the combat buoyancy of the battleship.” A wonderful phrase was also added about the possibility of reducing the height of the ship’s hull by one deck, “if according to your calculations it turns out to be harmless to the seaworthiness of the battleship.” This document was signed by the Chairman of the MTK, Vice Admiral Dubasov, for the Chief Inspector of Shipbuilding Gulyaev. and ID of senior clerk Vvedensky (RGA of the Navy, f. 421, op. 8, d. 69, l. 363).

May 1 D.V. Skvortsov presented to the MTK the project he had modified (the characteristics are given in the book “Andrew the First-Called”). On May 8, the pitching parameters were determined in the experimental pool; on June 4, based on the results of model towing tests (ship length 133.5 m, width 24.7 m, draft 7.92 m), it was determined that the power for 18-knot speed should be 16,600 hp. With.

There was no longer any talk of uniformity.

The head of the experimental pool, Lieutenant Colonel A.N., who conducted the tests. Krylov was well acquainted with the practice of MTK, which already once, in order to reduce the load in the Aurora cruiser project, did not think about reducing the number of 152-mm guns from 10 to 8, but did not want to accept the contours received by the pool, which promised an increase in speed. It was clear that in the new project (without a forecastle) the lines would not be changed. And when, naturally, it was discovered that the model without a forecastle was thoroughly buried in the water, A.N. Krylov, knowing that there was no question of alterations, philosophically noted that the commander would have to deal with this disaster at sea. In order to reduce the pitching and flooding, it will be necessary to change its course and speed accordingly. In other words, instead of the general world rule of building the best ships in the world, the MTK already recognized in advance that a ship that has not yet been built will be deprived of freedom of maneuver in battle and must give up an advantageous position to the enemy in bad weather.

It’s amazing, but none of all those who so routinely committed ordinary bungling occurred to remember the experience of the cruiser Admiral Nakhimov, which, back in the voyage of 1887, was so desperately burying itself in the oncoming waves that it was proposed to remove the bow tower from the ship and install a forecastle. Such were the times, such was the spirit of the era, such were the concepts of the historical responsibility of officials. It is not difficult to imagine them today, referring to the “reforms” taking place before our eyes, useless vouchers and the “monetization” of pensioners’ benefits.

At the end of October 1924, at the French naval base of Bizerte (Tunisia), with the symbolic lowering of the St. Andrew's flag on the battleship "General Alekseev" (until 1917 - "Emperor Alexander the Third"), the last formation of the imperial fleet - the Russian squadron - ceased to exist.

St. Andrew's flag was stored in Australia for a long time in the emigrant Wardroom of Russian naval officers. In 1975, Captain M.I. Maksimov, the last remaining member of the Wardroom, handed over the flag for safekeeping to Mikhail Protopopov, a priest and the son of an officer in the Russian Imperial Army. The last time the flag was displayed in public was in 1985 in Melbourne during the funeral of a Black Sea Fleet officer.

In 2014, with the assistance of the Representative of the Russian Military Historical Society for Cossack Affairs in the USA, Valery Annenko, the flag was transferred to the Russian Military Historical Society and restored at the State Research Institute for Restoration (director - Dmitry Antonov). On August 15, 2014, during the meeting of the President of Russia with cultural figures in Yalta, the Chairman of the Russian Military Historical Society, Minister of Culture of the Russian Federation Vladimir Medinsky handed over to Vladimir Putin the restored St. Andrew's flag from the last ship of the Russian Imperial Navy.

Nikolay Manvelov

St. Andrew's flag from a battleship
"Emperor Alexander the Third"

The main banner of the ship of the Russian Imperial Navy was the stern St. Andrew's flag - a rectangular white panel with a blue diagonal cross. The cross was adopted in honor of the heavenly patron of Russia - the Holy Apostle Andrew the First-Called. As he said, “the flag is white, through which is the blue cross of St. Andrew, for the sake of the fact that Russia received holy baptism from this apostle.”

In its modern form, the St. Andrew's flag did not appear immediately. According to a number of sources, in 1692, the ships of Peter’s amusing flotilla on Lake Pleshcheyevo carried the St. Andrew’s Cross, superimposed on the cloth of the modern Russian tricolor, which in those days was called the “flag of the Tsar of Moscow.”

In 1668-1697, the Russian stern naval flag was a red cloth with a blue straight cross, the rays of which did not reach the edges of the banner. There were white rectangles in the upper left and lower right corners.

The first document that mentions the oblique cross of St. Andrew the First-Called dates back to 1699. In the draft instructions of Peter the Great to the Russian envoy to Turkey, clerk Emelyan Ukraintsev, the Russian tricolor with an oblique cross is drawn by the tsar’s hand.

The cross of St. Andrew officially became the Russian naval flag only in 1703 after the Russians occupied the island of Kotlin, where Kronstadt was later built. The four rays of the cross symbolized for the tsar the consolidation of Russian possession of the shores of the Baltic, Caspian, Azov and White. “Glory, glory to God for the correction of our standard, which in the image of the cross of St. Andrew favored correction,” wrote Peter after Russia gained a foothold on the shores of the Baltic Sea.

Before the start of the battle, the St. Andrew's flag was also raised on the topmasts of the masts or the ends (ends) of the yards.

The running naval crews carried banner flags on poles. If the ship was commanded by a crew commander on a voyage, the banner flag was kept in his cabin.

At different times there were white, blue and red flags, in the roofs of which St. Andrew's crosses were located. They were carried, respectively, by the ships of the vanguard, corps de battalion (main forces) and rearguard. In 1865 these flags were abolished.

The stern flag of the ship could have in the center an image of the “miracle of St. George about the serpent.” For the first time such a flag was received in 1827 for the heroism of the crew in the naval battle of Navarino, the battleship Azov of the Baltic Fleet. In 1829, the flag was assigned to the Black Sea brig Mercury, which forced two Turkish battleships to retreat. St. George's flags were transferred to ships bearing the names “Memory of Azov” and “Memory of Mercury”. The banners of the naval crews manning these ships were also St. George's.

In August 1856, after the heroic defense of Sevastopol in 1854-1855, the St. George banner flags were assigned to all naval crews of the Black Sea Fleet.

For the first time - in 1819 - by decree of Emperor Alexander the First, St. Andrew's flags were assigned to the Guards crew and all ships that were manned. This was done in memory of the battle of Kulm (1813).

The stern flag was guarded by a sentry who remained at his post even during the battle. During the battle near Port Arthur on January 27, 1904, the sentry of the armored cruiser "Bayan" Nikifor Pecheritsa received shrapnel wounds in both legs, but did not leave his post. They changed him only after the battle. One of the last to leave the ship in Chemulpo was the sentry at the banner of the cruiser “Varyag” - boatswain Pyotr Olenin was not replaced throughout the entire battle and miraculously did not die.

There were St. Andrew's flags of a special type. The banner flag of the Naval Cadet Corps in the middle of the panel on top of the cross had an image of a double-headed eagle in a yellow circle. At the ends of the rays of the cross were the coats of arms of the corps itself and the imperial monograms.

St. Andrew's flag, like other symbols of old Russia, was abolished only after the October Revolution. The only exceptions were the flags assigned to members of the imperial family, which were abolished in September 1917, when the country became a republic. Until October 30, 1924, St. Andrew's flags flew in Bizerte over the ships of the Russian squadron, which left Crimea in November 1920.

Unlike the flag, which was raised on ships of all classes every day at 8 am and lowered, usually at nightfall, the flag (it was also called the fortress flag) was assigned only to combat ships of the 1st and 2nd rank - battleships, battleships and cruisers. It was a red rectangular cloth, on which straight and oblique white crosses, as well as the St. Andrew's flag, were superimposed. The Russian Imperial Navy remained in service in the RSFSR and the USSR until August 1924.

The guy was raised on the bow flagpole when anchored, on a barrel, on mooring lines, or in the dock, as well as on a coastal battery allocated for the production of artillery salutes. The right to raise the jack on the mizzen mast belonged to the great princes and grand duchesses (such flags had a side cutout, resembling a weather vane), but with the personal permission of the emperor. The Grand Ducal Kaiser flags had a yellow circle in the center with the image of the imperial standard.

The Kaiser flag could have been assigned to someone other than the august person. It was assigned, for example, to Alexei Orlov (the future Orlov-Chesmensky), who commanded the Russian squadron during the 1st Archipelago Expedition. After the victory of the Russian fleet in the Battle of Chesme, the Kaiser’s flag was included in the count’s coat of arms, and he retained the right to raise his flag on ships of the Russian Imperial Fleet for life.

The Russian squadron in Bizerte was formed as a result of the departure of the ships of the White Black Sea Fleet from the ports of the Crimean Peninsula, as well as auxiliary ships on which the evacuation of troops and civilians was carried out in November 1920. The exact number of people taken out is unknown, but it is believed that it could reach up to 150 thousand people.

Initially, the squadron included over 120 ships, including ships flying a military flag, as well as numerous transports, including a large number of ships of the Russian Society of Shipping and Trade (ROPiT) and the Voluntary Fleet. Upon arrival in Constantinople (Istanbul), a gradual sale of civilian ships began. The warships that arrived in Turkey were transformed into the Russian squadron under the command of Rear Admiral Mikhail Kedrov.

On December 1, 1920, France agreed to accept the Russian ships, providing a closed roadstead at the Bizerte naval base for parking. The crews of the ships, as well as the refugees on board (mainly family members of military sailors) were able to stay in the premises of forts and military camps. The relocation of ships to Bizerte took place at the end of 1920 - at the beginning of 1921.

In North Africa, a naval educational institution was organized on the squadron, and the magazine “Bizerte Naval Collection” was published. Meanwhile, due to the constant reduction in the number of already incomplete ship crews, as well as the actions of the French government to neutralize the squadron, it gradually faded away as a military association.

So, in 1921, the beautifully equipped huge transport workshop “Kronstadt” was taken by the French to Marseille under the pretext of a plague epidemic. Subsequently, the ship became part of the French fleet as the Vulcan.

On October 29, 1924, France decided to recognize the USSR. The next day, St. Andrew's flags were lowered on the last ships of the Russian squadron. The only remaining formation of the White Fleet ceased to exist.

The squadron's combat ships were supposed to be transferred to the USSR, but Moscow refused to recognize itself as the heir to the war debts of the Russian Empire. In addition, public opinion in Europe was against the military strengthening of the USSR. The ships rusted in Bizerte until the 1930s, when they gradually began to be scrapped.

The Russian squadron included:

2 battleships - "General Alekseev" and "George the Victorious".

2 cruisers - "Almaz" and "General Kornilov".

11 destroyers - “Restless”, “Wrathful”, “Daring”, “Hot”, “Live”, “Zvonky”, “Zorkiy”, “Captain Saken”, “Hasty”, “Ardent” and “Tserigo”.

4 submarines - AG-22, Burevestnik, Tyulen and Duck.

3 gunboats - “Grozny”, “Strazh” and “Yakut”.

3 minesweepers - “Albatross”, “Cormorant” and “Whaler”.

4 armed icebreakers - “Vsadnik”, “Gaydamak”, “Dzhigit” and “Ilya Muromets”.

2 hydrographic vessels - “Vekha” and Kazbek.”

1 transport workshop - “Kronstadt”.

1 floating base - “Prey”.

4 tugboats - “Belbek”, “Golland”, “Sevastopol” and “Chernomor”.

1 hospital ship - “Bestuzhev”.

Transports - “Dalland”, “Don”, “Ekaterinodar”, “Zarya”, “Inkerman”, “Crimea”, “Olga”, “Careful”, “Poti”, “Psezuape”, “Rion”, “Samara”, “Sarych”, “Sukhum”, Transport No. 410, Transport No. 412, Transport No. 413, “Turkestan”, “Shilka” and “Yalta”, etc.

A large number of small and auxiliary vessels.

The stern flag of the battleship of the Russian Imperial Navy "Emperor Alexander the Third" (from 1917 - "Volya", from 1919 - "General Alekseev") was in storage in Australia for a long time under the custody of Captain M.I. Maksimova.

Russian emigrants, according to the testimony of the mitred archpriest, Administrator of the Affairs of the Australian-New Zealand Diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church, Mikhail Protopopov, believed that this flag was the last one lowered in 1924 in Bizerte on the ships of the Russian squadron.

The flag was kept in the emigrant Wardroom of Russian naval officers and was used to cover coffins during the funeral service of former officers of the Russian Navy. In 1975 M.I. Maksimov remained the only member of the Wardroom and handed over the flag for safekeeping to Mikhail Protopopov, a priest and the son of an officer in the Russian Imperial Army. The last time the flag was used was at the funeral of a former naval officer in 1985 in Melbourne.

Research work by the Russian Research Institute of Restoration confirmed that the flag was sewn during the First World War of 1914-1918. The material was silk - natural or artificial (viscose). Symmetrical streaks were found across the entire surface of the flag's fabric, indicating that the flag had been folded for a long time under unfavorable conditions.

Experts from the Russian Military Historical Society also confirm the authenticity of the flag. The size of the panel is 134 centimeters by 216 centimeters, which corresponds to those established in the Russian Imperial Navy, as well as in the White Movement, for the stern flag of a ship of the 1st rank (140 centimeters by 210 centimeters) with possible tolerances.

A drawstring made of a strip of linen fabric (width - 3.2 centimeters) is sewn along the end edge of the flag, into which a cord is threaded with a loop sewn at one end. This suggests that this flag was used to fly on a ship's flagpole. It cannot be a banner flag (there are no traces of attachment to the pole), as well as a coastal fortress flag (Kaiser flags (guys) of a different design played this role).

The battleship "Emperor Alexander the Third" was laid down in Nikolaev in October 1911. In April 1914, it was launched, and entered service in June 1917, already renamed Volya.

The ship's displacement was about 24 thousand tons, speed - 22 knots (approximately 40 kilometers per hour). The battleship was armed with 12 305 mm and 20 130 mm guns. The thickness of the armor reached 300 millimeters. The crew number is 1,190 people, including 32 officers.

"Emperor Alexander the Third" was one of the few ships of the Russian Imperial Fleet in the Black Sea, whose fate could be called unique. Unlike the similar “Empress Maria” and “Empress Catherine the Great,” it did not die either from an internal explosion or from Russian torpedoes from destroyers during the famous “death of the squadron” in Novorossiysk Bay. The crew refused to destroy their ship on Lenin's orders. "Volya" returned to Sevastopol.

The ship also avoided the sad fate of a number of other battleships of the Black Sea Fleet - its vehicles were not blown up by the former allies of the Russian Empire, who were thus trying to avoid the ships falling into the hands of the Reds.

Renamed "General Alekseev", the battleship became the most powerful combat unit of the White Black Sea Fleet and the future Russian squadron in Bizeret. It is no coincidence that it was he, and not the formal flagship - the obsolete battleship "St. George the Victorious" - who was the last to lower the St. Andrew's flag.

On October 29, 1924, France (at that time it belonged to modern Tunisia and Bizerte) decided to recognize the USSR. The next day the flag on the former "Emperor Alexander III" was lowered. The last combat formation of the White Fleet ceased to exist.

The squadron's combat ships were supposed to be transferred to the USSR, but Moscow refused to recognize itself as the heir to the war debts of the Russian Empire. The ships rusted in Bizerte until the mid-1930s, when they gradually began to be scrapped. The turn of “General Kornilov” came in 1936...

The topic of continuity of generations has always been relevant. The battleship "Emperor Alexander the Third" was named in honor of its predecessor, the squadron battleship of the 2nd squadron of the Pacific Fleet, who died heroically in May 1905 in the Tsushima naval battle. None of the ship's crew, which was staffed by the elite Guards crew, escaped. At his post in the conning tower, the commander, captain 1st rank Nikolai Bukhvostov, a direct descendant of the first soldier of Peter the Great's amusing regiments, Sergei Bukhvostov, fell.

We should not forget that both the Black Sea battleship and its heroic predecessor were named in honor of the Russian Emperor Alexander III, famous for the unofficial title of “peacemaker” - during his reign the Russian Empire did not participate in wars and was in a state of peace. It was under him that Russia regained its fleet in the Black Sea, establishing itself as a great maritime power. It was Alexander the Third who authored the catchphrase that Russia has only two allies - its army and navy.

Nowadays, when Russia is once again strengthening not only in the Black Sea, but also in the vastness of the world’s oceans, when its strengthening begins to frighten the forces that intend to resolve issues of world politics without regard to anyone, these words of Alexander III acquire additional relevance.

NOTES

The topmast is a vertical spar that is a continuation of the mast.

Former Volunteer Fleet steamship. Taken away from Crimea in tow; returned to the Volunteer Fleet shortly after arriving in Istanbul.

Nikolay Manvelov — historian-publicist, author of the book “Customs and Traditions of the Russian Imperial Navy.”